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Corporate social responsibility has evolved as a business strategy, but the business worth 
of voluntary social conduct has not been well understood. The contradictory research 
findings mean that social performance is not maximized, which constrains economic 
growth and sustainable development. Grounded by stakeholder theory, this correlational 
study was aimed at examining the effect of social responsibility factors on the market-
based Fama-French cost of capital. Within a sample of 71 United States banks, the 
publicly available ethical ratings, financial data, and stock market data were analyzed 
using multiple regression models. Contrary to the positive effect of social conduct on 
financial performance common in the literature, this study revealed no significant effect 
of social factors on the accounting returns, and, consequently, the shareholders perceived 
the social activities as risky and therefore demanded higher returns. The study also 
showed that governance, diversity, and employee relation were positively related to 
accounting returns while product and community factors were negatively related to 
profits. The implied higher cost of raising equity finance following engagement in social 
activities is a lesson for corporate managers to exercise caution in their social conduct 
and carry the investors along. Such inclusive policy could help to minimize investor bias 
and moderate their consequential adverse reactions to well-intentioned corporate actions. 
This research contributes to positive social change by assisting the bank managers, 
directors, investors, regulators, and government in improving the discharge of their 
respective roles to ensure optimal allocation of resources to competing social activities in 
a manner that may maximize performance and improve the overall stakeholder wellbeing.  
 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance of Banks in the United States 
 
by 
Waidi Alani Gbadamosi 
 
MBA, The University of Manchester, 2014 
MSc, Enugu State University of Science and Technology, 2003 
BSc, Ogun State University, 1991 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 









First of all, this doctoral dissertation is dedicated to God Almighty for inspiring 
the commencement of the PhD degree program and also for enabling its successful 
completion. As the first PhD degree in Gbadamosi family, I dedicate this capstone 
dissertation to the entire Gbadamosi family of Abeokuta, Ogun State led by my father, 
Late Chief Raimi Gbadamosi, and my mother, Mrs. Silfat Gbadamosi, for empowering 
me to pursue my education to the highest level. The dissertation is also dedicated to my 
wife, Obiageri, who not only provided the support I needed to successfully complete this 
program, but also endured my prolonged absence from home most of the time in a bid to 
work on class assignments and write this dissertation. I equally dedicate this doctoral 
dissertation to my children Adetutu, Oluwafemi, Ayomidele, Abiodun, Oluwatobi, 





My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Mohammad Sharifzadeh of College of 
Management and Technology who chaired my dissertation committee and also doubled 
as the methodology expert. His tutelage in the course of this program has been insightful. 
Incidentally, Dr. Sharifzadeh was my first faculty mentor at the point of my 
commencement of this doctoral program in Spring 2010. Dr. Jeffery Prinster, my 
committee member and a content expert, is well appreciated for his guidance during the 
coursework as well as on this dissertation project has been invaluable. Dr. Prinster’s 
advice and words of encouragement are treasured and helpful. I am also indebted to Dr. 
David Cavazos, the URR member who provided all the support I needed to ensure that 
my research meets the quality standard of the university.  
I also appreciate the moral support and encouragement I received from my former 
staff in the Internal Audit Department of Keystone Bank Ltd, Lagos Nigeria, which kept 
me going during the coursework. These include Olukunle Akinola, Prince Akamadu, 
Aderemi Aborode, Tsola Unokesan, Asiegbu Ezeh, Augustine Ukachi, Olumide Adeyemi 
and others whose names space would not permit me to mention. Finally, the words of 
encouragement of my friends, Blessing Eguavoen, Perpetual Bolu, and Dr. Mohammed 
Sanni Abdulai, were helpful and are well appreciated, particularly while this research was 
being planned and conducted. I will forever remain grateful for everyone’s contributions 





Table of Contents 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ....................................................................................1 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
Background of the Study ...............................................................................................3 
Statement of the Problem ...............................................................................................9 
Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................................10 
Research Questions and Hypotheses ...........................................................................11 
Research Question 1 ............................................................................................. 11 
Research Question 2 ............................................................................................. 12 
Hypotheses ............................................................................................................ 12 
Theoretical Framework of the Study ...........................................................................18 
Nature of the Study ......................................................................................................21 
Definition of Terms......................................................................................................21 
Assumptions .................................................................................................................24 
Scope and Delimitations ..............................................................................................25 
Limitations ...................................................................................................................27 
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................28 
Summary and Transition ..............................................................................................28 
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................32 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................32 




Corporate Social Responsibility ..................................................................................33 
Evolution and Definition of CSR .......................................................................... 33 
Dimensions of CSR............................................................................................... 35 
Social Irresponsibility Dimension......................................................................... 36 
CSR Theoretical Frameworks ............................................................................... 37 
Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility .......................................................... 40 
CSR Measurement Methodology .......................................................................... 43 
KLD Ethical Rating Index .................................................................................... 47 
Current Trend in CSR Measurement .................................................................... 48 
Financial Measures of Business Performance .............................................................49 
Accounting Measures of Performance .................................................................. 49 
Market-based Measures of Business Performance ............................................... 50 
Information Asymmetry and Financial Performance Measures ........................... 53 
Current Trend in Operationalization of Financial Performance ........................... 53 
CSR Theories and Business Case ................................................................................55 
Neoclassical Economic Theory of CSR ................................................................ 55 
Stakeholder Theory of CSR .................................................................................. 56 
Institutional Theory of CSR .................................................................................. 58 
Resource-based View of CSR ............................................................................... 59 
Recent Empirical Findings on CSR-FP Link ...............................................................60 
Divergent CSR-FP Relationships ......................................................................... 62 




Geographical and Industrial Concentration of Studies ......................................... 68 
Divergent Control Variables ................................................................................. 69 
Study Analytic Tools ............................................................................................ 70 
Summary of Gaps in the Current Literature ................................................................71 
Identification of Gaps in Current Literature ......................................................... 71 
Plan to Fill the Identified Gaps in Literature ........................................................ 72 
Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................73 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................74 
The Philosophical Paradigm of the Study ....................................................................74 
Ontology and Epistemology of the Study ............................................................. 74 
Selected Guiding Philosophical Worldview of the Study..................................... 75 
Description of Research Design ...................................................................................76 
Statistical Design of the Study .............................................................................. 76 
Definition of the Variables of the Study ............................................................... 77 
Target Population .........................................................................................................84 
Sampling Method .........................................................................................................85 
Sampling Design and Sampling Frame................................................................. 85 
Sample Size, Statistical Errors, and Threats to Statistical Conclusion 
Validity ..................................................................................................... 86 
Instrumentation ............................................................................................................89 
Data Collection Procedures ..........................................................................................90 




Hypotheses Formulation ..............................................................................................92 
Hypothesis 1.......................................................................................................... 92 
Hypothesis 2.......................................................................................................... 93 
Data Analysis ...............................................................................................................93 
Models of the Study .............................................................................................. 94 
Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis .................................. 99 
Method of Entering Predictors into SPSS ........................................................... 102 
Interpreting the Output of the Multiple Regression Analysis ............................. 103 
Summary ....................................................................................................................104 
Chapter 4: Results ............................................................................................................105 
Introduction ................................................................................................................105 
Organization of Chapter 4 ................................................................................... 106 
Data Collection ..........................................................................................................107 
IRB Approval for Data Collection ...................................................................... 107 
Sources of Collected Data ................................................................................... 107 
US Financial Services Sector and MSCI Socially Rated Banks ......................... 108 
Selection of Sample ............................................................................................ 109 
MSCI Socially Rated Banks ............................................................................... 110 
Inclusion of Covariates in the Regression Models ............................................. 111 
Plan Implementation Challenges ...............................................................................113 
Determination of Fama-French Three Factor Model Cost of Capital ................. 114 




Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 1 ........................ 117 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 1 ................... 119 
Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 2 ........................ 120 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables in Hypotheses 1 and 2 ....... 121 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypothesis 2 .................... 122 
Data Analysis: Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions and Hypothesis Testing ........123 
Hypothesis 1: Individual CSR Factors and Accounting Returns ........................ 123 
Hypothesis 2: Individual CSR Factors and Cost of Capital ................................ 153 
Summary ....................................................................................................................169 
Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations ........................................172 
Summary of Findings .................................................................................................172 
Interpretation of Research Findings ...........................................................................176 
Overview of the Literature Relating to the Findings .......................................... 176 
Research Question 1: Effect of CSR Factors on Accounting Returns ................ 177 
Research Question 2: CSR Factors and Cost of Capital ..................................... 182 
Research Findings and the Theoretical Framework of the Study ....................... 187 
Stakeholder Theory: Interpretation of Findings on Research Question 1........... 188 
Stakeholder Theory: Interpretation of Findings on Research Question 2........... 189 
Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................190 
Recommendations for Action ....................................................................................194 
Recommendations for Shareholders ................................................................... 195 




Recommendations for Management ................................................................... 197 
Recommendations for Banking Industry Regulators .......................................... 199 
Recommendations for Public Policy ................................................................... 199 
Recommendations for Further Research ....................................................................200 
Implications for Social Change ..................................................................................201 
Positive Social Change for Decision Makers in the Banks ................................. 201 
Positive Social Change for Banking Regulators and Government ..................... 203 
Positive Social Change for the Academic Community....................................... 203 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................204 
References ........................................................................................................................206 
Appendix A: Analysis of the Recent Studies on Impact of CSR on FP ..........................223 
Appendix B: List of Sampled Banks ...............................................................................228 
Appendix C: Fama-French three-Factor Model Cost of Capital .....................................229 






List of Tables 
Table 1 Summary of Recent Empirical Studies Reviewed ............................................... 61 
Table 2 Summary of Control Variables in the Current Literature .................................... 70 
Table 3 Sectorial composition of banks with CSR Ratings ............................................ 108 
Table 4 Sectorial composition of Sample ....................................................................... 109 
Table 5 Univariate Properties of the Study Variable ...................................................... 112 
Table 6 Determination of Excess Market Returns for Systematic Risk ......................... 115 
Table 7 Calculation of size factor returns (SMB) ........................................................... 116 
Table 8 Calculation of value factor returns (HML) ........................................................ 116 
Table 9 Statistical Descriptives of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 1 .................... 117 
Table 10 Statistical Descriptives of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 1 ............. 120 
Table 11 Distribution of CSR Ratings Scores of the Sampled Banks ............................ 121 
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of the Estimated Cost of Capital ................................... 123 
Table 13 EBITDAMgn Regression Model: Model Summary ........................................ 126 
Table 14 Evaluating the ANOVA values of EBITDA Margin Model ........................... 128 
Table 15 Coefficients in the EBITDA Margin Model .................................................... 130 
Table 16 Correlation Coefficients in the EBITDA Margin Model ................................. 133 
Table 17 Determination of Effect Size in the EBITDAMgn Model ............................... 135 
Table 18 Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance ....................................................... 137 
Table 19 Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis ...................... 139 
Table 20 Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality ......................... 140 




Table 22 Evaluating the ANOVA values of MTB Model .............................................. 143 
Table 23 Coefficients in the MTB Model ....................................................................... 144 
Table 24 Correlation Coefficients of MTB Model ......................................................... 147 
Table 25 Determination of Effect Size in the MTB Model ............................................ 149 
Table 26 Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance ....................................................... 149 
Table 27 Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis ...................... 152 
Table 28 Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality ......................... 153 
Table 29 FF3FCOC Regression Model: Model Summary ............................................. 156 
Table 30 FF3FCOC Regression Model: ANOVA .......................................................... 156 
Table 31 Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with FF3FCOC .............. 157 
Table 32 Coefficients in the FF3FCOC Model............................................................... 160 
Table 33 Correlation Coefficients of FF3FCOC Model ................................................. 163 
Table 34 Determination of Effect Size in the MTB Model ............................................ 165 
Table 35 Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance ....................................................... 166 
Table 36 Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis ...................... 168 







List of Figures 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the study…………………………………... 20 
Figure 2. CSR framework ………………………………………………………. 39 
Figure 3: Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for EBITDAMgn OLS Model … 136 
Figure 4. Histogram of residuals for the EBITDAMgn OLS Model ……………. 137 
Figure 5. Normal P-P Plot of for the EBITDAMgn OLS Model ……………….. 138 
Figure 6. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for MTB OLS Regression Model... 150 
Figure 7. Histogram of the MTB OLS Model …………………………………... 151 
Figure 8. Normal P-P Plot of the MTB OLS Model …………………………… 152 
Figure 9. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED of FF3FCOC OLS Model ……….. 166 
Figure 10. Histogram of residuals for FF3FCOC’s OLS Model ………………... 167 










 century ushered in misfortune for investors, employees, consumers, and 
other sympathizers of business corporations. This followed the collapse of many 
corporate giants like Tyco, Enron, Adelphi, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Merrill 
Lynch, among others in the United States and Swissair, Metallgesellshaft, Parmalat, and 
Vivendi in Europe, due to managerial opportunism and large scale accounting fraud 
(Dinsmore, 2014). Similarly, the world economy is yet to recover fully from the ravaging 
effects of the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008. To a large extent the social 
consequences of these crises have reduced consumer confidence in business enterprises, 
thus creating reputational issue for organizations and limiting their competitiveness and 




 century to the 
turn of the 21
st
 century, businesses showed a lack of social responsibility and 
sustainability (Adeleke, 2014). They were portrayed as depleting natural resources, not 
mindful of the footprint of their activities on the earth’s capacity, polluting the 
environment and threatening the ozone layer (Stanley, 2011). These developments have 
created a desire for increased oversight of corporate activities and have also attracted 
public attention to the social conduct of business organizations (Idemudia, 2011). In 
response to the challenging business environment arising from these developments, 
business firms embarked on aggressive social responsibility activities and other strategies 
that are capable of improving their reputation and restoring stakeholder confidence 




a distorted marketing strategy (Sun & Cui, 2014). This creates a challenge for 
understanding the motive behind corporate social conducts.  
Recognizing the importance of sustainable business conduct, the European 
Commission (EC) formed the Europe 2020 strategy with a commitment to promote 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) by businesses in the region. In the Commission’s 
view, CSR is a key source of competitive advantage and has potential to induce 
innovation, capacity building, positive customer relationship, cost effectiveness, human 
resource management, and effective risk management (EC, 2011). The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) equally advocates for the observance 
of social and environmental standards by business corporations. OECD (2008) 
emphasized social responsibility as a central theme of good governance of enterprises, 
acknowledging the importance of ensuring the cooperation of all stakeholders. Social 
responsibility activities of individual corporations has been observed and documented in 
the literature (Carol, 1991). These firms showcase in their websites and annual reports 
their activities on and commitment to social responsibility (Adeleke, 2014). Regional and 
national bodies have sprung up to monitor social responsibility of enterprises. One of 
these is the Social Enterprise Report and Awards (SERA) that annually presents awards 
to firms with distinguished and exemplary corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Adeleke) practices. Firms regularly expend or invest money and other resources in CSR 
(Sun & Cui, 2014). As a way of integrating CSR in their corporate strategies, some firms 
now have a senior officer at the directorate level whose responsibility is to manage CSR 




to improve their fortune therefore deserves critical scrutiny, which was undertaken in this 
study.  
In this chapter, I explored the background of the study with a definitive statement 
of the problem and purpose of the study. The statements of the research questions and 
hypotheses followed this exploration. The conceptual framework guiding the study was 
presented, supported by the assumptions, scope, limitations and delimitations of the 
study. The significance of the study was offered with insights on how the study could 
lead to the creation of social change to specific segments of the society. The chapter was 
then concluded with the definition of certain terms that have contextual meanings in the 
study. 
Background of the Study 
Businesses seek to create wealth for their owners through product or service 
offerings that satisfy effective demand (Fomukong, 2014). Since the 1950s, scholarly 
efforts made to determine whether responsible business social conduct can significantly 
induce profit have yielded unclear results till date (Orlitzky, 2013). The intensity of CSR 
practices has been adequately captured in the empirical literature: growing evidence that 
socially responsible investments outperform others (Nofsinger & Varma, 2014); 
increasing consumer demand for green, organic products (Borgers & Pownall, 2014); 
business risk being affected by various dimensions of CSR (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, & 
M’Zali, 2013); and quality of financial reporting being dependent on the business CSR 
attitude (Grougiou, Leventis, Dedoulis, & Owusu-Ansah, 2014). However, in their recent 




business sustainability practices, including CSR activities, is currently waning. The 
observed subsidence is attributed to the twin factors of the obscure CSR-business value 
link and the perceived incompatibility of the traditional measures of business 
performance with socially responsible behavior (Orlitzky, 2013). It remains a challenge 
for a business community to identify, quantify, and unlock the business value of 
responsible social conduct, limiting effective allocation of corporate resources. 
Studies that have attempted to find out if CSR helps in creating value or whether 
it destroys business value can be categorized based on their outcomes – positive 
relationship, negative relationship, or no significant relationship (Fomukong, 2014). The 
studies in which positive relation between CSR and financial performance (FP) were 
found dominate the empirical literature (Chen & Wang, 2011; Kasim, 2012; Lee, Faff, & 
Langfield-Smith, 2009; Muise, 2009; Mustafa, Othman, & Perumal, 2012; Weshah, 
Dahiyat, Awwad, & Hajjat, 2012). A negative CSR-FP relationship was found by 
Becchetti & Ciciretti (2009), Lioui & Sharma (2012), Rahmawati & Dianita (2011), and 
Yang, Lin, and Chang (2010) while it was in only very few studies that no significant 
relation was found between CSR and FP (Chih, Chih, & Chen, 2010; Dinsmore, 2014; 
Linthicum, Reitenga, & Sanchez, 2010; Soana, 2011). The divergence of findings creates 
lacuna in the knowledge of the potential value of social conduct of business. 
The inconsistent findings on the issue can be explained by the divergent 
conceptual philosophies underlying the individual studies. First, CSR has been both 
narrowly and broadly conceived by researchers, reflecting the essentially contested nature 




Researchers have treated CSR in various ways: as the information disclosed to the 
stakeholders on the business social conduct (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; 
Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011; Sobhani, Amran, & Zainudden, 2012; Yang et al. 2010); as 
the perception of the various stakeholders of the business social conduct (Akanbi & 
Ofoegbu, 2012; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Chen & Wang, 2011; Christmann, 2000; 
Mustafa et al. 2012; Oke, 2011); as corporate reputation (Laan, Ees, & Witteloostuijn, 
2008; Linthicum et al. 2010; Maden, Arikan, Telci, & Kantur, 2012); as socially 
responsible investment and charitable donations (Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Nofsinger & 
Varma, 2014); and as independent multidimensional ethical rating of business (Baird, 
Geylani, & Roberts, 2012; Callan & Thomas, 2009; Choi, Kwak, & Choe, 2010; Makni, 
Francoeur, & Bellacance, 2009; Soana, 2011). While most researchers viewed CSR from 
the perspective of ethical rating indices provided by various independent bodies such as 
KLD and EIRIS, the CSR was also operationalized differently. A large number of studies 
treated the CSR ethical ratings as aggregated measures (Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & 
Mishra, 2011; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Linthicum et al. 2010; Soana, 2011; Torres, 
Bijmolt, Tribo, & Verhoef, 2012) while only a few examined the individual components 
of social conduct (Baird et al.; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Makni et al.). 
Second, financial performance was equally divergently treated by researchers, with scope 
covering the traditional accounting measures, market based measures, and cost of capital. 
The traditional accounting performance measures used included both absolute 
returns/earnings/assets together with their growth (Arnold & Valentine, 2013; Becchetti, 




earnings based ratios such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on 
investment (ROI), and earnings per share (EPS) (Callan & Thomas, 2009; Makni et al. 
2009; Yang at al. 2010). Other accounting measures found in the literature to address the 
problem are loan contract terms (Goss & Roberts, 2011), brand equity (Torres et al.), 
cost-to-income ratio (Soana, 2011), and absolute forecast error on EPS (Becchetti et al.). 
The FP was also viewed from market perspectives such as stock price values and stock 
price related ratios (Baird et al.; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Callan & Thomas, 2009; Choi 
et al.; Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Kang, Lee, & 
Huh, 2010; Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Soana, 2011). Cost of 
capital was scantly treated by researchers as a measure of financial performance 
(Campbell, Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2012; Ghoul et al.; Goss & Roberts, 2011). These 
variations partly explain the inconsistent research outcome.  
Apart from the divergent ways in which CSR and FP were treated by researchers, 
the empirical literature also suffers from some fundamental shortcomings which further 
contribute to the examination of CSR-financial performance relation. First, even though 
most studies claimed to utilize stakeholder theory, they examined multiple industries 
(Becchetti et al. 2013; Linthicum et al. 2010; Lioui & Sharma, 2012), multiple countries 
(Busch & Hoffmann; 2011; Chih et al. 2010; Wu & Shen, 2013), and both multiple 
industries and multiple countries (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hassan, & Kobeissi, 2012; Jo & 
Harjoto, 2011; Lee et al. 2009; Torres et al. 2012). Such studies ignored the fact that 
stakeholders’ attributes such as composition, perceptions, interests, preferences are 




et al. 2012; Soana, 2011) and are also dynamic with possibility of changing over time 
(Chen & Delmas, 2011). The few studies that examined banking industry did not control 
for unique banking risk like loan deposit ratio (LDR), on which Wu and Shen (2013) 
emphasized. Second, most prior studies paid little attention to specificity consistent with 
stakeholder theory, as many studies adopted aggregated/ omnibus CSR measures and 
failed to decompose the measures into various components (Callan & Thomas, 2009; 
Choi et al. 2010; Deng et al. 2013; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013). This led to 
the problem of likely imperfect correlation of the individual CSR components (Moura-
Leite, Padgett, & Galan, 2014; Scholtens, 2008) and inaccurate measures (Goss & 
Roberts, 2011). Such studies failed to recognize the heterogeneous nature of 
stakeholders’ objectives and expectations. Third, even though a handful of studies have 
examined whether CSR is priced by capital market (Becchetti et al.; Ghoul et al. 2011), 
the examination of the relationship between individual components of CSR and the 
business cost of capital as a measure of market-based financial performance was seldom 
examined. Fourth, a large number of studies on the subject are dated, which limits their 
relevance to current practice. Finally, a number of studies that utilized ordinary least 
squares did not attempt to test the time order preference by lagging the variables included 
in the regression models, and as a result such studies did not provide explanation of the 
causal influence between CSR and FP.  
Consequent upon the above limitations corporate managers and decision makers 
currently lack information that could guide them in the effective allocation of corporate 




and explains the recent skepticism expressed by most of the world business leaders who 
questioned the sustainability of their social strategies for business value creation (UN 
Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). According to these authors, the lack of knowledge 
of the business worth of CSR is beginning to dampen the motivation of business leaders. 
It is also capable of undermining the global, regional and national efforts being made by 
independent bodies to address social responsibility and irresponsibility issues in business 
(Adeleke, 2014). The limited knowledge of CSR-business value linkage calls for studies 
that address the deficiencies in the prior studies, with focus on areas that are currently 
underexamined. Such studies will improve the understanding of the CSR and its strategic 
value to the business community. It will also assist in improving risk management and 
decision making by business managers as well as their oversight providers. In addressing 
the CSR-business value linkage, a dominant issue relates to the definitional clarification 
of the CSR concept as well as the tendency to manipulate financial performance 
measures.  
Defining the CSR concept has been difficult, and this partly accounts for the 
divergence of its application in practice. Small and medium-sized firms adopt an informal 
process of CSR while large firms adopt a more formalized approach to managing their 
social conduct. EC (2011) provided an insight into what constitutes CSR by defining the 
concept as the responsibility of business firms to account for their footprints in the 
society. To effectively discharge this responsibility, the Commission averred that 




with their social partners (EC, 2011). By collaborating with their stakeholders, firms may 
be able to create shared values and mitigate the impact of their footprints. 
Although the financial performance suffers little or no definitional challenge, it is 
prone to manipulation by business managers and their collaborators (Jiao, 2010; Jensen, 
2010). This gives rise to such practices as window dressing of accounts, earnings 
management, and financial engineering all of which are fraudulent acts (Bona, 2012). 
The fact that financial reporting regulation and legislations made it mandatory to subject 
accounting numbers to independent review provides little respite for preventing corporate 
misdemeanor (Jensen, 2010). Studies that rely on the published accounting numbers have 
limited practical use, as the integrity of the numbers remains an issue to contend with 
(Soana, 2011). This explains why market-based financial performance measures are 
considered to be more reliable than the accounting-based measures (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 
2013). It is important that a study of CSR-FP linkage should complement the traditional 
accounting measures of performance with market-focused measures such as the market-
determined cost of financing. In this study, I examined the impact of the CSR on both the 
traditional accounting measures of performance and the market-determined cost of 
financing in the context of banking business. 
Statement of the Problem 
Two in three global CEO’s believe that business sector is not doing enough to 
address sustainability issues (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). Though 
businesses were pressured into improving their social performance (Montiel & Delgado-




destroys value (Orlitzky, 2013). The problem under study was that the business worth of 
voluntary social conduct has not been identified or understood. The specific problem 
addressed was the lack of knowledge about whether CSR could enhance business 
performance (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013).  
Due to methodological divergences (Gregory, Tharyan, & Whittaker, 2014), 6 
decades of research into the business value of social conduct produced inconclusive 
findings (Grougiou et al. 2014). This correlational study is focused on examining the 
effects of the CSR factors of the US banks on their accounting returns and cost of capital 
as a contribution to the ongoing efforts at bridging the inadequate knowledge. The 
potential improvement in managerial understanding could aid sustainable resource 
allocation and value optimization to stakeholders.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of my correlational study was to test the Freeman’s (1984) 
stakeholder theory by relating the CSR components to the financial performance 
measures for large banks in the United States. Guided by the rating methodology of 
MSCI KLD Research and Analytics, CSR components of interest were community, 
governance, diversity, product, and employee relations. Financial performance was 
defined generally as the traditional accounting as well as the market based measures, and 
the intervening variables comprising size, risk, growth, preceding year performance, and 
management preference were statistically controlled in the study. Archival data on the 
CSR ratings, the financial data, and the stock market data of the selected banks in the 




outcome of the study might help to improve the managerial understanding of how to 
optimally allocate scarce corporate resources to those social activities with potential to 
impact the bottom line. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In this study, I examined if the CSR components could predict the accounting 
performance and the market-determined cost of capital of banks in the United States. This 
two-part study reflects the bidimensional nature of the FP measures comprising the 
accounting measures and the market-focused measures. The goal of the study was to 
answer the two research questions and to test the associated hypotheses. These questions 
were necessitated partly by the empirical dominance of the aggregated CSR scores and 
the inadequate focus on the individual CSR components. Aggregating the CSR scores is 
at variance with the stakeholder theory and was inappropriate for this study. The theory is 
that the views of the stakeholders are varied as well as their needs, aspirations, and 
expectations. Compressing those needs in empirical studies is capable of inducing 
misleading conclusion about the stakeholder behavior. The prevalent practice of 
aggregating the CSR scores in the empirical literature partially explains the observed 
inconsistent and inconclusive findings of the prior studies. 
Research Question 1 
To what extent can the individual CSR components predict the bank accounting 
performance, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and management preference 




financial performance of firm are size, banking risk, growth, and prior financial 
performance as well as management preference factor in the form of capital expenditure 
(Chen & Wang, 2011). Controlling for these intervening variables is common in the 
literature (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). The answer to this question would complement the prior 
studies and provide more complete and more relevant knowledge of the social issue. 
Research Question 2 
  To what extent can the individual CSR components of banks help in predicting 
the banks’ cost of capital? The compelling need for this question was the observed gap in 
the literature regarding the limited emphasis on the market-based cost of capital as a 
measure of the business performance. Measuring business performance from the 
financing cost perspective not only addresses the concerns expressed by the prior 
researchers like Ghoul et al. (2011), Goss & Roberts (2011), and Hong & Kacperczyk 
(2009), it also broadens the knowledge of the CSR-business value link. 
Hypotheses  
In order to study the two research questions proposed, I tested two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The aim of the Hypothesis 1 was to examine the effect of 
the individual CSR components on the accounting performance of banks while the 
Hypothesis 2 was aimed at examining the impact of the individual CSR components on 




Hypotheses 1: CSR on accounting performance. The null hypothesis and the 
alternative hypothesis on the extent of predictability of accounting financial performance 
by the individual CSR factors were specified as:  
H01: The individual CSR components of banks cannot predict the banks’ 
accounting performance after controlling for the effects of firm unique and 
management preference factors. 
Ha1: The individual CSR components of banks can predict the banks’ accounting 
performance after controlling for the effects of firm unique and management 
preference factors. 
 CSR has been operationalized in diverse ways in the literature, but the trend of the 
current research suggests a bias toward the multidimensional ratings. Although many 
prior studies have used the composite multidimensional rating scores of the CSR, such an 
approach did not consider the possibility of correlation between the individual CSR 
components. It was then expedient to adopt the individual CSR components in this study. 
Many rating agencies do publish the qualitative scores on social responsibility of 
different organizations including banks, one of which is Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini 
Research and Analytics (KLD). As the most widely used in the current literature, KLD 
measures each firm’s reputation using seven qualitative indicators: community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relation, product, human right, and environment (Laan 
et al. 2008). Though KLD provides rating on each of the 13 indicators of social 
responsibility for over 3,000 large American companies, this study is focused on testing 




because KLD ratings were not available for the other factors on banks. The rating scores 
for each of these components were included in the regression model to test the above 
hypotheses. KLD provides the largest dataset for the CSR studies and has been found to 
have passed several tests of construct validity (Laan et al.), though it is also considered to 
be imperfect (Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010). The accounting performance 
measures commonly used in the empirical literature revolve around ROA, ROE, and 
ROI. However in view of the specialized setting of the study being banking, market-to-
book (MTB) ratio and earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
margin were tested in the multivariate regression models designed for the hypotheses. 
The relevant intervening variables were controlled in the model. The financial ratios and 
other relevant information about each bank were obtained from Bankscope database.     
Multivariate regression analysis was employed to test both hypotheses, using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model. For this purpose, the KLD multidimensional CSR 
ratings of each bank on each component represented the independent variables while each 
measure of accounting returns (MTB and EBITDA margin) represented the dependent 
variable. KLD database provided the dimensional CSR measures for each CSR 
component.    
The control variables comprised the firm unique factors of size, banking risk, 
growth, and past FP and management preference factor of capital expenditure. In terms of 
operationalization, the size of the bank was taken as the volume of the total assets, the 
banking risk was operationalized as the leverage ratio, the growth was the asset growth, 




management preference was taken as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. 
Natural logarithms of total assets value was taken in order to standardize the values. I 





Subscripts = Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j 
FPit  = Financial performance for each US bank, measured as EBITDA  
   margin and MTB ratio separately 
β0   = Model intercept 
β1  = Slope of rating score of each CSR component 
Β2...5  = Slope of each control variable 
CSRjit-1 = Lagged rating score of CSR component j 
FPit-1  = Preceding year’s FP (ROA or Net-Earnings) 
TotAssett = Total Assets measuring the size of each bank  
Levt  = Leverage ratio   
AssetGrowth = Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total    
   assets during the preceding period. 
CapexRt =  Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure management  
   preference. 
ɛit  = Statistical disturbance term 
FPit = β0 + β1CSRjit-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3Levt + β4AssetGrowth + 





Hypotheses 2 – CSR on the cost of capital. The focus of this hypothesis was to 
address the second research question through the use of multifactor regression model, 
testing the impact of each CSR component separately on the cost of capital. The cost of 
equity capital used was based on FF3F model that incorporated three risk factors 
comprising market risk premium (MRP), size (SMB) and growth (HML). The null 
hypothesis (H02) and alternative hypothesis (Ha2) are specified as: 
H02: Individual CSR components of banks cannot predict their cost of capital. 
Ha2: Individual CSR components of banks can predict their cost of capital. 
In testing the Hypothesis 2, the individual scores of CSR factors of each bank obtained 
from the KLD database represented the independent variable, while the cost of capital of 
each bank for each period was the dependent variable. The cost of capital used followed 
the Fama and French (1993) model in which the authors attempted to correct the 
anomalies that plagued the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) model by 
introducing two additional risk factors for size (SMB) and growth (HMB) in addition to 
the market risk premium (MRP) which CAPM fully addresses (Eraslan, 2013).  
The objective of this hypothesis was to assess the effect of the individual CSR 
indicators on the cost of capital of a bank as an FP measure. I considered the use of FF3F 
formulation in the model to be superior because Fama and French (1993) introduced 
additional risk factors that significantly addressed the anomalies that marred the earlier 
traditional, single-factor CAPM model. Fama and French (1996) claimed that the 
anomalies in the traditional CAPM model disappeared in their three factor model. This 




based on the cost of capital with respect to the individual CSR indicators, and is a 
significant contribution to the empirical literature. The relation was specified in the 




Subscripts  = Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j 
FF3FCOCit     = Cost of capital calculated using Fama-French three-factor  
   approach 
β0   = Model intercept 
β1j   = Slope of CSR component j 
CSRijt-1  = Lagged rating score of CSR component j 
MTB   = Current period’s MTB ratio  
EBITDAMGN = EBITDA margin 
LogTotAsset  = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage  = Ratio of debt to total asset, measuring leverage ratio.   
AssetGrth  = Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total   
    assets during the preceding period. 
CapexR  =  Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure  
    management preference. 
Log_ME  = Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
FF3FCOCit   =   β0 + β1jCSRijt-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3LEVERAGE +        
                 β4ASSETGRTH + β5EBITDAMgn + β6MTB + β7CAPEXR  





ɛit   = Stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and  
    insignificant, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
Determination of cost of capital. Cost of capital was determined based on FF3F 
model, using Equation 3 formulation. 
where, 
 
E(Ri)  = Expected rate of return on stock portfolio. 
Rf   = Risk-free rate of return. 
E(Rm-Rf) = Expected excess return on the market index 
bi, Si, hi = Slopes of the variables or beta values. 
E(SMB) = Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a  
   portfolio of small stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of big  
   stocks. 
E(HML) = Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a  
   portfolio of High Book-to-Market stocks and the excess return on a 
   portfolio of Low Book-to-Market stocks. 
Theoretical Framework of the Study 
This study was guided by the Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory that states that 
in the long term, it is beneficial for a business firm to be in harmony with its 
stakeholders. The empirical studies in which positive relationships between the CSR and 
the FP were found presuppose that seeking to satisfy the stakeholders rather than a 
narrow focus on the stockholders is profitable and leads to greater wealth to firm owners. 




This is consistent with Jiao’s (2010) contention that commitment to CSR is an investment 
in a firm’s intangible assets and enhances its competitiveness. The prevalent euphoria of 
the CSR activities of enterprises rests on the positive stakeholder view to create shared 
value. This requires firms to invest in innovation and voluntarily engage in other 
activities that improve human and environmental condition. The opposite view is that the 
stakeholder theory may encourage the business managers to indulge in extracting private 
benefits at the expense of the stockholders (Jensen, 2010). Jiao (2010) attributed the 
empirical studies that found negative CSR-financial performance relation to such 
dimension.  
Relying on the positive view of the stakeholder theory, I examined the extent to 
which the individual CSR components of the banks could predict the banks’ FP 
particularly when the confounding effects of key variables were controlled. In the study, 
the FP was separately treated both from the accounting perspective and also from the cost 
of capital perspective. The concept map shown in Figure 1 relating the individual CSR 
components to the respective corporate FP measures was adopted to guide the study. The 
chosen variables of the CSR, the FP, and the mediators were based on the reviewed 





Figure 1: CSR-CFP conceptual model 
In this study, I adopted five of the seven KLD CSR qualitative measures 
comprising community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product. Social 
ratings were not available for environmental and human right factors as well as those 
factors under the exclusionary screens. Two dimensions of the financial performance 
were explored: the accounting returns comprising EBITDA margin and MTB ratio and 
the market-based cost of capital. Fama-French cost of capital represents the required rate 
of return on a security based on the excess returns valued by the company’s beta (a 
measure of the company’s systematic risk), the premium relating to the company’s size, 
and the premium relating to the company’s growth factor. As intervening variables, the 
firm size was operationalized as the volume of total assets, the banking risk was 
operationalized as the leverage ratio, the growth was constructed as the asset growth, the 
preceding year financial performance was the volume of the prior year financial 
performance (either the EBITDA margin or the MTB as the case may be), and the 




Nature of the Study  
In this correlational study, I tested the stakeholder theory that relates the CSR of 
business firms to the financial performance. Generally, the potential understanding from 
a quantitative research of this nature could be generalized to the larger settings. The 
independent variables comprised the CSR ratings published by KLD Research Analytics 
Inc. (2015): community, governance, diversity, employee relations, and product. The 
dependent variables were that financial performance measures, comprising the 
accounting returns (EBITDA margin and MTB) and the Fama-French cost of capital. In 
the accounting returns model, I used the firm size, banking risk, growth, preceding-year 
financial performance, market capitalization, and managerial discretion in the form of 
capital expenditure as the control variables. 
For the 71 banks selected for the study, I collected financial data from the 
Bankscope database and the stock market returns from the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
Because the study data were quantitative in nature, I analyzed the data through multiple 
regression models using SPSS. 
Definition of Terms 
Agency theory: The conception that managers and directors of business firm are subject 
to conflict of interest, which may be resolved or minimized by aligning their interests 




Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): The model of determining the required rate of 
return of a security that is based on the consideration of the excess returns and the 
systematic risk of the asset (Fama & French, 1993). 
Corporate governance: The means by which business firms are operated, managed and 
controlled for the benefit of the stakeholders (OECD, 2008). 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The behavior of a business firm that aligns with 
the interests of the diverse stakeholders and integrates these interests in the operations, 
products and practices of the firm (Carol, 1979).  
Cost of equity:  The minimum rate of return required by the equity shareholders which is 
determined with reference to the market price of the stock (Fama & French, 1993). 
Earnings management: The unethical practice by management to manipulate financial 
performance and financial position of an enterprise (Rahmawati & Dianita, 2014). 
Environmental conduct: Behavior of business firms to treat environment as a resource in 
a sustainable manner (Idemudia, 2011). 
Environmental footprint: The adverse effects of businesses operations on the society, 
which corporations have social obligations to reduce to the safe level (Idemudia, 2011). 
Ethical conduct: Obligations of business firms to operate with fairness and justice while 
dealing with the stakeholders (Carol, 1979). 
External stakeholders:  A group of people or organizations that influence or are 
influenced by the firm such as customers, suppliers, government, trade unions, and 




Fama-French three factor (FF3F) model: The variant of capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) that includes additional two factors of size and growth to the market risk 
premium considered in the single factor model. The FF3F addresses the anomalies of the 
single factor model (Fama & French, 1993).  
Financial reporting: The rules governing the maintenance of records in a business and 
preparing the required financial statements (Bona, 2012). 
Greenwashing: Activities of business firms to improve its public image through strategic 
communication process (Sun & Cui, 2014). 
Internal stakeholders: A group of people who work directly within the business firm such 
as employees, management, and shareholders (Orlitzky, 2013). 
Management discretion/preference: Spending decisions taken by firms that are purely 
discretionary in nature (Soana, 2011). 
Managerial opportunism: The tendency for corporate managers to act unethically by 
using corporate resources to advance their own pecuniary and other interests at the 
expense of the shareholders (Jensen, 2010). 
Ozone layer: atmospheric condition of the earth which becomes threatened by the 
environmental footprint of business operations (Idemudia, 2011). 
Risk management: The practice of identifying the business risks, analyzing the risks to 
understand them, assessing them for the purpose of prioritizing how to treat them, dealing 
with them through some strategic actions, and monitoring them to ensure that they are 




Social conduct: Concerns of business firms for the working conditions of employees and 
the living conditions of other stakeholders (Carol, 1979).  
Social responsibility: The role of business firms to support and improve the society while 
pursuing legitimate business interests (Carol, 1979). 
Socially responsible investment: The expenditure of business firms for the purpose of 
improving the relationship with the stakeholders (Nofsinger & Varma, 2014). 
Stakeholders: Those that the operation of the business firm has impact upon and those 
that can influence the behavior of the firm (Freeman, 1984). 
Stakeholder theory: Stakeholder theory states that in the long run it is beneficial for 
business firms to keep the stakeholders happy with the firm (Freeman, 1984). 
Sustainability: The running of affairs of business organizations in a beneficial way to the 
society in future (UN Global Compact and Accenture, 2013). 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC): The overall cost of capital determined as the 
weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. It is used as an opportunity 
cost of capital in the firm (Hajiha & Sarfaraz (2013). 
Assumptions  
A number of assumptions were made in this study. First, it was assumed that the 
stakeholder theory used for this study was appropriate even though the study was focused 
on only banking industry. This implied that an attempt to generalize the results of the 
study beyond the banking industry needs to be treated with caution. The second 
assumption was that the five KLD CSR measures adopted as the predictors adequately 




that the relationship between the CSR and the FP is clear and logical in order to permit 
the generation of the hypotheses of the study. The next assumption was that the study of 
the CSR in the financial sector was relevant to economic and social development such 
that the observed impact of the CSR on the FP of banks should be real and nonspurious. 
The fifth assumption was that the hypothesized banks, being the listed banks on the KLD 
database, were representative of all the large banks in the United States. Finally, I made 
the assumption that the secondary data used in this study– the social ratings of sampled 
banks, the financial data of the banks, and the stock performance data of the banks– were 
complete and accurate. 
Scope and Delimitations  
The focus of this study was on examining the effect of the CSR on the FP of the 
banks in the United States. CSR variable was viewed as the multidimensional, ethical 
ratings at individual component level. The use of multidimensional, ethical ratings was 
one of the several ways of measuring CSR. An alternative was to view CSR from the 
perceptions of the stakeholders using primary data sources including questionnaires or in-
depth interviews, or as a disclosure of information relating to social conduct, or as a 
unidimensional social measure such as corporate reputation, environmental footprint, 
social investment or charitable expenditure. Although several ethical rating agencies exist 
that measure CSR in different ways, in this study I adopted the ratings provided by KLD  
because of its popularity among the researchers. Unlike the common approach of 




aggregating the ratings. Instead, I examined the effect of each of CSR component on the 
financial performance measures of each bank.  
In this study, I viewed the FP as the accounting returns of EBITDA margin and 
MTB as well as the market-based cost of capital. It is recognized that many intervening 
variables could confound the relationship between the variables; in this study I limited 
such factors to only firm size, banking risk, growth, prior year’s financial performance, 
market capitalization, and management preference under accounting returns, with the 
addition of the EBITDA margin and MTD for cost of captial model. Each of these factors 
is capable of being treated in diverse ways, but I treated the firm size as the asset volume, 
the banking risk as the leverage ratio, the growth as the relative growth of the total asset, 
the prior year’s FP as the ratio of the current year FP measure (EBITDA margin and 
MTB as the case may be) to their prior year levels, and the management preference as the 
ratio of capital expenditure to total asset. 
I selected a sample of 71 banks that are available on the KLD database and that 
were also listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ. This limited sample size was determined by 
the simultaneous availability of social, financial, and stock market data. The secondary 
data used in the study comprised the proprietary ethical ratings data and the published 
financial data of banks in the United States obtained from the Bankscope Database, both 
of which are publicly availabe. The stock market data used for computation of cost of 
capital were obtained from Yahoo! Finance database. The ethical, financial and stock 
market data used were limited to a period of 5 years. Secondary data is commonly used in 




Multiple regression analysis was employed to analyze the data in order to determine the 
correlation among the variables as well as assess their predictability. The chosen data 
analysis strategy was based on its popularity in the empirical literature. Finally, an alpha 
level of .05 and a beta level of .8 was set to minimize the statistical errors in the study 
and permit a meaningful generalizability of the findings to the entire banking industry as 
well as to other settings. 
Limitations 
Many factors may limit the usefulness of the findings of this study. First, the 
findings of the study may not be generalizable beyond the US banking industry. 
Extending the results to other industries in the United States or outside the geographical 
context of the study may render such generalization inaccurate. Second, the limited 
variables of this study implied that some important variables may have been omitted from 
the regression models which, if included in the models, could potentially alter the 
findings of the study. Third, the 5 year data used might not be adequate to permit reliable 
generalization. Fourth, the use of secondary data that was not constituted a limitation to 
the usefulness of this study, because such data were generated for a different purpose. 
Fifth, the accuracy of the secondary data might not be guaranteed. Potential errors and 
inaccuracies in the data at the measurement, compilation, or publication level would 
render the findings of the study inaccurate. Sixth, the study also suffered from availability 
bias, as some banks were dropped from the selection list because they had incomplete 
data. Missing or incomplete data is capable of weakening the potential of multiple 




violated leading to structural or model errors. Nevertheless, these limitations provide an 
opportunity for further studies to build on the outcome of this research. 
Significance of the Study 
The focus on the individual CSR components made this study to be unique by 
filling a gap in knowledge through the identification of the nature and significance of the 
effect which each component has on the firm’s bottom line. Guided by this knowledge, 
corporate managers might be able to discriminate among the different CSR activities and 
allocate more resources to those that have significant positive relationship with the FP 
and less to others. Another unique feature of this study was its focus on the rarely 
examined market revealed financing cost as a measure of financial performance. Apart 
from complementing the prior studies, the study could provide a more complete 
understanding of how the different social factors influence the finance cost. Bank policy 
makers require such understanding to be able to take effective investment decisions 
(Ghoul et al. 2011). The improved understanding of the CSR-FP relationship might fill 
the knowledge gap in the literature, aid optimal resource allocations by business 
managers, and thus create positive social change. 
Summary and Transition 
In this chapter, I set the background for the study in the context of the US banking 
sector. The research problem that informed the study was identified within the current 
empirical literature, with a clear description of the deficiencies of prior studies that 




decision makers in banks to guide them in their resource allocation responsibilities. The 
purpose of the study was stated and clarified; the variables of the study were explained, 
and the two research questions and hypotheses that guided the inquiry were stated, 
explained and justified. Underpinned by the positive view of the stakeholder theory, a 
conceptual framework to guide the study was presented, showing how the individual 
CSR components were related to each of the financial performance measures. I equally 
identified, explained, and justified the intervening variables believed to mediate the 
results of the interaction between the CSR components and the financial performance. 
The study rested on a number of important assumptions which I identified and explained. 
I also explained the scope within which the study was conceptualized and the 
delimitations set to ensure a controlled inquiry. The significance of the study was 
explained in terms of the potential positive social change that the study could create. I 
closed the chapter with the identification of the factors, situations and circumstances that 
might limit the generalization of the findings and conclusions to other settings, with the 
explanation that these limitations might be explored in further studies.  
In the chapter 2, I conducted the review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on CSR-FP relation, to set the context of the study. The literature review was 
thematically structured, identifying the key issues in the literature, evaluating the 
evidence supporting the issues, assessing the significance of this evidence, and taking a 
position for the implication for the current study. This approach was to ensure that the 
current study was twined within the confines of the current literature. While analyzing the 




within the last 5 years in line with the guiding principles of the doctoral studies in 
Walden University. I commenced the literature review with a brief introduction and an 
explanation of how the resources used for the reviewed were acquired. I then proceeded 
to explain the key topics covered including CSR, financial measures of business 
performance, CSR theories and business case, and the recent empirical findings on the 
CSR-FP link. Under each of these topics, I identified the subthemes and used the 
analytical approach to evaluate them and provide a justification for their relevance to the 
current study. I closed the literature review chapter by summarizing the gaps identified 
during the literature analysis, indicating how these gaps were addressed in the current 
study.  
In the chapter 3, the methodology for conducting the study was explained, and the 
details of the chosen design were provided together with the theoretical and empirical 
justifications. I began the chapter by examining the chosen philosophical paradigm of the 
study including its ontology and epistemology. I then reviewed the design of the research 
and defined the dependent, independent and control variables of the study. The 
characteristics of the target population were identified, followed by the description of the 
sampling method and the sampling frame that guided how the sampling items were 
selected. I explained and justified the instrumentation, data collection procedures, and 
data analysis method within the context of the literature reviewed. I also provided the 
details of the two hypotheses that guided the inquiry and provided a justification for their 




providing an insight on how the output of the data analysis should be interpreted based on 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction  
The current literature on the business value of social conduct is inconclusive and 
controversial, as researchers found divergent effects of social performance on the 
business financial performance. In this study, I sought to examine the effects of the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the business financial performance (FP) 
measures proxied by the cost of capital. In this chapter, I reviewed the theoretical and 
empirical literature relevant to this study. In the first section, the review of the concepts 
of CSR and FP was undertaken as well as the assessment of how they have been viewed 
by theorists and empirical researchers. The linkage between the CSR and FP and how this 
link has been examined by researchers were reviewed in the second section. The focus of 
the third section was on the operationalization of the independent variables (CSR and its 
components), dependent variables (both accounting and market derivatives) and control 
variables that have been identified in the literature to influence the CSR-FP relation. The 
main issues from the literature review were then summarized in the final section, closing 
with the identified gaps that needed to be addressed as well as the plan that could help to 
address them. 
Literature Search Strategy  
This literature review was based on various sources including Academic Search 
Primer and Business Search Primer or EBSCO, ProQuest Dissertations, and Walden 




years . The search strategy was principally based on the advanced search options using 
Thoreau Multiple Databases with Boolean operation on such subjects as corporate social 
responsibility, stakeholder theory, CSR, corporate financial performance, social 
performance, financial performance, social market performance, sustainability, and 
corporate ethics. I also utilized the edited resources that were relevant to the theoretical 
and empirical development of the CSR and FP constructs. 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
Evolution and Definition of CSR  
Involvement of business firms in societal development activities beyond the 
pursuit of profit making to accelerate shareholders’ wealth maximization has been 
gaining momentum in business and in academics. Although businesses were found to 
have engaged in some form of social activities during the 19
th
 century era of factory 
systems the formal writings on and the developments of the CSR concept date back to 
1950s (Maden et al. 2012). But understanding the nature of the impact that the CSR has 
on the business financial performance has recently elicited increasing academic and 
business interests with the escalating demand for businesses to be more responsible to the 
stakeholders other than the shareholders and strive to meet their multifarious needs 
(Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). The CSR topic is now a common feature of corporate 
websites; corporations now designate a senior management member to anchor the CSR 
issues, while most reputable business schools now not only engage CSR subject matter 
professors, they also integrate CSR ideals into the business management curricular 




integrated the CSR ideals into their business models and operating structures, as a 
strategy to maximize profit through self-interest (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Common 
evolutionary trends that support increasing acceptance and growth of CSR include the 
increasing affluence of the global societies as well as the increasing competition and 
globalization (Surroca, Tribo, & Zahra, 2013), the need to redress the image crisis 
(Avram & Avalsilcai, 2014), advances in communication technology that aid the global 
broadcasting of irresponsible corporate acts (Keffas & Olulu-Briggs, 2011; Wang, Lu, 
Kweh, & Lai, 2014), and the increasing concern for environmental safety and ecological 
sustainability (Idemudia, 2011). Despite this euphoria of social interests by business 
firms, there is no universally accepted definition of the CSR yet. 
 The CSR has been conceptualized in diverse ways and researchers are yet to agree 
on a common definition of the construct. It is regarded as essentially contested concept, 
with meanings varying with people and with contexts (Saeidi et al. 2014). The emergent 
state of the construct is evidenced by lack of cohesion, definitional consensus and 
theoretical maturity that dominate the literature. A universal definition is fundamentally 
inevitable to the understanding, growth and wide acceptance of the concept. A common 
theme of the CSR that has emerged in literature relates to how to create value to the 
stakeholders rather than a narrow focus on the stockholders, the corporations’ legal 
owners (Peloza & Shang, 2011). An off-shoot of this theme is the popular definition of 
CSR as a set of context-specific corporate actions and policies that integrate the 
stakeholders’ expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, social and 




lacuna that presently characterizes the CSR literature, it was accepted for this study that 
CSR is a voluntary business firm action directed toward improving the economic, social, 
and ecological or environmental conditions of the society including the future generations 
(Okoye, 2009). The lack of definitional consensus on CSR can be attributed to the 
divergence of the perspectives that are associated with the construct. 
Dimensions of CSR  
Several dimensions of the CSR have received adequate research attention. The 
early conceptualization of CSR was the philanthropic perspective whereby business firms 
make charitable donations or contributions to the society (Caroll, 1991). The 
organizations that make such corporate contributions including banks do amplify such 
acts of generosity in their published information to draw public attention to them so as to 
garner support and legitimacy (Wu & Shen, 2013), although the sincerity of the 
benevolence act may be questioned by the profit-centeredness inherent in the nature of 
business (Jensen, 2010). Environmental issues also feature prominently in the CSR 
thought. The CSR concept overlaps with the environmental responsibility including the 
human and the natural environment that are often neglected in the CSR discourse 
(Idemudia, 2011). The concept has also been viewed as a managerial process (Akanbi & 
Ofoegbu, 2012), as exemplified by the creation of executive offices or designates for 
CSR responsibilities parallel to the other corporate responsibilities. In this regard, the 
CSR is taken as a corporate strategy, aimed at assisting organizations to achieve its goals 
through the application of the traditional management functions like planning, 




the business (Saeidi et al, 2014). Mustafa et al. (2012) contended that CSR has become a 
core business strategy aimed at contributing to the bottom line. Thus social responsibility 
considerations should therefore be seen not as a burden, but as a tool that may assist to 
innovate and gain competitive edge. On the contrary, it was recently observed that CEOs 
only used CSR investment as a tool that enables them gain some personal advantage like 
empire building and power, after which they reduce their investment in CSR (Jiraporn & 
Chintrakarn, 2013), which is in agreement with the school of thought that opportunistic 
managers may exploit the CSR for their private benefits (Jensen, 2010). From the human 
rights and labor perspective, CSR was viewed as a contribution to social welfare (Maden 
et al. 2012), the essence being to motivate employees in the work environment and 
enhance corporate reputation. The enumerated diversity of the CSR dimensions partly 
explains the inconsistent research outcome on the CSR-FP relation. 
Social Irresponsibility Dimension  
  Corporate social irresponsibility is another dimension of the CSR that is currently 
gaining momentum among researchers. It arises from the perceived failure of business to 
act in accordance with societal expectations. Following the observation of McWilliams, 
Siegel and Wright (2006) that corporate irresponsibility has almost been ignored in the 
CSR literature, Herzig and Moon (2013) and Lange and Washburn (2012) examined the 
irresponsible conduct of corporations. The irresponsible conduct arises when a corporate 
decision is not Pareto-optimal (Arnold & Valentin, 2013). The concept centers around the 
commonly observed despicable corporate acts including fraud, fraudulent financial 




other stakeholders like customers, employees and the general public at risk, and polluting 
the environment (Herzig & Moon). Such corporate acts of irresponsibility precipitated the 
collapse of many corporate giants in the 2000’s such as Parmalat, Enron, and WorldCom 
(Arnold & Valentin, 2013). The global meltdown of the 2007-2008 was also attributed to 
the irresponsibility of the financial sector (Herzig & Moon). Nevertheless, the empirical 
study of the corporate irresponsible acts is marred largely by the perceptive and 
subjective assessment of undesirability by the observer (Lange & Washburn, 2012). The 
observer’s reactive subjectivity makes the objective analysis of corporate social 
irresponsibility a mirage. The corporate social irresponsibility hypothesis is therefore 
aimed at providing more complete understanding of the CSR concept.  
CSR Theoretical Frameworks  
A number of theoretical frameworks have been proposed by researchers to model 
the CSR idea. Using the social contract theory signifying the societal license implicitly 
granted to businesses to operate, Committee for Economic Development (CED) (1971) 
developed a CSR framework of three concentric circles: the inner circle representing the 
strict economic responsibility of the business to the society through the provision of 
goods or services profitably and the provision of employment; the intermediate circle 
representing the obligation to respect the societal value system; and the outer circle 
depicting the expectation for active involvement in improving the environment. Even 
though its emphasis is on the involvement of businesses in the provision of social/public 
goods beyond the narrow economic focus, the framework provides no idea of how the 




Caroll (1991) expanded the CED framework by developing a more 
comprehensive three dimensional CSR framework, covering the nature of corporate 
responsibilities, the topical social issues to which the responsibilities are tied, and the 
philosophy of responsiveness. The corporate responsibility dimension was modelled as a 
pyramid of four key responsibilities that are based on the societal expectations from the 
business firms (Carol, 1979). Arranged in their order of emphasis, these are economic 
responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and philanthropic or 
discretionary responsibilities (Carol, 1979). The economic responsibility, as the base of 
the pyramid, attracts the greatest emphasis, as shown in the Figure 2. The economic 
responsibility of business firm is the societal expectation that the business firm should 
produce the needed goods and services and sell them profitably, as well as employ people 
in the production process (Carol, 1979). According to Caroll, the economic responsibility 
is so fundamental that the other responsibilities rest on its assumption. A corollary to this 
requirement is that if the business fails in its economic responsibilities, it faces a threat of 
going out of business and losing its rights to exist under the terms of the social contract 
theory. The legal responsibilities relate to the societal expectation that, in producing the 
needed goods and services, business firms must perform their expected roles within the 
confines of the extant laws, regulations, norms and customs leading to orderliness in the 
society (Caroll, 1991). Failure to abide by the guiding rules increases the risk of being 
penalized which may include withdrawal of the implicit social contract certificate (Caroll, 
1991). The author posited that every society also expects business firms to act ethically 




influenced largely by internal decision structure and a set of organizational beliefs, values 
and culture (Lange & Washburn, 2012). This connotes that these artificial persons are 
also capable of assuming and discharging moral responsibility. So, the society expects 
business corporations to act ethically while discharging their other obligations. The 
philanthropic responsibilities are voluntary activities that the society desires. Such 
gestures are in the form of corporate donations, charitable gifts or community 
involvement in purely corporate activities (Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Nofsinger & 
Varma, 2014). The society rewards the business firms for such philanthropic gestures in 
the form of loyalty to the firm and social acceptance of its products or services (Arnold & 
Valentin, 2013). However, Friedman (1970) warned that when firms indulge in 
philanthropic activities in anticipation of obtaining these rewards such activities do not 
constitute a CSR. This emphasizes the voluntary and nonpremeditated nature of the CSR 
concept. 
 
Figure 2: CSR framework: Theoretical framework showing the four-part CSR model 




Carroll (1979) provided further insight into how the corporate responsibilities 
described in the pyramid can be discharged. Carroll contended that both the social issues 
dimension and the corporate response dimension are largely context-dependent: the social 
issues are dynamic and are in a state of flux, attracting varying degrees of interest or 
concern to each firm or industry, while the responsiveness approach also comes in 
varying degrees ranging from doing nothing to doing much depending on the managerial 
decisions in the particular firm at a particular time period. This exposition is a 
contributing factor as to why the CSR remains an essentially contested concept that is 
largely affected by industry conditions and managerial disposition. 
Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility  
 Consistent with the comprehensive Carol’s (1979) CSR framework, business 
firms respond to their social responsibilities in varying degrees of intensity, ranging from 
reactive, defensive posture to proactive, leading stance, depending on their motive at the 
particular time. It implies that a number of idiosyncratic and environmental factors drive 
CSR. Banks, for instance, are largely motivated to pursue CSR because of the strategic 
value of the social conduct to their business (Wu & Shen, 2013). The authors posited that 
consumers and investors are the predominant drivers of CSR in the banking industry.  
Wood (2010) contended that businesses should be concerned with consumerism 
amongst other social issues. Consumerism is the idea that consumers tend to reward the 
ethically perceived firms by paying higher prices for their products while they punish the 




protests (Parsa, Lord, Putrevu & Kreeger, 2015). The market perception is central to the 
strategic implication of the CSR to the business firms. 
The attitude of business firms to social responsibility is a key consideration by the 
investors in their selection processes Ghoul et al. (2011). The use of social screens in the 
selection process inevitably results in differential costs of capital among CSR and 
nonCSR firms. Ghoul et al. (2011) found evidence supporting the notion that the firms 
with socially responsible practices entrenched in their business or corporate strategies 
have higher valuations, lower cost of capital and lower risk while those with antisocial 
practices such as those that operate in the sin industries like tobacco, beer, and gun attract 
lower valuations, higher financing cost and higher risk. The strategic content of the CSR 
is therefore a potent driver of business engagement in social conduct.  
In consonance with stewardship theory, the business managers who control 
corporate resources are placed in a position to manipulate the use of the CSR as a tool to 
achieve particular aims (Jensen, 2010). How well the managers use this tool is largely 
dependent on the available external control in form of public policy (Brammer, Jackson, 
& Matten, 2012), stakeholder pressure (Sobhani et al. 2012), and the internal control 
exerted by their governance boards (Jensen, 2010). Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) 
observed that CEOs commit resources to CSR for selfish reasons such as to gain more 
power. Corporate control is important in order to ensure managerial utilization of the 
CSR resources toward organizational value creation. 
The presence or the absence of laws and regulations as well as the effectiveness of 




business firms to play by the codified rules is part of the legal domain of the Caroll 
(1991) CSR framework. Caroll contended that the presence of the laws and regulations 
and their enforcement are a major tool that helps to align managerial behavior to good 
social conduct. Thus to the extent that failure to operate within the confines of the rules 
and regulation is a trajectory of corporate failure, the business pursuit of the CSR is 
driven by the need to discharge their legal compliance responsibilities. 
The CSR is also driven by the organizational need to build moral capital through 
deeply rooted positive cultures and virtues, which aid achievement of business goals 
(Griffin & Prakash, 2014). Falling within the philanthropic domain of the Caroll CSR 
framework, organizational virtuousness is a tool of strategic value creation (Fernando & 
Almeida, 2012). This practice has led to the propagation of new concepts in management 
theory such as McDonaldization and Starbuckization (Brammer et al. 2012). Thus the 
need to build enduring corporate culture that is deeply rooted in tradition and 
virtuousness is instrumental to the philanthropic responsibilities.  
Lately, the frontiers of the business engagement in CSR have been further 
expanded by the emergence of the concept of enlightened shareholder value and the 
associated quest to find business legitimacy (Adeyanju, 2012). While seeking to achieve 
their sustainable development goals, governments at national and supranational levels 
encourage businesses to espouse CSR ideals (Arnold & Valentin, 2013). The business 
corporations are called upon to complement the government efforts in providing public 
goods and social services (Griffin & Prakash, 2014). Some jurisdictional governments 




of social conduct (Cajias, Fuerst, & Bienert, 2014). Against this backdrop, a handshake 
between the private sector and the government ensures sustainable CSR.  
CSR Measurement Methodology  
 Researchers have measured the CSR in diverse ways including the use of 
questionnaire surveys, content analysis of disclosed CSR information in corporate 
publications, spending measures, unidimensional, and multidimensional ratings based on 
some observable social responsibility indicators. Each of these measures has unique 
strengths and weaknesses. Soana (2011) argued that the diversity of CSR measures 
largely contributes to the contradictory findings on the nature of the CSR-FP relation. 
The prevalent diversity of measures is exacerbated by the multiplicity of possible 
approaches within each measure. For instance for some studies in which 
multidimensional social responsibility ratings were used, researchers adopted KLD 
ratings (Becchetti et al. 2012; Lioui & Sharma, 2012), EIRIS Index (Wu & Shen, 2013), 
AEI Index (Soana, 2011), and SGP Index (Torres et al. 2012). Each of these rating bodies 
determines its index based on some surveys as well as measures on several qualitative 
factors. 
 Questionnaire surveys.  
Questionnaires are completed by respondents who may be the targeted 
stakeholders or corporate executives based on their perceptions of how the firm 
discharges its social responsibilities. Chen & Wang (2011) administered their 
questionnaires to the senior executives of Guangdong enterprises of China while Mustafa 




companies in Malaysia. When survey questionnaires are used, they only represent the 
views and perceptions of the respondents, which could be bias (Lange & Washburn, 
2012). 
    Content analysis of disclosures in corporate publications.  
Scores of researchers have adopted content analysis of disclosures in corporate 
publications relating to social and environmental matters. This process involves counting 
of words, phrases, clauses or sentences in the publications that relate to the social or 
environmental themes and using binary values to quantify them (Ganescu, 2012). 
Presupposing that the social disclosure in the corporate publications is a good proxy for 
the CSR, many studies adopted this measure to examine the CSR-business value link. 
Rahmawati and Dianita (2011), Uadiale and Fagbemi (2012), and Uwuigbe and Egbide 
(2012) used content analysis of corporate disclosures to examine the CSR-FP relation. It 
has been argued that no research has attested to the validity of content analysis of 
published corporate information (Soana, 2011). For this reason, the content analysis 
methodology lacks theoretical base and offers only limited practical value. 
    Spending measures.  
CSR could be measured by the level of expenditures such as the voluntary 
donations and the charitable contributions made by the firm toward improving the social 
and environmental wellbeing of the stakeholders (Soana, 2011). The voluntary social 
spendings such as donations, advertising expenditures and training expenditures may help 
to bolster the firm’s image, reduce the social pressure against the firm, and ultimately 




wealth (Weshah et al. 2012).The motive for the expenditure and the prevalence of 
information asymmetry make the efficacy of the social spendings by business managers 
to be shrouded in uncertainty which increases agency cost (Sun & Cui, 2014).  
    Unidimensional indicators.  
The unidimensional indicators are focused on only a single aspect of social 
responsibility practices such as environmental or philanthropic practices in the local 
communities. Because unidimensional CSR measures are limited by lack of 
comprehensiveness, Caroll (1979) espoused the economic, legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic dimensions of CSR. To overcome the narrow focus of unidimensional 
measures, researchers combined the measure with other measures. For instance, Busch & 
Hoffmann (2011) measured the CSR as carbon intensity which they related to the firm 
sales, but combined this unidimensional measure with the questionnaire surveys and the 
sustainability rating index.  
    Reputational measures.  
It is possible to calculate some scores on goodwill associated with the reputation 
of a firm and use these scores as measures of the CSR for research purposes. Fortune 
regularly provides such a calculation based on the reputation perceived by their 
respondents and publishes Corporate Reputational Index, such as its AMAC (America’s 
Most Admired Companies) ratings. As a CSR strategy, defending reputation helps the 
business corporations to develop legitimacy and gain competitive advantage (Sun & Cui, 
2014). The challenge with the reputation-based measures is that the respondents’ 




financial record (Soana, 2011). Therefore, reputation-based metrics are not likely to 
effectively measure CSR.  
    Multidimensional ethical ratings.  
Following the difficulty that the objective measurement of the CSR poses to the 
empirical research, specialized agencies have in the last 3 decades sprung up devising 
models to quantify various aspects of CSR (Saeidi et al. 2014). These agencies collect 
data regularly that relate to the different stakeholder groups. The scores from the data are 
then aggregated using arithmetic or weighted average to determine the overall ethical 
rating for each organization of interest. These agencies create database of ethical ratings 
which researchers have used over time to study the CSR. Currently, there is 
preponderance of the use of multidimensional ethical ratings in the measurement of the 
CSR for empirical study purposes (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011). Of all the rating systems 
currently available, KLD is the mostly used resource (Chen & Delmas, 2011; Montiel & 
Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). Out of the 30 recent studies reviewed in this study, ethical 
ratings were adopted in 20 or 67% and KLD ethical ratings were adopted in 15 out of 
these 20 studies or 75%. Therefore KLD ethical ratings are the most popular amongst 
researchers. 
Notwithstanding their popularity, Chen and Delmas (2011) contended that the 
multidimensional ethical ratings suffer from lack of a ranking of importance of the CSR 
factors. According to these authors, two broad aggregation methodologies are commonly 
used in the literature: (1) assigning equal weights to the CSR factors; and (2) assigning 




contended further that assigning equal weights to CSR factors assumes equal importance 
of all indicators, which is invalid, as stakeholder attributes such as perceptions, 
composition, and preferences, are dynamic and tend to change over time. Despite these 
limitations, I used KLD ethical rating methodology in this study based on its popularity. 
KLD Ethical Rating Index  
 Based in Boston, USA, KLD is an investment research firm that was established 
in 1988. The firm, which was acquired by RiskMetrics Group (RMG) in 2010, developed 
KLD STATS database that tracks the CSR activities of the listed US companies, using 
qualitative measures of strengths and concerns with two broad screens – qualitative 
screens and exclusionary screens. KLD evaluates social performance through multiple 
data types including expert opinion, surveys, and public disclosures (MSCI, 2015). The 
qualitative screen comprises seven categories: community support, diversity, 
employment, environment, human rights, product, and corporate governance (MSCI, 
2015). The exclusionary screen includes six categories relating to the business 
involvement in the ‘sin’ activities of gambling, firearms, military, nuclear, alcohol, and 
tobacco (MSCI, 2015). The strength and the concern factors under each category are 
rated and assigned a binary value of “1” if the firm meets the specified criteria or “0” if 
the firm does not meet the criteria (MSCI, 2015). However, only the concern factors are 
considered under exclusionary screens. On a yearly basis, there are unequal numbers of 
strengths and concerns in each category because some rating categories are discontinued 
(MSCI, 2015). Because of this, it is therefore difficult to make a direct year-on-year 




The use of ethical ratings is not without limitations. KLD is considered to be an 
imperfect measure of the CSR (Chen & Delmas, 2011; Saeidi et al. 2015), and as a result, 
researchers have operationalized KLD ratings in diverse ways to measure the CSR 
activities of firms. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) dropped corporate governance and 
product categories in their studies. According to them, while corporate governance relates 
to shareholders’ financial objective rather than the social objectives of broad 
stakeholders, product category is focused on product quality and is not a strong element 
of the CSR. Jo and Harjoto (2011) and Wang et al. (2014) summed the values of 
strengths to measure the CSR of their sampled firms and also summed the values of the 
concerns (weaknesses) to measure their corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). The 
diverse methods of applying the KLD ethical ratings make it difficult to compare 
research findings and reach consensus. 
Current Trend in CSR Measurement   
I found that the use of multidimensional ethical ratings based on objective 
methodologies dominates the current literature, and more of such studies used aggregated 
ratings compared to those that used individual CSR components. The CSR ethical ratings 
were adopted in 20 or two-third of the 30 recent studies reviewed. In 15 of the 20 studies, 
KLD ratings were adopted while in the other five researchers used Swiss-based 
Sustainability Asset Management (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), Fortune Magazine’s 
AMAC (America’s Most Admired Companies) ratings (Sun & Cui, 2014), EIRIS (Wu & 
Shen, 2013), Singaporean SGP ratings (Torres et al. 2012), and Italian AEI ratings 




one study, the questionnaire surveys in six studies, and the spending measures in three 
studies. Furthermore, of the 20 studies in which CSR was measured as social ratings, the 
aggregated composite measures were used in 17 studies or 85% while individual 
components of the ratings were adopted in only three studies or 15%. Where the ratings 
of the individual components of CSR were used, researchers isolated the CSR factors that 
were positively related to FP from those that were not, leading to more relevant 
conclusions. Nevertheless, how well a measure reflects CSR remains a puzzle yet to be 
resolved and will continue to feature in the future studies (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 
2012). 
Financial Measures of Business Performance   
 Financial performance (FP), unlike the CSR, presents little challenge in research 
in both conceptual and measurement terms. Stewardship model of business requires every 
business firm to make profit and to increase the firm value (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 
2010). Empirical researchers are unanimous in viewing profit or value creation from two 
perspectives: accounting perspectives and market perspectives, each of these presents its 
own unique challenges (Goss & Roberts, 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013). Although the number 
of the CSR studies is still inadequate, studies that are based on the accounting measures 
of performance have more proportionately received due attention, while the market-based 
performance remains underexamined (Becchetti et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 2011). 
Accounting Measures of Performance    
Profit determination follows strict sets of accounting rules embodied in generally 




and jurisdictional regulations. Appropriate accounting rules and policies are selected 
based on the management objectives and decisions. The accounting measures of financial 
performance proliferate in the recent literature, and they include the earnings per share 
(Becchetti et al. 2013; Ghoul et al. 2011), the EPS growth and return on 
equity/assets/sales (Becchetti et al. 2013; Chen & Wang, 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; 
Wu & Shen, 2013), and the asset growth (Wu & Shen). The other measures I found in the 
recent literature include the turnover and turnover growth (Arnold & Valentine, 2013), 
the net-/non-interest income on non-performing loan (Wu & Shen, 2013), the loan 
contract terms (Goss & Roberts, 2011), the brand equity (Torres et al. 2012), the cost-to-
income ratio (Soana, 2011), and the absolute forecast error on EPS (Becchetti et al. 
2013). Since accounting numbers follow strict sets of accounting rules, are validated by 
the independent external auditors, and are contained in the published financial statements, 
they are expected to be of high quality and subject to minimal manipulation (Jiao, 2010). 
However, because accounting indices are backward looking and are based on convention 
and corporate choice, they can be biased, incomparable, and open to manipulation 
(Gregory et al. 2014). This is typified by the spate of corporate scandals that have been 
recorded in recent history which were characterized by manipulation by the corporate 
managers often in tacit collusion with their auditors. 
Market-based Measures of Business Performance    
 Market-based performance measures focus less on accounting numbers or rules; 
so they are less susceptible to managerial subjectivity, manipulation or opportunism 




independent evaluation of the firm performance, reflecting the investors’ perception and 
expectations of the future performance of the firm (Gregory et al. 2014). They are also 
not without limitations. Because market-based measures utilize capital market parameters 
such as security prices to evaluate firm FP, their focus is only on the financial 
stakeholders, while nonfinancial stakeholders who are also affected by corporate social 
conduct and misconduct are ignored (McWilliams et al. 2006). Market-focused measures 
may also not reflect the investors’ assessment of the true value of information asymmetry 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2014). Conversely, market-based measures provide opportunity to 
consider alternative benchmarks and triangulate the findings from performance 
evaluation process to ensure a balanced and more objective conclusion (Ghoul et al. 
2011). Market-based measures can be categorized into two broad types: (1) measures 
based on share value, and (2) measures based on cost of capital. Each of these measures 
can be separately related to the CSR measures for testing possible association. 
Share value-based measures of financial performance.  
Share-values have been used extensively to measure the firm financial 
performance (Tafti et al. 2012). The most commonly adopted measures are based on 
share prices including: (1) stock price (Baird et al. 2012), (2) price-earnings ratio (Soana, 
2011), (3) MTB ratio (Deng et al. 2013; Soana, 2011), and (4) Tobin’s q (Busch & 
Hoffmann, 2011; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Kang et al.; Lioui & Sharma, 
2012; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Of all these, the use of Tobin’s q is more prominent 
among researchers. Market returns have also been used by researchers to measure of 




abnormal market returns (Becchetti et al. 2012; Deng et al. 2013). Only very few scholars 
used the volatility of market returns (Deng et al.) or adopted asset pricing approach in 
their empirical models (Becchetti et al. 2012). The use of volatility and asset pricing 
approaches to studying the CSR-financial performance relation is an area that deserves 
extensive exploitation by researchers. 
Cost of capital as a measure of financial performance.  
In finance theory there are two sides to profitability: maximizing returns and 
minimizing financing cost. There is inadequate research into the relation between CSR 
and the financing cost dimension of corporate financial performance (Goss & Roberts, 
2011). Campbell et al. (2012) observed that the relation between WACC and internal 
financial resources is positive and significant. For CSR research purposes, the cost of 
capital can be operationalized as the cost of debt, the cost of equity, and WACC. In the 
review of the current literature, I sighted only four of such studies: Cajias et al. (2014), 
Ghoul et al. (2011), Gregory et al. (2014), and Hajiha & Sarfaraz (2013).  
Ghoul et al. (2011) examined the relationship between the CSR composite scores 
and the cost of equity; the authors found a positive interaction between the two variables. 
In their research, Campbell et al. (2012) examined the cost of debt, the cost of equity and 
the WACC separately against their nonCSR related independent variables. The focus of 
this study on the underresearched effect of CSR factors on the financing cost could help 




Information Asymmetry and Financial Performance Measures   
Financial performance measures are conditioned by information asymmetry (Jiao, 
2010). The managerial tendency to manipulate financials increases the information 
asymmetry, which complicates the financial reporting and performance measurement 
system (Grougiou et al. 2014). A number of factors affect the degree to which 
information asymmetry masks financial performance measures. First, information 
asymmetry is increased with market imperfection and reduced when market is perfect 
(Armstrong, Core, Taylor, & Verrecchia, 2011). Second, information asymmetry is 
reduced in large firms and increased in small firms (Bouslah et al. 2013). Lastly, 
information asymmetry is increased when earnings management practice is entrenched 
and reduced in more transparent environment (Grougiou et al. 2014). Genuine CSR 
disclosures help to reduce information asymmetry, risk and financing cost (Dhaliwal et 
al. 2014; Rahmawati & Dianita, 2014). This suggests that the ethical dimension of CSR 
has implication for the quality of financial information of a business firm. 
Current Trend in Operationalization of Financial Performance  
I observed from the recent literature I reviewed that financial performance was 
divergently operationalized, though still within the accounting and the market-based 
dimensions. In most of the studies, the traditional definitions of FP such as ROE, ROA, 
Sales growth, market returns, and Tobin’s q were not used. In a good number of the 
studies, financial performance was operationalized in an unconventional manner such as 
netinterest income, noninterest income, and nonperforming loan (Wu & Shen, 2013), 




income ratio (Soana, 2011), absolute forecast error on EPS (Becchetti et al. 2013), cost of 
equity (Ghoul et al. 2011), and volatility of market returns and risk-adjusted market 
performance (Baird et al. 2012).  
In a few of the studies reviewed, researchers tested the financial performance 
from the market expectations perspectives. This is consistent with the claim by Becchetti 
et al. (2012) and Ghoul et al. (2011) that finance literature suffers from inadequate 
research on the CSR-FP relation from the investors’ perspectives. Deng et al. (2013) 
employed Fama-French three factor model and Carhart four-factor model to test whether 
social performance was incorporated in the stock returns and found this to be affirmative. 
Becchetti et al. also tested the market reaction to corporate entry into and exit from the 
multidimensional KLD’s Domino 400 Social Index using Fama-French three factor 
model and also found significant impact of the announcement of the CSR event on the 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Similarly, Ghoul et al., who 
tested the cost of equity premium on the various CSR components, found that some high 
CSR elements are associated with lower equity capital cost, implying a positive CSR-FP 
relation.   
In an attempt to enrich the understanding of the impact of the CSR on the FP from 
the market perspectives, the FP was tested in many studies based on the various market-
based measures. From the 30 studies reviewed, I found that Tobin’s q was used by six 
researchers (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Lioui & 
Sharma, 2012; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013), share value by three 




Gregory et al. 2014), excess returns in nine studies (Becchetti et al. 2012; Deng et al. 
2013), and, finally, cost of capital in four studies (Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 2011; 
Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). Thus while Tobin’s q and excess returns 
are prominent in the current literature, share values and cost of capital are uncommon 
measures of FP. In the CSR studies, using FP measures that are not based on market 
dynamics amounts to model misspecification and faulty design (McWilliams et al. 2006). 
A more comprehensive approach would be to test the market-based cost of capital on 
each of the CSR factors , as the result of such design should reflect the expectations of 
the stakeholders (Becchetti et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. (2011). This research was aimed at 
addressing this gap in the empirical literature, and in this regard I regressed the market-
revealed cost of capital against the individual CSR components of the selected US banks.  
CSR Theories and Business Case   
 A number of organizational theories have been applied to study the relation 
between corporation and society (Okoye, 2009). The common ones that researchers have 
used are the neoclassical economic theory, the stakeholder theory, the institutional theory, 
and the resource-based view, although it has been argued that each of these theories is 
useful for a particular purpose when applied to the CSR depending on the dominant 
research questions (Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014).  
Neoclassical Economic Theory of CSR  
CSR theory evolved from the Smithsonian view of corporation as a member of 
the larger economic system, where the constituents are driven by self-interest and where 




on this contractarian view of a firm, Friedman (1970) argued that business corporation is 
obliged to pursue only profit making, contending that social responsibility and business 
are incompatible. This pure economic view of corporation was also emphasized by a 
number of empirical researchers. Jensen (2010) contended that when corporations 
diverge from their basic goal of making profit for their owners to the pursuit of social 
endeavors, this creates an opportunity for the managers to move away from the radar of 
control,  motivating them to indulge in pursing private benefits to the detriment of the 
owners and other stakeholders. This theoretical perspective is informed by the 
philanthropic dimension of the CSR. Thus the neoclassical economic theory is useful as a 
starting point of theorizing the CSR-FP relation. The complex and dynamic nature of the 
social and human environment suggests that a broader conception of corporate conduct is 
imperative (Okoye, 2009). 
Stakeholder Theory of CSR  
Propounded by Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory is based on the axiom that it 
is in the best long-term interest of a business to care for its stakeholders on whom the 
firm depends for its inputs and outputs. This perspective is a paradigm shift from the 
neoclassical theory that focuses only on the business owners. Stakeholder theory, referred 
to as good management theory, is about doing good to those that the firm interacts with in 
order to create the enabling environment for the business firm to gain competitive 
advantage and grow (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011). The stakeholder theory is a dominating 
theory in the empirical literature, as it is well supported by researchers (Ghoul et al. 




social performance is positively related to merger performance. Orlitzky (2013) drew 
attention to the increasing pressure many corporations face to become more socially 
responsible and embrace the CSR in the process.  
The stakeholder theory has equally been used to study several other CSR 
contexts. It was used to test if the CSR creates value after merger of firms (Deng et al. 
2013), if the stakeholder welfare impacts on the firm valuation (Jiao, 2010), if the climate 
change impacts on the financial performance of firms (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), if the 
environmental factors affect the profitability of a business (Lioui & Sharma, 2012), and if 
the CSR impacts the financial risk of a company (Ghoul et al. 2011). Stakeholder is a 
broad concept; its scope encompasses the internal stakeholders like managers and 
employees, the external stakeholders like investors who commit resources based on their 
perception of the information available to them, the future generations who are affected 
by the corporation’s past, present and future activities, and the broad society together 
with the societal issues that condition human values (Orlitzky, 2013). This populist 
characteristic of the stakeholder theory is instrumental to the development of the strategic 
case for the CSR (Becchetti et al. 2013). This is done by integrating the social dimension 
into all the facets of business process to gain competitive advantage, leading to the 
achievement of organizational goals of profitability, stability, and growth (Chen & Wang, 
2011). Conceptualized this way, it is possible to clearly identify the organizational goals 
and its stakeholders, develop strategies to manage the stakeholders through the 
manipulation of attitudes, structures, and practices, and finally assess the relationship 




This seems to explain why most of the empirical studies into the CSR-FP relation results 
in the positive relationship, depicting the normal investment-return behavior.  
Institutional Theory of CSR 
 The role of institutions on the ability of corporations to act in socially responsible 
or irresponsible manner provides an alternative theory of the CSR. Because empirical 
research on the CSR has largely been dominated by the stakeholder theory, the 
institutional theory of the CSR was long neglected (Brammer et al. 2012). The authors 
proposed six key institutional factors: (1) the design of regulation, (2) the availability of 
effective self-regulation, (3) the effectiveness of the stakeholder monitoring, (4) the 
degree to which the normative calls are embedded in the business culture, (5) the 
membership of trade association, and (6) the engagement in dialogue with the 
trade/employee unions and the investor groups. Based on these factors, while some firms 
are considered socially responsible many others are considered socially irresponsible 
(Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). Using these institutional factors, one can determine 
whether a firm acts in a socially responsible or irresponsible manner to particular 
stakeholder group. The institutional factors are neither exhaustive nor static (Servaes & 
Tamayo, 2013). The institutional theory has been in some recent studies where 
institutional factors were found to mediate the impact of the CSR on the FP such as level 
of customer awareness (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and the degree of earnings 
management (Rahmawatti & Dianita, 2011). From the above, it could be inferred that the 




conditions that could mediate the behavior of the CSR-FP relation under the stakeholder 
theory.  
Resource-based View of CSR  
Resource-based view is another popular theory I found in the CSR literature. The 
theory is about the notion that possession of a strategic resource or asset such as CSR 
capability can strengthen a firm’s competitive position if the competitors do not have 
access to such resources. Hart (1995) posited that environmental social responsibility is a 
key capability that creates competitive advantage to a firm. Although what constitutes an 
organizational resource is context dependent, nevertheless, to the extent that the CSR 
confers social legitimacy on its holders, competitive advantage is strengthened by the 
presence of the social legitimacy (Dawkins & Fraas, 2013). For instance, Lioui and 
Sharma (2012) found negative relationship between the environmental CSR and the FP 
agents. It is imperative for a firm not only to identify the resources at its disposal but also 
to subject them to careful analysis of their effect on the performance outcome. 
The above analysis suggests that each theory is about a particular perspective that 
is held of the CSR dimension, implying that the theories are not competitive but rather 
complementary. It is important that researchers select a theory that is most appropriate for 
the research questions being studied. Although application of the stakeholder theory 
remains common in the empirical literature, the theory suffers from some fundamental 
weaknesses. Jensen (2010) contended that the failure of the proponents of the stakeholder 
theory to specify how managers should make tradeoffs among the competing interests 




allocation decisions, they become unaccountable for their actions and may indulge in 
pursuing private benefits using the CSR screens. Orlitzky (2013) also shared the view 
that the stakeholder orientation inherent in the CSR is a restraint to value maximization, a 
primary long-run business objective. These views seem to be confirmed by UN Global 
Compact and Accenture (2013) claiming that global business leaders expressed 
skepticism in the CSR-business value link and questioned the continued championing of 
the sustainability drive by the business sector. This underscores the need to consider the 
conceptual weaknesses inherent in the application of stakeholder theory. 
Recent Empirical Findings on CSR-FP Link   
The empirical literature on CSR-FP link revolves around two central issues: the 
nature of the interaction and the direction of the causation between the two social 
constructs. Although, the study of both issues started over 6 decades ago, the empirical 
debates about them remain unsettled (Grougiou et al. 2014; Jo & Harjoto, 2011). The 
mutual interaction between the stakeholders and the business firms has over time shaped 
the development of the CSR as a business management strategy which many firms now 
imbibe to sustain competitive edge (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). Despite over 6 decades of 
research into the CSR-FP relationship, researchers continuously seek to determine the 
causal impact of CSR on FP and vice versa. In this section, I attempt to analyze and 
synthesize the recent empirical studies on the CSR-FP relation with a view to 
determining the common trend and identifying the significant gaps in the literature in 




In this study, 30 recent studies on the CSR-FP relation within the recent 5 years 
between 2011 and 2015 were analyzed, with findings revolving around positive, negative, 
neutral, and mixed relationships between the two constructs, depending largely on the 
methodology adopted in each study and how the study was designed. This is largely 
consistent with the earlier studies. The studies differed in the geographical settings, the 
perspectives adopted toward measurement of CSR and FP, the direction of the study as to 
which construct is treated as independent variable or dependent variable, the nature of 
control variables used, and finally the method of analysis. Attempt was made in some of 
the studies to perform causal analysis through Granger causality test of lagged variables. 
As indicated in the Table 1, out of the 30 papers analyzed, no relationship was 
found between CSR and FP in Soana (2011) and Dinsmore (2014) while positive and/or 
negative relationships were revealed in the other 29 studies (or 97%). Consistent with the 
earlier literature, in 22 of the 30 studies reviewed (or 73%), researchers recorded positive 
CSR-FP relationship. While negative relationships were observed in only two studies (or 
7%), mixed relationships were found in only five of the 30 studies reviewed (or 17%). 
Thus in this analysis the studies showing non-positive (negative or neutral) relationships 
are rare, amounting to only three or 10% of the papers reviewed.  
Table 1 
Summary of Recent Empirical Studies Reviewed  
S/n Year 
Category of studies 
TOTAL 
Positive Negative Mixed Neutral 
1 2011 4 1 2 1 8 
2 2012 8 1 1  10 




4 2014 4    4 
5 2015 3    3 
Total 22 2 5 1 30 
Proportion (%) 73% 7% 17% 3% 100% 
 
The comprehensive result of the analysis of the 30 peer reviewed articles on the 
topic is shown in Appendix 1, indicating the scope, the variables covered, the analytical 
tools adopted, the contexts of study, and the nature of the relationships found in each 
study. Although the outcome of the current literature is consistent with the prior literature 
predominantly, tending towards positive CSR-FP relationship, the inconsistent results of 
the studies analyzed supports the lingering contested nature of the CSR. Despite the 
efforts that have been made over time to improve the methodological designs of studies, 
the inconsistencies of the findings on the CSR-FP relation are far from being resolved. 
So, the recent empirical research into the CSR-FP relation remains largely inconclusive, 
as researchers continue to find positive, negative, neutral and mixed relationships 
between CSR and FP in their respective studies.  
Divergent CSR-FP Relationships  
In the current literature, the studies showing positive CSR-FP relationship are 
prevalent. Positive relationship was found in 22 out of the 30 studies reviewed, or 73%. 
This is consistent with the prior literature (Jensen, 2010; Jiao, 2010) as well as the 
recent dissertations (Adeleke, 2014; Fomukong, 2014; Kasim, 2012). Negative CSR-FP 
relation was reported in two studies (Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011) 




skewness of findings toward positive CSR-FP relation to conceptual and methodological 
issues. 
First, the adopted measures of the CSR accounted for most of the variations 
amongst the 30 recent studies reviewed. In 20 of the studies (or 67%) multidimensional 
ratings of CSR were adopted as the predictor variables. Among the 20 studies in which 
ethical ratings were used, 15 (or 75%) were based on KLD ethical ratings that were 
largely aggregated or composite scores. Out of the 15 studies that were based on the KLD 
ratings, positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 11 or 73% (Cajias et al. 2014; Deng et 
al. 2013; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Servaes 
& Tamayo, 2013). Thus the use of composite KLD ratings tends to yield more of positive 
CSR-FP relationships. Similarly, positive CSR-FP relationships were equally found in all 
the six studies where CSR was measured using questionnaires (Chen & Wang, 2011; 
Ganescu, 2012; Mustafa et al. 2012; Parsa et al. 2015; Saeidi et al. 2015; Tafti et al. 
2012) and also in all the three studies where CSR was based on spending measures 
(Adeyanju, 2012; Wang, Wu & Sun 2015; Weshah et al. 2012). Similarly, negative 
relationship was observed in the only study that adopted content analysis of disclosures to 
measure CSR (Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011) as well as where CSR was focused on the 
environmental factors (Lioui & Sharma, 2012). With this revelation, it is important for 
researchers to consider the impact of their chosen measures, as the choice of measure 
may influence the outcome of the studies. 
Second, the level of aggregation of the CSR multidimensional scores contributed 




individual component measures is a recent dimension in the literature. Out of the 20 
studies where CSR was based on multidimensional ratings, individual components of 
CSR were tested in only six (Baird et al. 2012; Gregory et al. 2014; Inoue & Lee, 2011; 
Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Nandy & Lodh, 2012) while aggregated 
scores were tested in 14 studies. Positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 10 out of the 
14 studies (or 71%) that were based on the aggregated scores while 50% was recorded in 
the studies that were based on the individual components. The implication of this is that 
positive CSR-FP relationship is escalated when aggregated CSR scores compared to 
when individual CSR components are used. This is because the components are not likely 
to behave homogenously with respect to the FP, since stakeholders’ needs are 
heterogeneous and are, in many cases, conflicting (Moura-Leite et al. 2014). The true 
behavior of the CSR seems to be exposed when the individual components of CSR is 
examined. This implies that the decomposed CSR measures are more effective than the 
composite CSR scores, although it remains uncommon in the literature. It has been 
suggested that the aggregated CSR ratings be decomposed into their individual 
components to improve the understanding of the nature of each CSR factor (Goss & 
Roberts, 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013). The fact that the component approach to measuring 
CSR was rarely adopted in the recent studies reviewed is indicative of an 
underresearched area. 
Third, the findings of the recent studies reviewed were conditioned by the 
broadness or the narrowness of the study contexts. The studies in which multiple 




be considered as a contributing factor to the divergence of the research outcome observed 
in the literature. In the current literature represented by the 30 recent studies reviewed, 
multiple industries were examined in 19 (or 63%) of the studies while single industries 
were addressed in only 11 (or 37%) with varying results. In the 19 studies that were 
based on the broad context, positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 15, or 79% of 
them (Cajias et al. 2014; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013; Nandy & 
Lodh, 2012). On the other hand, positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 7 out of the 
11 studies (or 64%) that were based on single industries (Saeidi et al. 2015; Wang et al. 
2015; Parsa et al. 2015; Weshah et al. 2012). Thus positive CSR-FP relationship is prone 
to occur when multiple industries are examined in the study. From the above analysis, 
examining the CSR-FP relation in multiple industries and multiple countries in a single 
set of studies is prevalent, with escalated outcome of positive CSR-FP relationship. In 
such studies the fundamental contextual condition of stakeholder theory is not 
recognized. Stakeholders’ goals, objectives and aspirations tend to differ across the 
contexts of industrial and national boundaries (Baird et al. 2012). Thus combining the 
CSR ratings of different industries and different countries may lead to inconsistencies, 
even though such a strategy yields more of positive CSR-FP relation. A better approach 
is therefore to conduct the study in the context of each industry and each country (Baird 
et al. 2012 and Soana, 2011).  
Fourth the divergent operationalization of the FP is a contributing factor to the 
recorded dominance of the positive CSR-FP relationship. Consistent with the prior 




based measures of FP in the current literature. Out of the 30 recent studies reviewed, the 
FP was operationalized from the perspective of the traditional accounting in 17 (or 57%). 
In such studies, the FP was operationalized as ROA or ROE (Mustafa et al. 2012; Saeidi 
et al. 2015; Wu & Shen, 2013), interest income (Wu & Shen, 2013), loan contract (Nandy 
& Lodh, 2012), customer willingness to pay (Parsa et al. 2015), brand equity (Torres et 
al. 2012), and Tobin’s q (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 
2011; Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). The 
market-based measures of the FP were used by researchers in 10 studies or 33% while 
CSR was treated as the dependent variable in only three studies or 10%. The market-
based measures used include share value (Baird et al. 2012; Tafti et al. 2012), excess 
returns (Becchetti et al. 2012; Deng et al. 2013), absolute forecast error (Becchetti et al. 
2013), default risk (Sun & Cui, 2014), cost of equity (Ghoul et al. 2011), cost of capital 
(Cajias et al. 2014; Gregory et al. 2014), and WACC (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). A 
positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 11 (or 65%) of the 17 studies where 
traditional accounting based measures as FP while eight (or 80%) were observed in the 
10 studies in which the market based measures of performance were used. Interestingly, 
positive relationship was observed in all the four studies of the effect of the CSR on the 
FP, when the FP was measured as the cost of capital (Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 
2011, Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). The implication of this finding is 
that socially focused strategies may be an effective tool to managing financial risk and 




The studies in which mixed relationships were found were next in the hierarchy of 
importance to those in which positive relationships were observed. The mixed outcome 
observed in only five of the 30 studies examined, was contingent upon several factors: (1) 
the nature of the industry studied (Baird et al. 2012; Inoue & Lee, 2011), (2) short-run or 
long-run horizon (Inoue & Lee, 2011), (3) nature of the particular CSR component tested 
(Baird et al. 2012; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), and (4) the nature of the FP measures (Wu 
& Shen, 2013). Regarding the time horizons, although negative CSR-FP relationship was 
found in the short run, a positive relationship was observed in the long run (Inoue & Lee). 
This is consistent with the view that CSR is an investment in intangible asset that takes 
some time to yield the expected returns (Jiao, 2010). Also, the multidimensional nature of 
the CSR suggests that individual CSR components are likely to produce different effects 
on the FP (Baird et al. 2012). 
Divergent Relationship Interpretations  
The interpretation of the relationship between CSR and FP has also become a 
crucial factor that now features in the literature. Jensen (2010) drew attention to the 
prevalent misinterpretation of CSR-FP relation. He claimed that the negative CSR-FP 
relation could signify investors’ confidence in the firm and their preparedness to accept 
lower returns in the short run or in alignment with their private social responsibility 
values. However, Jiao (2010) contended that the positive relationship is indicative of the 
fact that CSR is an intangible investment with potential for value enhancement while the 




that each study’s theoretical and conceptual framework should guide how the result is 
interpreted. 
Geographical and Industrial Concentration of Studies  
The geographical setting of the studies revealed a concentration of the CSR 
studies in the US, as 14 out of the 30 studies reviewed were conducted using the US data. 
This is in consonance with the widely reported view in the literature that CSR originated 
in the United States, where formal writings on the CSR have been most evident, and a 
sizeable body of literature has accumulated (Caroll, 1991).  
Many sectors of the economy are still underresearched. The CSR-FP relation in 
the US banking sector is yet to be specifically tested. Among the 30 recent studies 
examined, only five were focused on the banking sector, translating to 16.7%, which 
implies that the effect of CSR on the FP in the banking sector is underresearched. The 
five banking sector-focused studies relate to Nigeria (Adeyanju, 2012), Iran (Tafti et al. 
2012), Jordan (Weshah et al. 2012), Italy (Soana, 2011), and multiple countries including 
the United States (Wu & Shen, 2013). Thus, none of the studies was specifically focused 
on the US banking sector, particularly after the 2007-2008 financial crisis despite its 
global ravaging effects. During the crisis the beta, a measure of systematic risk, of many 
banking sectors around the world soared simultaneously (Jánský, Adam, & Benecká, 
2012), constituting a threat to the survival of the financial sector. It is desirable to 
examine the effectiveness of the social efforts of the banks in reversing the escalated 
systematic risk. The other industries specifically focused on are the carbon/energy (Busch 




retail and consumer goods (Parsa et al. 2015), the automotive (Ganescu, 2012), and the 
manufacturing (Saeidi et al. 2015) industries. The results of these industry focused 
studies vary with the nature of the industries. In the studies that were focused on the 
banking sector, the CSR-FP relationship found include positive (Adeyanju, 2012; Tafti et 
al. 2012; Weshah et al. 2012), mixed (Wu & Shen, 2013), and neutral (Dinsmore, 2014; 
Soana, 2011), depending on the methodology adopted. Researchers found a positive 
CSR-FP relationship in the automotive (Ganescu, 2012), the retail and consumer goods 
(Parsa et al. 2015), the airline (Wang et al. 2015), and the manufacturing (Saeidi et al. 
2015) sectors. A mixed CSR-FP relationship was found in the carbon/energy (Busch & 
Hoffmann, 2011) and the tourism (Inoue & Lee, 2011) industries. The fact that none of 
these studies was focused specifically on the US banking sector is indicative of a gap that 
needs to be filled to enrich the literature. 
Divergent Control Variables  
Researchers incorporated control variables in their models in all the recent studies 
examined, except in Soana (2011) and Weshah et al. (2012) in which the authors 
excluded control variables in their model for the sake of simplicity of their analyses. 
Prominent among the variables controlled in the models of the studies reviewed are: size 
(Saeidi et al. 2015), risk (Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Moura-Leite et al. 2014), banking risk (Wu 
& Shen, 2013), management preference (Torres et al. 2012), capital expenditure (Gregory 
et al. 2014), earnings (Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Nandy & Lodh, 2012; Saeidi et al. 2015), 
firm growth (Cajias et al. 2014; Chen & Wang, 2011), industry (Deng et al. 2013), and 




variables only the size, the risk and the industry factors occurred most in the recent 
studies. 
Table 2 
Summary of Control Variables in the Current Literature   




1 Size factors  Total Assets, Sales, Audit Fee 22 29% 
2 Risk factors Debt/Equity Ratio, Leverage, 
Capital Structure 
17 23% 
3 Industry factors Industry classification, sector 
codes,  
10 13% 





R&D, Advertising & Capital 
Expenditure 
7 9% 
6 Year Year 7 9% 
7 Profitability & 
Earnings 
Profits, Earnings, EPS, P/E 
ratio, ROE, ROA, ROS. 
5 7% 
 Total 75 100% 
 
A major revelation from the review of the current literature from the above is that 
of the five studies conducted on the banking sector, only Wu and Shen (2013) controlled 
for the banking risk. I therefore controlled for risk proxied by leverage ratio in this study 
in addition to the control variables dominant in the above literature. 
Study Analytic Tools  
The common analytical tools adopted in the studies reviewed were the multiple 
regression models combined with the structural equations in some cases. The regression 
models were applied in four ways: (1) as a straight OLS with multifactor analysis for 




by lagging some variables in order to give an idea of the causal relationship between the 
CSR and the FP (Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 2011; Sun & Cui, 2014), (3) with the 
Fama-French three factor model (FF3F), and (4) with the Carhart four factor model 
(4FM). All these were set up and analyzed via multiple regression tools (Deng et al. 
2013). Using asset pricing models such as CAPM FF3F and Cahart 4FM is a new 
dimension in the CSR literature and needs to be refined further. 
Summary of Gaps in the Current Literature 
Identification of Gaps in Current Literature  
 A number of gaps are evident in the current literature. First, the tradition of 
inconsistencies in research findings signifies inadequacy of studies conducted into the 
CSR-FP interaction. Until a common ground is found, more studies are required to 
resolve the observed inconsistencies attributed to the methodological shortcomings in the 
prior studies. Second, the observed prevalent use of composite, aggregated 
multidimensional measures of CSR in most studies is fundamentally flawed. The 
possibility of imperfect correlation of individual components of CSR ratings renders the 
use of composite measures inappropriate with the potential to produce inaccurate results 
(Goss & Roberts, 2011). In view of this limitation, the studies in which the individual 
components of CSR are tested tend to be more reliable than those in which the 
aggregate/composite measures are tested (Goss & Roberts; Wu & Shen, 2013). In spite of 
this, it is in only a handful of studies that researchers tested the individual CSR 
components, indicating a significant gap in the current literature. Third, the mixed 




multiple countries are aggregated for the purpose of testing the study models. This is 
inconsistent with stakeholder theory, as interests and expectations of stakeholders are 
contextually diverse; they are divergent across the industrial and the geographical settings 
(Baird et al. 2012; Soana, 2011). Dearth of studies of specific industries and specific 
countries on CSR-FP relation constitutes a weakness in the current literature that needs to 
be addressed.      
Finally, studies in which CSR-FP relation was tested from the perspectives of 
market expectations are scanty in the current literature. Of the 30 recent studies reviewed, 
only four studies were found in which the CSR and cost of capital relation was examined 
(Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). 
Thus, how the CSR studies relate to the cost of finance as a measure of the FP remains an 
underresearched area. Even though Ghoul et al. (2011) observed that better CSR ratings 
are associated with lower cost of capital, it is obvious that research into the influence of 
the business social conduct on financial outcome is generally scanty. Several researchers  
such as Hajiha and Sarfaraz (2013), Goss and Roberts (2011) and Hajiha and Sarfaraz 
(2013) have separately called for inquiries into the CSR- financing cost relation, a call I 
attempted to respond to in this study. 
Plan to Fill the Identified Gaps in Literature 
Consistent with most studies on the CSR-FP interaction, this study was performed 
in two modes: even though the individual component CSR measures were tested in the 
two parts, the first part was focused on the traditional accounting measures of 




used for this purpose included a number of firm-specific and management preference 
control variables common in the literature. In the second part of the study, I addressed the 
effect of the CSR factors on the market-revealed cost of capital relation for the sampled 
banks using the FF3F model. The insight from the efforts aimed at addressing the 
enumerated gaps could enable managers and decision makers in banks to allocate scarce 
corporate resources to social performance in a more effective manner. 
Chapter Summary  
The literature review conducted in this chapter centered on the stakeholder theory, 
an alternative perspective to the conventional neoclassical economic theory of social 
responsibility. The stakeholder theory recognizes the need for businesses to shift 
emphasis from the stockholders to the other stakeholders, and by so doing the business 
firm would enjoy the support and the cooperation of the stakeholders to create value and 
competitive advantage which in the long run should lead to greater value to the 
stockholders. The stakeholder theory applied in this study was underpinned by the 
Carroll’s (1991) four-part theorem. In the review of the current literature on the CSR-FP 
relation, several areas of inconsistency in findings were observed, indicating some gaps 
that need to be explored further.  
Necessitated by the need to address some of the identified gaps in the empirical 
literature, this study was designed in way to minimize the highlighted deficiencies in the 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 The aim of this study was to test the effect of the individual CSR components on 
the financial performance (FP) of banks in the US, both when the FP is viewed from the 
accounting returns perspective and also from the market-revealed cost of capital 
perspective. Because this quantitative study was grounded in the positivist paradigm, 
multiple regression analysis was used to test the study hypotheses. The detailed account 
of the methodological issues involved in designing and implementing this dissertation 
was provided in this chapter. The starting point of the chapter was the description of the 
philosophical worldview of the study, providing the epistemology and the ontology 
applicable to the research questions. This was followed by the description of the research 
design selected, the target population, the sampling method, the instrumentation, the data 
collection procedures, the research questions, the hypotheses formulation, and the data 
analysis strategy. I concluded the chapter with the insights of how the output of the 
statistical analysis was interpreted and a brief summary of the chapter. 
The Philosophical Paradigm of the Study 
Ontology and Epistemology of the Study 
Generally, research is guided by the philosophical worldview that revolves around 
the ontology and the epistemology of the study. Ontology refers to either the objectivity 
of the social reality or its subjectivity, that is, whether it is socially constructed (Collis & 
Hussey, 2009, p. 59). These two ontological views are referred to as objectivism and 




reality is constant and cannot be affected by the researcher or participants (Creswell, 
2009). Constructionism is the view that social reality is constructed and is therefore not 
constant (Creswell). Similarly, epistemology relates to how valid knowledge comes about 
(Collis & Hussey, 2009, p. 59). Two schools of epistemological thought are the 
positivists who hold the belief that valid knowledge is observable and measurable and the 
interpretivist who views valid knowledge as that expressed by the research participants. 
Following this analysis, quantitative research aligns with objectivism ontology and 
positivist epistemology based on their deterministic characteristic while qualitative 
research relates to constructionism ontology and interpretivist epistemology (Creswell, 
2009, p. 7). 
Selected Guiding Philosophical Worldview of the Study 
 This study was anchored on the deterministic philosophy of cause and outcomes, 
in which it was proposed that the firm financial performance would be influenced by the 
firm’s social responsibility practices. This followed the reasoning of the postpositivist 
epistemological worldview which contends that the knowledge of the world can be 
scientifically and objectively obtained by reducing ideas into variables that can be tested 
using numerical measures (Creswell, 2009, p. 7). Such a study entails the use of 
quantitative research paradigm focused on testing a theory through the specification of 
the hypotheses and the collection and analysis of numerical data to support or refute such 
hypotheses. According to Creswell, quantitative design is suitable when there is a need to 
identify the factors influencing an outcome or to test a theory or a relationship for the 




differs from qualitative or mixed method research paradigms. The qualitative paradigm is 
useful if little is known about the social phenomenon of study such as the nature of the 
variables to examine, and the lived experience of the research subjects is then required to 
provide the needed knowledge through the human construction of the social 
phenomenon. The mixed methods research is suitable when a better understanding of the 
phenomenon can be obtained only through the blended strengths of both quantitative and 
qualitative paradigms by combining the quantitative and the qualitative data which 
provides opportunity for triangulation (Creswell, p. 18). The qualitative design has been 
followed in some earlier studies on the CSR-FP interaction such as Heijden, Driessen, 
and Cramer (2010) and Fernando and Almeida (2012) where case study strategy was 
used. The recent study by UN Global Compact and Accenture (2013) was conducted 
using mixed-methods paradigm. Generally, qualitative research provides limited 
opportunity to generalize findings to other settings. 
Description of Research Design 
Statistical Design of the Study 
 Consistent with the quantitative research paradigm, this research was designed as 
a correlational study where multivariate regression analysis was applied in examining the 
CSR-FP relation. Based on the research questions in the study, two regression models 
were used, reflecting the bidimensional nature of a business financial performance 
measures: the accounting returns and the market-based financial performance measure. In 




market-determined cost of capital was applied in the market-focused financial 
performance model.  
Unlike in the simple regression where outcome variable is tested against only one 
predictor, two or more predictors are involved in multiple or multivariate regression. 
According to Field (2009, p. 210), a multiple or multivariate regression model is suitable 
where the study involves determining the linear combination of predictors that maximally 
correlate with the dependent variable. This study was designed to ascertain the linear 
combination of the CSR factors that correlate maximally with the FP measures of the 
banks in the US. The idea is to optimize those factors that positively correlate with the FP 
to create value and deemphasize those that do not significantly correlate positively with 
the FP in order to preserve value. 
Generally, a multiple regression model is typified by the relation:  Yi = (b0 + b1X1i 
+ b2X2i + … bnXni) + Ɛi. Yi stands for the outcome variable, b0 represents the model 
intercept, b1 , b2 up to bn represent the slopes of the first, second and the n
th
 predictors, 
while Ɛi represents the residual term. The disturbance term is determined as the variation 
between the predicted value of Yi and the corresponding observed value (Field, p.210). 
Definition of the Variables of the Study 
As a postpositivist research that relies on the empirical validation of knowledge 
and the objective measurement of the reality, the concepts and the constructs of the study 
embodied in the research questions were converted into their empirical equivalents 





Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 49) distinguished between three 
categories of properties of variables in quantitative research as the analytical, the 
measurement, and the relational properties. According to them, the analytical dimension 
of the variables shows the role each variable plays in the explanatory scheme of research. 
In this regard, three kinds of variables are distinguished: dependent, independent, and 
control variables. The dependent or outcome variable is the variable being predicted 
while the independent variable is the predictor. The control variables are included in the 
model in order minimize the extent to which the explanatory power of the model is 
wrongly attributed to the selected predictor(s). Because the presence of control variables 
minimizes the disturbance term, the causal link between the dependent and independent 
variables contained in the hypotheses becomes more established when such confounding 
factors are adequately controlled for (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, p. 51).  
The measurement dimension of the variable properties relates to whether the 
variables of the study are measured continuously or discretely. The level of measurement 
of the variable is important for quantitative research design that relies on the use of 
statistical tools to analyze the quantitative data of the study. Finally, the relational 
dimension is about the nature of the relation that exists between the variables. This 
relation can take directional form (positive or negative) and can also be about the strength 
or magnitude ranging from lowest magnitude of no relation to highest magnitude of 
perfect relation (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, p. 55). 




In this study, the CSR factors were the predictors or the independent variables in 
the two models: the accounting return and the market performance models. Representing 
the predictors were the CSR factors relating to community, governance, diversity, 
employee relation, and product, as part of the 13 KLD MSCI CSR indicators (MSCI, 
2015). MSCI provides these 13 CSR indicators in two categories: (i) the seven qualitative 
screen factors comprising and (ii) the six exclusionary screen factors or controversial 
business issues consisting of tobacco, military, alcohol, firearms, nuclear power, and 
gambling. However, I found that KLD MSCI ratings were not available for 
environmental and human right factors as well as all the exclusionary screen factors. 
KLD MSCI used the qualitative screens to measure the strengths and the concerns of 
each of the seven factors in the qualitative category. I described each of the selected 
factors in detail below. 
Community factor.  
The community support (COM) factor strengths cover charitable giving activities, 
donations to support innovation, community engagement, and engagement in notably 
positive community activities (MSCI, 2015). The COM factor concern measures the 
gravity of the aspects of the firm’s activities in its local communities.  
Employee relations factor.  
The employee relations strengths indicator measures the firm’s fair treatment of 
its unionized workforce and the effectiveness of its relationship with its employees and 




poor relation with organized unions, the violation of health and safety standards, and 
engagement in supply chain and other labor-management controversies. 
Diversity factor.  
The factors relating to diversity strengths include how well the minority and 
women groups are represented in the firm’s decision making and input sourcing as well 
as the extent of consideration of work/life balance programs in the workplace. The 
concerns indicator is focused on the diversity related controversies. 
Product factor.  
The product strengths indicator measures the firm’s commitment to quality and 
safety of its products as well as their accessibility by the economically disadvantaged. 
Conversely, the product concerns indicators measure the firm’s involvement in 
controversies over the quality of its products or services, including its marketing, 
customer relations, contracting, and competitive business practices.  
Governance factor.  
The focus of the governance strengths indicator is on the quality and fairness of 
the reporting of the firm’s activities including its support for public policies, and how 
these positively impact the stakeholders. Governance related concerns have measures that 
focus on the incompleteness of firm’s social responsibility and sustainability reporting, 
absence of support for public policies, severity of controversies relating to the firm’s 
executive compensation and governance practices, and issues around the firm’s business 
ethics practices. 




KLD CSR ratings of organizations were binary values of 1 if the firm meets the 
specified criteria and 0 if the firm does not meet the criteria. Researchers have utilized 
these values in divergent ways. Callan and Thomas (2009) examined the whole of the 13 
factors by developing a 5-point scale of +2 to -2 to measure the strengths and the 
concerns of each factor. Ghoul et al. (2011) considered the qualitative issues and 
controversial issues separately based on their belief that the two screens are inherently 
different and may not coexist in the same setting. The authors determined the absolute net 
scores for each indicator and excluded corporate governance factor based on their 
operating definition of the construct that precludes any conflict between internal 
stakeholders and shareholders. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) decimalized the CSR scores 
and took the net for each indicator; they equally excluded product and corporate 
governance indicators from their model. Goss and Roberts (2011) warned that strengths 
and concerns of each CSR factor should be analyzed separately as the omnibus CSR 
score is a less accurate measure. The observed divergence in the application of CSR 
scores using KLD ratings compelled me to carefully select a suitable approach in the 
current study to operationalize the CSR scores that aligned with the research questions of 
the study. 
Consequently, to measure the CSR value of each indicator, the categorical ratings 
by KLD was scaled using 5-point scale of +2 to -2, with +2 representing two or more 
strengths, 1 representing one strength, 0 representing presence of neither strength nor 
concern, -2 representing two or more concerns and -1 representing one concern. Each 




measurement and scaling approach followed the earlier studies of Callan & Thomas 
(2009), Goss & Roberts (2011), Graves & Waddock (1994, 2000), Hillman & Keim 
(2001), and Waddock & Graves (1997).  
In order to strengthen the predictive capability of the regression models proposed 
in the study, each CSR component was properly lagged which permitted the testing of 
Granger causality. Granger causality testing through the appropriate lagging of the 
independent variables is a growing feature of the current literature. A few of the current 
researchers that performed Granger causality testing included Choi et al. (2010), Makni et 
al. (2009), and Scholtens (2008). 
    Dependent variables of the study.  
The financial data which were at interval or ratio level of measurement were used 
to operationalize the dependent or outcome variables in the two models of this study. 
These data included both absolute values and constructed ratios. The absolute values 
were standardized using their natural logarithms to make them appropriate for the linear 
regression analysis, an approach that is equally common in the literature. 
   Accounting-based financial performance model.  
In the accounting returns model, EBITDA margin and MTB were regressed 
against the CSR factors. EBITDA margin has been tested by a number of researchers 
including Gregory et al. (2014) and Saeidi et al. (2015). MTB represents the constructed 
ratio of market price per share to the book value per share, an approach that was recently 
tested empirically by Hajiha and Sarfaraz (2013) and Wu and Shen (2013). Both 




also included in the returns filed with companies registry. The financial data for these 
variables in respect of the sampled banks were obtained from the Bankscope database. 
 Market-based cost of capital model.  
In this model, the equity capital cost of the banks as a measure of financial 
performance was individually regressed against the lagged CSR factors. In this study, the 
cost of capital was determined based on the Fama-French three-factor (FF3F) asset 
pricing model, which considers three risk factors of market risk premium, size premium, 
and growth premium to determine the required rate of return by the investors. FF3F is 
considered to be superior to the traditional single-factor CAPM (Fama & French, 1993). 
Using a similar approach, Ghoul et al. (2011) empirically tested the CSR on the equity 
capital cost of industries in the US. 
    Control variables of the study.  
Consistent with the current literature, the accounting returns model included five 
control variables: the size, the risk, the growth, the preceding year accounting financial 
performance, and the management preference. Size, preceding year’s accounting 
financial performance, and the management preference factors were addressed by Lioui 
and Sharma (2012), Torres et al. (2012), and Yang et al. (2010), while risk was a 
considered control variable in Wu and Shen’s (2013) study. In terms of 
operationalization, the size was measured as the absolute value of the total assets but 
standardized by natural logarithm, the preceding year’s accounting FP was the preceding 




as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, and the risk was measured as the 
leverage ratio. 
The control variables in the cost of capital model included total assets, asset 
growth, market capitalization, leverage, EBITDA margin, MTB, and capital expenditure 
to total asset ratio. These control variables were also based on the financial data that were 
included in the published financial statements of the banks, accessed through the 
Bankscope database. 
Target Population 
The unit of analysis in this study was banks and the population of interest (target 
population) was the listed banks in the United States. The findings of the study could be 
generalized to the ethically rated listed banks in the country. I accessed the ethically rated 
banks in the US from the KLD database. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation  (FDIC) (2014), there were 6,730 insured banks in the US. Regulated by the 
Federal Reserve System, the US banking industry comprises the national banks, the 
regional banks, money center banks, savings and loans and credit services banks. The 
industry has been undergoing several challenges, the latest of which was the aftermath of 
the subprime mortgage crises leading to closure of a large number of banks during post-
crisis period. Faced with this situation, close attention to soft issues like social 
responsibility of banking business becomes a critical recovery and defensive strategy for 
most banks.  
KLD Research and Analytics Inc. regularly publishes social ratings of the large 




including the financial services sector. In this study I extracted the list of the ethically 
rated listed banks, which also had complete financial and stock market data to form the 
study sample. 
Sampling Method 
Sampling Design and Sampling Frame 
 A single stage sampling design was adopted in this study since there was access to 
the names in the population (Creswell, 2009, p. 148). The banks that formed the sample 
of the study were drawn from the actual population of the ethically rated banks, which 
also had the requisite financial and stock market data. The banks were selected from the 
list of the US banks included in the Socrates Database of KLD Research and Analytics 
Inc. To be retained the banks must also have the relevant financial information in the 
Bankscope database and share price information Yahoo! Finance database. This 
requirement was necessary so as to minimize the tendency of missing data for the 
purpose of the SPSS analysis. The constructed sampling frame of the study was therefore 
defined as the KLD rated US banks, with the requisite financial data in the Bankscope 
database and share price information in the Yahoo! Finance database.  
Annually, the ethical ratings of the corporations are provided in the form of binary 
representation for performance indicators contained in an excel spreadsheet. Meeting an 
established criterion for a rating is indicated as 1 in the excel spreadsheet cell under that 
indicator while failure to meet criteria established for a rating is indicated with a 0 in the 
excel spreadsheet cell under that indicator. In situations where an indicator has not been 




spreadsheet cell of that indicator. The ethical ratings are based on mixed methodology 
including survey questionnaires, interviews of the relevant stakeholders, and analysis of 
the content of the published social information. The ratings are therefore robust. 
Following the acquisition of KLD by MSCI ESG Research, significant rating 
methodologies were introduced from 2010. This principally entails the introduction of 
industry specific ESG rating templates for each of the seven ESG ratings categories and 
effectively ensures that ratings are researched for companies that are relevant to the 
industry.  
Fundamentally, the KLD data obtained included the entire 3,000 US largest 
companies by market capitalization. This compels a need to isolate those companies that 
are outside the banking industry, to have a sampling frame that contained only the list of 
banks that were ethically rated. The number was later pruned by the availability of the 
requisite financial and stock market data for each of the ethically rated banks. 
Sample Size, Statistical Errors, and Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity 
The need for generalizability of the findings of this study requires that the 
selected banks adequately represent the population being studied. Representativeness of 
the population implies that the sample statistics ought to reflect the population parameters 
as closely as possible. A way to ensure this is to select a sample size that is adequate 
(Trochim, 2008). Determining adequate sample size is best achieved by conducting 
power analysis, based on some standard parameters such as the alpha level, the power 




2007, p. 93). Generally, power analysis provides insight to the sample size considered to 
be appropriate for the detection of effects resulting from the predictors.  
Even with the adequate sample size, the threat to conclusion validity still exists, 
i.e., that the conclusions from the test procedures may be different from the conclusions 
that may be drawn if the statistical procedures are applied to the entire population of 
interest. This development is referred to as sampling risk. Practically, sampling risk is the 
risk that the conclusion to be drawn from the sample test would be different if the same 
test procedures were applied to the entire population. In other words, sampling risk is the 
risk of incorrect conclusion drawn from the sample because of the presence of statistical 
errors. Such statistical errors are of two categories: Type I and Type II errors, both of 
which directly depend on the null hypotheses. The consideration of these errors 
underscores the importance of selecting a sample that truly represents the population.    
Also called an error of the first kind, Type I error arises from rejecting the H0 
when H0 is true, implying false positive. The chance of committing Type I error is 
measured by the alpha or the significance level (α) of the test, which is statistically taken 
as the complement of the confidence level. Conventionally, a 5% chance is allowed for a 
Type I error occurring in a test (Cohen, 1992).  
Conversely, Type II error arises from the failure to reject the H0 when H0 is false, 
implying false negative. Rudestam and Newton (2007, p. 95) attributed such error to the 
inadequate power of the study. Because the selected level of power gives an indication of 
the risk of the presence of the Type II error in the study findings, it is important to avoid 




Statistically, Type II error is denoted by beta (β). As the complement of β (or 1- β), the 
power of the test is related to the Type II error. Unlike in the case of the error of the first 
kind, the general convention is to allow a 20% chance of the Type II error in a study, 
which translates to the power level of 80% (Cohen, 1992).  
The implication of false positive or the Type I error occurring in the current study 
is that it may lead to overinvestment in the CSR projects. Although, the firm may 
perceive overinvestment in CSR as destructive to business value, however, such 
investment is desired by the society. According to Friedman (1970), voluntary 
commitment of corporate resources to a social course without expecting value in return is 
the central theme of pure CSR. On the other hand, the implication of the false negative or 
the Type II error occurring in this study is that it may lead to underinvestment in the CSR 
initiatives, which is detrimental to societal aspirations and sustainable development. From 
the societal perspective, underinvestment in CSR implied by the Type II error in the 
context of this study is more devastating than overinvestment in CSR implied by the 
Type I error. This study is therefore designed primarily to reduce the risk of committing 
the Type II error, by increasing the power level beyond the conventional 0.8 level. This 
goes a long way in mitigating the threats to the conclusion validity (Trochim, 2006). 
According to Cohen (1992), an increase in the desired power level beyond the 
conventional 0.8 entails increased sample size and reduced alpha level with a caveat that 
the increased sample size may be constrained by the research budget. In view of the 




chance of the error of the second kind. I also limited the alpha level to the conventional 
0.05 for this study.  
Consequently, in determining the sample size that is representative of the actual 
population I relied on the running of the version 3.0.10 of G*Power Analysis. This 
procedure returned a sample size of 92 banks to be selected from the sampling frame. The 
G*Power analysis was based on the selection of the F test as Family Test for the multiple 
regression model, R
2
 deviation from 0, and power analysis of “A priori: Compute 
required sample size - given alpha, power, and effect size”. The analysis was also based 
on the 0.15 medium size effect, the alpha of 0.05, and the power of 0.8. However, only 71 
banks could be selected because of the need to ensure that the ethically rated banks also 
had the requisite financial and stock market data. A sample size of 71 banks was 
considered adequate for this study, as it was an improvement over some earlier studies 
that used much less sample size. Fomukong (2014) selected 50 companies to examine the 
relationship between CSR and EVA in the US context. 
Instrumentation  
 As noted in chapter 2, there is no generally accepted method of measuring CSR 
performance of firms, a development that led researchers to adopt multiple measures for 
the evaluation of firms’ social performance. Some researchers adopted direct 
measurement through questionnaires administered to the stakeholders, some measured 
the CSR performance of their subjects through a unidimensional measure such as 
spending, reputation, or environmental practices, while others adopted multidimensional 




adopted such third party developed measures for social responsibility of banks in the 
United States. In this regard, the CSR ratings performed and archived by KLD Research 
and Analytics Inc. were used to assess the social responsibility performance of the banks 
in the US. KLD CSR rating has become popular among empirical researchers as its 
preponderance was revealed in chapter 2.  
 I also utilized secondary financial data in this study to measure the dependent 
variables and the control variables. As secondary data, the financial data were accessed 
from the Bankscope database, as they are also contained in the published financial 
statements of public interest entities including banks. Thus extensive reliance was placed 
on the third-party sources for the data used in this study. 
I am not oblivious of the potential limitations inherent in the use of third-party 
archival data for research such as the problem of missing, incomplete or compromised 
data, the problem of inadequate data, and the possible challenge of lack of access to the 
proprietary database belonging to the third party owner (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 
101), as well as the enormity of the financial cost of access where available. In order to 
obviate these challenges, I defined the sampling frame such that any case with incomplete 
data was excluded from the sample.  
Data Collection Procedures 
As a secondary data analysis, archival data used for this study are privately 
owned. The data to be used are in three categories: (1) the CSR ratings on the ESG 
factors of the banks, (2) the financial data comprising the absolute values and the 




market data. The proprietary CSR ratings of the research subjects was obtained from the 
KLD’s Socrates database after obtaining the access. The financial data were obtained 
from the Bankscope database and the stock market data were downloaded from the 
Yahoo! Finance database which were publicly available. I am aware of my responsibility 
to secure these data for the prescribed period after the approval of the study. 
Research Questions  
Consistent with the statement of the problem and the purpose of this study, two 
research questions were advanced, with focus on the effect of the individual CSR factors 
of the accounting returns and the market-revealed cost of capital of the banks, as 
measures of financial performance.  The research questions are restated as follows:  
Research Question 1: To what extent can individual CSR components predict 
bank accounting performance, controlling for the effects of bank unique and 
management preference factors?   
Research Question 2: To what extent can individual CSR components of banks 
help in predicting the banks’ cost of capital? 
In the Research Question 1, the unique factors considered as control variables were firm 
size, risk, growth, and prior financial performance while the management preference 
factor considered as control variable was the capital expenditure relative to the total asset 
value. These factors were measured in financial terms, although the absolute values like 
the value of total assets that measures the size of each bank were standardized by their 
natural logarithms. In both research questions, the independent variables were the 





 To answer the two research questions posed in this study, two hypotheses were 
tested. The central aim of the statistical test of hypotheses was to determine if the null 
hypotheses in each case could be rejected, so that the speculative, alternative hypotheses 
could be accepted (Fisher, 1935, p. 19). However, the extent of correct rejection or non-
rejection of the null hypotheses given the reality of the state of the entire population 
determines the chances of Type I and Type II errors, which have been extensively 
considered in this study. The two hypotheses are described as follows. 
Hypothesis 1 
To address the first research question on the effect of the individual CSR factors 
on the accounting returns of the sampled US banks controlling for the bank unique 
factors of size, risk, growth, and past FP and the management preference factor of capital 
expenditure, the null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) were specified as: 
H01: The individual CSR components of banks cannot predict the banks’ 
accounting performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique and the 
management preference factors. 
Ha1:  The individual CSR components of banks can predict the banks’ accounting 
performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique and the 





 The second research question is on the effect of the individual CSR factors on the 
bank financing cost as a measure of financial performance, also controlling for the effects 
of the firm unique and the management preference factors. The null hypothesis (H0) and 
alternative hypothesis (H1) were restated below. 
H02: The individual CSR components of banks cannot predict their cost of    
          capital. 
Ha2: The individual CSR components of banks can predict their cost of capital. 
Consistent with Fisher’s (1935, p. 19) views, because the null hypotheses were phrased in 
a way that permitted their rejection, I speculated that the alternative hypotheses would be 
accepted if the corresponding null hypotheses were rejected. The associated statistical 
errors in terms of the chances of incorrect rejection of a true H0 and failure to reject a 
false H0 have been adequately considered in this study. I considered that the chance of 
Type I error (or alpha level) set at the conventional alpha level of 5% and the chance of 
Type II error set at the conventional 20% level were appropriate for this research. The 
aim of these measures was to preserve the reliability and generalizability of the 
conclusions to be drawn from the outcome of the statistical tests performed. 
Data Analysis 
The secondary data of this study were analyzed by means of multiple regression 
analytical tool, a dominant strategy in the recent empirical literature on this topic. 




market-based cost of capital model. I used IBM SPSS Version 21 for the statistical 
analysis to test the models. 
Models of the Study 
The two models in the study were to assist in testing the null hypotheses advanced 
with a view to answering the research questions posed. The models related the outcome 
variables to the predictors and the control variables with a provision for the statistical 
disturbance terms. The models were described below. 
 Accounting returns model. The first research question focused on the effect of 
the individual CSR factors on the accounting returns of the sampled banks controlling for 
the bank unique factors of size, risk, growth, and past FP and management preference 
factor of capital expenditure. I examined this research question by applying the multiple 




Subscripts = Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j 
FPit  = Financial performance for each US bank, measured as EBITDA  
   margin and MTB ratio separately 
β0   = Model intercept 
β1  = Slope of rating score of each CSR component 
Β2...5  = Slope of each control variable 
FPit = β0 + β1CSRjit-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3Levt + β4AssetGrowth + 




CSRjit-1 = Lagged rating score of CSR component j 
FPit-1  = Preceding year’s FP (ROA or Net-Earnings) 
TotAssett = Total Assets measuring the size of each bank  
Levt  = Leverage ratio   
AssetGrowth = Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total    
   assets during the preceding period. 
CapexRt =  Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure management  
   preference. 
ɛit  = Statistical disturbance term 
Although there were several empirical inquiries into the impact of the CSR on the 
accounting based FP such as Callan & Thomas (2009), Choi et al. (2010), Deng et al. 
(2013), Jo & Harjoto (2011), and Wu & Shen (2013), in most of such studies aggregate 
perspective was adopted, covering multiple industries and multiple countries, leading to 
the use of condensed CSR scores. The studies using the aggregated approach were tainted 
by the likely imperfect correlation of the individual CSR components (Scholtens, 2008) 
and were also likely to lead to inaccurate CSR scores that compromise the results (Goss 
& Robert, 2011). In order to obviate this challenge and also in line with the fact that 
stakeholders’ need is conceptually contextual, a more appropriate approach was to 
decompose the CSR scores by focusing on the individual components which underscored 




In this model, two dependent variables (EBITDA margin and MTB) were 
separately tested in line with the current practice of the empirical research on the topic. 
Thus in the first trial, the EBITDA margin was regressed against the CSR components 
and the control variables in the Equation 4 and in the second trial, the MTB was 
regressed against the CSR components and the control variables also in the Equation 4. 
The outcome of each trial was separately and independently interpreted which enabled 
the unique conclusions made.  
Market revealed cost of capital model.  
The second research question had to do with the effect of the individual CSR 
factors on the market revealed cost of capital as a measure of financial performance, 
controlling for the bank unique factors (total asset volume, asset growth, Leverage, 
EBITDA margin, MTB ratio, and market capitalization) and the management preference 
factors (the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset). In this regard, the cost of capital 
used was based on the revealed required rate of returns revealed in the stock market 
reflecting the premium for the systematic risk, premium for size and premium for the 
growth factor based on the Fama-French three-factor model. I therefore used the 






FF3FCOCit   =   β0 + β1jCSRijt-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3LEVERAGE +        
                 β4ASSETGRTH + β5EBITDAMgn + β6MTB + β7CAPEXR  




Subscripts  = Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j 
FF3FCOCit     = Cost of capital calculated using Fama-French three-factor  
   approach 
β0   = Model intercept 
β1j   = Slope of CSR component j 
CSRijt-1  = Lagged rating score of CSR component j 
MTB   = Current period’s MTB ratio 
EBITDAMGN = EBITDA margin 
LogTotAsset  = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage  = Ratio of debt to total asset, measuring leverage ratio.   
AssetGrth  = Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total   
    assets during the preceding period. 
CapexR  =  Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure  
    management preference. 
Log_ME  = Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
ɛit   = Stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and  
    insignificant, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
The cost of capital was determined based on the Fama and French (1993) 
formulation of the required rate of return reflecting the market premium, risk premium 
and growth premium, which is represented in the model in the Equation 6 below. 
 






E(Ri)  = Expected rate of return on stock portfolio (same as cost of equity). 
Rf   = Risk-free rate of return. 
E(Rm-Rf) = Expected excess return on the market index 
bi, Si, hi = Slopes of the variables or beta values. 
E(SMB) = Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a  
   portfolio of small stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of big  
   stocks. 
E(HML) = Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a  
   portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the excess return on a  
   portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
Many researchers have examined the relationship between the CSR and the 
market-determined financial returns, but only a few have addressed the effect of the 
individual CSR components on the financing cost of firms, banks in particular. Ghoul et 
al. (2011), Goss and Roberts (2011), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) alluded to this 
fact in their separate calls for future CSR studies with focus on financing cost, which 
underscored the essence of examining this research question.  
As in the accounting-based financial performance model, the dependent variable 
(cost of capital) was separately tested in this model in line with the current practice of the 




against the individual CSR factors in the Equation 6. The outcome interpreted to produce 
appropriate conclusions. 
Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis, which dominates the current empirical literature, is 
based on a number of assumptions. According to Field (2009, p. 220), these assumptions 
must be checked to be true before any meaningful conclusion is drawn about a 
population. Field explored nine of these assumptions: (1) measurement of variables, (2) 
presence of variance, (3) absence of perfect multicollinearity among the predictors,   (4) 
no strong correlation between the predictors and the external variables, (5) presence of 
homoscedasticity, (6) lack of autocorrelation of error terms, (7) normally distributed 
errors, (8) independence of data, and (9) linearity of relationship. Greene (2012, p. 56) 
added full rank to this list. I described each of these assumptions below and explained 
how it was tested in this study in order to permit the generalization of the conclusions 
drawn from the tests based on sample data to the entire population. 
Measurement of variables.  
Multiple regression analysis requires the predictor variables to be measurable at 
interval level or categorical (binary) variables. It also requires the outcome variable to be 
measurable at interval level or continuous, but most importantly to be unbounded, 
without any variability on the outcome. The secondary data used as the independent 
variables met this requirement. The indicators of the CSR components available in the 
KLD database were categorical values of 1 where the performance criterion is met and 0 




transformed these categorical values using 5-point scale of +2 to -2, with +2 representing 
two or more strengths, 1 representing one strength, 0 representing the presence of neither 
strength nor concern, -2 representing two or more concerns and -1 representing one 
concern. Such recent researchers include Callan and Thomas (2009) and Goss and 
Roberts (2011) as well as the much earlier studies of Graves and Waddock (1994, 2000), 
Hillman and Keim (2001), and Waddock and Graves (1997). As done in the earlier 
studies, I measured the CSR value of each indicator by scaling the KLD categorical 
ratings, based on the net of the strength and the concerns.  
Non-zero variance.  
The predictors are expected to have some variation in value; their variances 
should not be 0. Because, the CSR values to be used as predictors were transformed to 
interval level, they had variation in value, which satisfied this assumption. 
No perfect multicollinearity.  
Multiple regression analysis does not allow perfect linear relationship between the 
predictors, meaning that independent variables are not allowed to correlate too highly, 
though some moderate correlation may not noticeably distort the regression results. In 
this study, running multiple regression analysis in SPSS generated a table of the 
significance of correlation among the independent variables. I checked to ensure that 
none of these correlations was significant in order to satisfy the assumption of low 
multicollinearity. 




In order to ensure reliability of conclusions drawn from multiple regression 
analysis, predictors should not correlate with external variables or with the disturbance 
terms where external variables are subsumed in the disturbance terms. This implied that 
the predictors should not be a relevant factor in the prediction of the disturbance terms or 
the external variables. 
Homoscedasticity.  
This assumption of multiple regression is that variance of the residuals (or 
disturbance terms) at each level of predictor is constant and equal. In other words, 
heteroscedasticity – where variances are unequal – violates the assumption of multiple 
regression analysis and should be tested. SPSS helped to check that this assumption was 
not violated while testing the regression model with the study data. 
Lack of autocorrelation.  
Multiple regression analysis does not allow disturbances at different levels of 
observation to correlate with each other or to be dependent on each other. Field (2009, p. 
220) recommended testing this assumption with the Durbin-Watson test. Durbin-Watson 
test is a statistical procedure for detecting presence of serial correlations between 
disturbance errors/terms. I performed Durbin-Watson test in each regression model of 
this study. 
Normally distributed errors.  
In multiple regression analysis, randomness of residuals and normal distribution 
of variables with a mean of 0 are basic assumptions. The residuals represent the 




based on the model at each level of observation. These differences should be close to 0, 
and when this happens it confirms that the model is strong. I performed this test using 
residuals plot to confirm that the residuals have a mean that is close to 0. 
Independence.  
Multiple regression analysis assumes that the values of outcome variables come 
from separate entities, and are therefore independent. The assurance that this assumption 
was met was provided by the sampling frame which comprised different banks that were 
ethically rated.  
Linearity.  
The multiple regression analysis specifies a linear, straight line relationship 
between the outcome variable and the predictors, with a constant slope. The essence of 
this assumption is to permit fair generalizability of the findings. According to Field 
(2009, p. 247), linearity assumption is tested by a scatter plot of *ZRESID against 
*ZPRED. If there is no curve pattern in the scatter plot, then the relationship is linear and 
the assumption of linearity is met. 
Full rank.  
It is assumed in multiple regression analysis that no exact linear relationship 
exists between any of the independent variables. According to Greene (2012, p. 56), this 
assumption is necessary for estimation of the parameters of the regression model.   
Method of Entering Predictors into SPSS 
 In entering the predictor variables into the SPSS, I was guided by the common 




screens factors are commonly tested and known by researchers without any order of 
importance. Hence, hierarchical (blockwise entry) method of entering data into the SPSS 
is more appropriate for this study and was adopted. According to Field (2009, p. 212), 
hierarchical method requires that the known predictors are entered first followed by 
additional predictors. Thus, I entered the control variables first followed by the CSR 
factors. However, the control variables and predictors were entered as a block, implying a 
forced entry approach (Field). 
Interpreting the Output of the Multiple Regression Analysis 
For the purpose of testing the two hypotheses, the statistical alpha p value was set 
at 0.05. The decision to reject or not to reject the H0 in both cases was guided by the 
computed statistical significance value which was compared with the set p value of 0.05. 
Where the computed significance value was less than the set 0.05, the relationship was 
deemed to be significant and the H0 was rejected in favour of the Ha. Similarly, where the 
computed significance value exceeded the set 0.05, the relationship was deemed to be not 
statistically significant, so the H0 was not rejected. The other important results of the 
analysis were the signs and size of the coefficients of each CSR component. A 
component with positive coefficient showed positive relationship with the outcome 
variable while a component with negative sign indicated negative relationship of the 
component with the outcome variable. Finally, the strength of the relationship between 
the variables was measured by the size of the predictor’s coefficient. This was achieved 
by comparing the computed level of significance of the coefficient of each predictor with 




range .10-.30 was taken as low correlation, a coefficient in the range .40-.50 was taken as 
moderate correlation, and a coefficient of .60 and above was taken as high correlation. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I provided a direction of the study by articulating the philosophical 
assumptions and paradigms guiding the research. The quantitative research design used 
was also described and justified in the context of the literature. I identified the variables 
of the study, justified their selection and explained how they were operationalized. An 
insight was provided into the characteristics of the target population, where the 
population was located, as well as how the sample was drawn from this population with 
the explanation of how the sample size was determined based on the assessment of the 
practical implications of the statistical errors and the availability of complete data. The 
chapter also included the details of the method adopted in gathering the required data and 
how this data were analyzed. To conclude the chapter, I restated the hypotheses of the 
study, described how they were tested, explained the assumptions of the regression model 
and how these assumptions were tested. I also explained how the variables were entered 
into the SPSS as well as how the outputs of the SPSS regression analysis were 
interpreted. This chapter provided a basis for chapter 4 of the dissertation which focused 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
In this study, I examined the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) factors and financial performance indices in the banking sector of the United 
States. The purpose of this quantitative study was to contribute to the ongoing debate as 
to whether corporate social conduct has any effect on the financial performance of 
business organizations, and if it does, to understand the nature and significance of such 
effects. I envisaged that a good understanding of this relationship might empower 
business managers with the essential information they require for their routine resource 
allocative decisions. The emphasis of the study of the CSR was on both the accounting 
performance measures and the market-based financial performance measures, which are 
yet to be adequately addressed in the literature. 
Two research questions were proposed in this study. The first question was 
focused on the extent to which the individual CSR factors could predict the bank 
accounting performance when the effects of the bank unique and management preference 
factors are controlled. On this question, a bidimensional view was taken of the 
accounting performance: MTB ratio which integrates market-based performance 
indicator with book-based indicator and EBITDA margin which is purely book-based. 
The second question was whether the individual CSR factors of banks could help in 
predicting the banks’ cost of capital. The paucity of research into the market-based 




instrumental to the choice of market-revealed cost of capital as a measure of financial 
performance in the study of CSR. 
 As required of a scholarly study, a hypothesis was proposed for each of the 
research questions and the hypotheses were subjected to statistical testing. In Hypothesis 
1, I suggested that the individual CSR factors could predict the banks’ accounting 
performance. In Hypothesis 2, I suggested that the individual CSR factors of banks could 
predict the banks’ cost of capital. In both cases, the effects of the bank unique and 
management preference factors were well controlled to minimize the potential bias 
resulting from the interaction of these factors with the firm financial performance indices. 
As a factor analysis, both hypotheses were modelled using multiple regression statistical 
tools. The outcome of the statistical testing and modelling of these hypotheses is 
presented this chapter. 
Organization of Chapter 4 
 As a transitional material for the discussion of the study findings to provide 
insights for further advancement of academic inquiry on CSR, this chapter was focused 
on the discussion and interpretation of the findings from the statistical analyses 
performed on the collected data. The chapter was structured into four sections: (a) data 
collection, where I described how the data was collected, the timeframe as well as other 
conditions stipulated in the approval to collect data, and data collection outcome vis-à-vis 
the plan; (b) descriptive statistical analysis of the collected data, where I discussed the 
outcome of subjecting the collected data to basic statistical analysis and, based on the 




statistical data analysis, where I discussed the findings from the statistical analyses 
performed based on the hypotheses of the study; and (d) summary of results, where I 
bring all the findings on the descriptive and inferential analysis together and indicated a 
transition to chapter 5. 
Data Collection 
IRB Approval for Data Collection 
 I obtained the IRB’s approval for this doctoral capstone, with the approval No. 
11-20-15-0158708. The approval was contingent upon my adherence to the procedures 
described in the application requests, which emphasized strict compliance with ethical 
requirements for Walden doctoral capstone. In collecting the data, I was strictly guided 
by the details of the IRB procedures. I commenced the data collection from the various 
sources after the approval was granted and concluded it within 6 weeks of receiving 
approval.  
Sources of Collected Data 
 As stated in chapter 1 and chapter 3, this study was conducted using secondary 
data of different types from multiple sources. The CSR ratings which formed the 
independent variables of the study were obtained from MSCI ESG Research Inc. The 
financial data which formed the dependent variables and control variables were obtained 
from the Bankscope database, based on the mandatory returns filed by the individual 
organizations. Stock price data were obtained from the Yahoo! database based on their 




firms) of the sampled banks from the Yahoo! Finance database to aid in the computation 
of the cost of capital used in testing the study hypotheses.  
Apart from Yahoo! Finance, which is publicly and freely available, I obtained the 
required permission from the respective database organizations before I could gain access 
to the other data sources. Some of these sources required payment of registration and 
subscription fees before I could gain access to the data. The starting point was to select 
the sample banks that had been socially rated by the MSCI ESG Inc. 
US Financial Services Sector and MSCI Socially Rated Banks 
 Financial data were available for 5,535 financial service providers in the United 
States based on the mandatory periodic returns filed with the company registry, but not 
all of these firms were socially rated by MSCI ESG Inc. MSCI publishes social ratings 
for over 3,000 large companies in the United State, covering different sectors of the 
economy, though I observed that social ratings were available for only 370 of the firms 
that provide banking related services including credit services, savings & loan, money 
center banks, and regional banks subsectors. The subsectorial composition of the 
financial service providers for which CSR ratings data were available is presented in 
Table 3.   
Table 3 
Sectorial Composition of Banks with CSR Ratings 
S/n Subsector No. of Firms Proportion  




2 Savings & loans 31 8% 
3 Money center banks  41 11% 
5 Regional banks 192 45% 
 Total 370  
 
Selection of Sample 
 In chapter 3, I proposed a sample size of 92 banks based on random selection. The 
sampling frame comprises the banks that (a) were socially rated by MSCI, (b) had 
complete financial data in the Bankscope database, and (c) were listed on the US stock 
exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ). Although financial data were available for 5,535 
financial service providers in the United Stated, MSCI ratings were available for only 370 
large banks. Further reviewed showed that complete financial data were not available for 
207 of the CSR-rated banks and stock information was also not available for another set 
of 92 CSR-rated banks. The unavailability of the essential information necessitated that 
these 299 banks (207 plus 92) be dropped from the sampling population. The sample of 
this study therefore comprised the remaining 71 banks. The sampled banks, which cut 
across four subsectors of the US finance industry, were geographically spread across the 
country. The sectorial and geographical distribution of the sample is presented in Table 4. 
The complete list of the banks is detailed in Appendix B. 
Table 4 




Sector No. of firms Proportion 
Credit Services 9 13% 
Foreign Money Center Banks 1 1% 
Foreign Regional Banks 2 3% 
Money Center Banks 5 7% 
Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks 5 7% 
Regional - Midwest Banks 13 18% 
Regional - Northeast Banks 5 7% 
Regional - Pacific Banks 8 11% 
Regional - Southeast Banks 5 7% 
Regional - Southwest  Banks 7 10% 
Savings & Loans 11 15% 
Total 71 
  
 A sample size of 71 banks was considered to be large. Review showed that the 
selected banks had complete CSR ratings, financial data, and stock market data required 
for the study. I did not encounter any situation relating to missing data. The 71 sampled 
banks were listed on the stock exchange, 15 on NYSE and 56 on NASDAQ. 
MSCI Socially Rated Banks 
 MSCI CSR ratings covered the seven qualitative screens of community, 
governance, diversity, employee relation, product, environment and human right and the 




tobacco. However, a review of the available information for the banking sector on the 
database showed that ratings were available only for community, governance, diversity, 
employee relation, and product. The banks were not rated for environment and human 
rights as well as the exclusionary factors, apparently due to the nature of the banking 
industry.  
The independent variables of the study were therefore restricted to the five CSR 
factors of community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product for which 
ratings were available. The available ratings were in the form of 0 or 1, indicating the 
firm’s performance under each factor element. Like many other researchers, the 
difference between the sums of strengths and concerns under each factor was used as the 
score for that CSR factor. The binary ratings were then transformed using natural 
logarithms to make them suitable for regression analysis. 
The observed peculiarity of the selection of the sample, based on the intersection 
of three independent databases (MSCI, Bankscope, and Stock Exchanges), in no way 
diminishes the external validity of the research. The joint availability of data from the 
three independent sources for each of the selected bank is to a large extent random since 
the data sources were completely independent. 
Inclusion of Covariates in the Regression Models 
 The two research hypotheses in this study were tested using factor analysis based 
on multiple regression models. Three dependent variables were involved in the study 
comprising EBITDA margin, MTB ratio, and Cost of Capital based on Fama-French 




value factor when determining the investors’ required rates of returns. Each of the 
dependent variables is a measure of financial performance. While EBITDA margin, a 
purely accounting return, is capable of being manipulated by management, MTB ratio is 
also subject to potential manipulation through the determination of the book value per 
share. But cost of capital is entirely market determined, devoid of potential manipulation 
by management. The CSR factors were rated by independent organizations based on a 
number of criteria some of which were based on surveys, publications, and expert 
opinion. Following the independent determination of the dependent and the independent 
variables, it is not unreasonable to claim that the social performance when significant 
should influence the financial performance. But it has been established in the prior 
literature that some financial factors largely explain financial performance measures. This 
suggests that the known confounding financial factors be controlled in the study. This 
was the basis of controlling for size in terms of asset volume, growth in terms of asset 
growth rate, previous year’s performance, market capitalization, and capital expenditure. 
Data were collected on each of these covariates and their effects on the dependent 
variable were isolated to permit a reasonable testing of the effect of the CSR factors on 
the financial performance measures. The univariate properties of the individual variables 
are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Univariate Properties of the Study Variables 




EBITDAMgn .0028 .8026 .290181 .1920500 71 
MTB .0693 3.5263 1.0539 .5318848 71 
FF3FCOC .0569 .1905 .10922 .02452 71 
COMscore 1.3863 2.0794 1.6130 .16305 71 
GOVscore 1.0986 1.7918 1.6821 .1570 71 
DIVscore 1.3863 2.0794 1.6314 .1959 71 
EMPRscore 1.3863 1.7918 1.5631 .1119 71 
PRODscore .6931 1.6094 1.5902 .1142 71 
LogTotAsset 20.7649 25.0842 22.4800 .9547 71 
ASSETGRTH .6506 .9775 .8030 .0606 71 
CAPEXR -.0509 .0000 -.0027 .0071 71 
EBITDAMgnt-1 .0033 .8311 .29166 .1973 71 
MTBt-1 .0603 3.5289 1.0201 .5344 71 
Leverage .0024 .3863 .0965 .0459 71 
LogME 17.7443 24.1239 20.4691 1.2405 71 
 
The statistical variation in these variables was further explored in the descriptive 
statistical analysis supra. 
Plan Implementation Challenges 
 While implementing the research plan I did not encounter any serious challenge 
that could warrant a significant change in the methodology. I was only confronted with 




and also to drop the contemplation to examine the whole of the 13 CSR factors as the 
predictors. It was also not possible to consider the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) as a measure of financial performance because the ingredients necessary to 
determine each bank’s cost of debt were largely unavailable. Consequently, the equity 
cost of capital was taken as the cost of capital for the study. 
Determination of Fama-French Three Factor Model Cost of Capital 
 I computed the cost of capital based on the Fama-French three-factor model 
(FF3FM). This requires the determination of the excess returns due to market premium or 
systematic risk, size factor, and value factor.  
Premium for excess market returns. 
In line with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), an excess return on market is 
determined as: 
Ri – Rf = Betai (ERm – Rf)     (7) 
In the Equation 7, Ri is the required rate of return expected by the investors, Rf represents 
the risk-free rate of return in the economy, Betai stands for the measure of the systematic 
risk on the individual security, and ERm represents the expected return on the market. 
The ERm was determined from the market return based on the average return on 
the NYSE index and NASDAQ index over a period of 5 years from January 2010 to 
December 2014. The two exchanges were used since the sampled banks were listed in 
either NYSE or NASDAQ. The excess market returns from the average returns and the 
risk free rate are presented in Table 6. The 30-day return on the US treasury stock was 




the Treasury, 2015). The calculated rate based on the individual firm betas represents the 
portfolio return that mimics the market risk premium factor, which is the same as 
determined under the single factor CAPM model. 
Table 6 
Determination of Excess Market Returns for Systematic Risk 
Exchange No. of sampled 
firms listed 
Average Daily 
Returns on Index 
over 5 Years 
Rf Excess Market 
Returns (Rm-Rf) 
NASDAQ 56 12.131% 2.21% 9.921% 
NYSE 15 10.328% 2.21% 8.118% 
Excess Market Returns  ERm - Rf   = 9.019% 
 
The premium for systematic risk was determined by multiplying the individual security’s 
beta and the excess market returns of 9.019%.    
Premium for size factor (SMB). 
The premiums for the size and value factors were determined following Fama and 
French (1993). I ranked the average returns of the sampled firms by their market 
capitalization and categorized them into the top 20 percentile as the Big and bottom 80 
percentile as the Small. I also ranked the average returns of the sampled banks by their 
book-to-market  (BTM) ratio, categorizing the top 30 percentile as the Value, the bottom 
30 percentile as the Growth portfolio, and the middle 40 percentile as the Neutral. When 
combined, I obtained the intersection of the stocks comprising SmallValue, SmallNeutral, 




Neutral, and BigGrowth constituting Big portfolio on the other hand. Yielding 0.24% as 
the size factor returns, the average of the total returns of the three Small portfolios minus 
the average of the total returns of the three Big portfolios are presented in Table 7. This is 
the portfolio return that mimics the size factor, for which investors expect some 
compensation. The expectation of Fama and French (1993) was that this premium should 
be added to the required rates of return on the securities in the portfolio. 
Table 7 
Calculation of Size Factor Returns (SMB) 
Small Portfolio Big Portfolio 
Portfolio No Total Returns Average Intersection No. Total Returns Average 
SmallValue 3 27.367% 9.122% BigValue 18 114.524% 6.362% 
SmallNeutral 7 34.631% 4.947% BigNeutral 22 117.123% 5.324% 
SmallGrowth 4 16.577% 4.144% BigGrowth 17 98.679% 5.805% 
  14 Average 6.071%   57 Average 5.830% 
Note: Average returns of Small minus Big is 0.24%, calculated as 6.071% - 5.830%. 
Premium for value factor (HML). 
Also following Fama and French (1993), the premium for value factor was 
determined by creating two portfolios – High portfolio and Low portfolio – and 
subtracting the average return of the Low portfolio from that of the High portfolio. The 
calculation of value factor returns as 2.77% is presented in Table 8. This is the portfolio 
that mimics the value or growth factor for which investors also require some 
compensation. Fama and French (1993) also contended that this premium be added to the 
investors’ required rates of return. 
Table 8 




High Portfolio Low Portfolio 
Portfolio No Total Returns Average Portfolio No Total Returns Average 
BigValue 18 114.524% 6.362% BigGrowth 17 98.679% 5.805% 
SmallValue 3 27.367% 9.122% SmallGrowth 4 16.577% 4.144% 
  21 Average 7.742%   21 Average 4.975% 
Note: Average returns of High minus Low is 2.77%, calculated as 7.742% - 4.975%. 
 The sum of premium for systematic risk, premium for size factor, premium for 
value/growth factor, and the risk free rate gives the total required rates of returns which 
represents the cost of capital used in the study. Appendix C shows the details of 
premiums and the resulting cost of capital for each firm in the selected sample. 
Data Analysis: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 1 
 In Hypothesis 1, the control variables include asset volume, asset growth, capital 
expenditure/total asset ratio, leverage ratio, market capitalization, and prior-year financial 
performance measure (using EBITDA margin or MTB ratio if the dependent variable is 
EBITDA margin or MTB ratio respectively). In either case, the statistical descriptives of 
these control variables are presented in Table 9. Although, the control variables were 
measured in absolute values, ratios, or percentages, where control variables were 
measured in absolute values, the natural logarithmic values were calculated using 
Microsoft Excel function before they were used in the regression model and SPSS. 
Table 9 
Statistical Descriptives of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 1 
Variable Min Max M S.D. N 
TotAssets ($'m) 1,042.51 78,330.43 9,488.77 12,200.48 71 




Market Capitalization ($'m) 50.85 29,983.14 1,944.91 4280.89 71 
Log_ME 17.7443 24.1239 20.4691 1.2405 71 
AssetGrwth (%) 65.06 97.75 80.30 6.06 71 
Capex/Asset (ratio) -.0509 .0000 -.0027 .0071 71 
EBITDAMgnt-1 (%) .33 83.11 29.17 19.73 71 
MTB t-1 .0603 3.5289 1.0201 .5344 71 
Leverage (%) .24 38.63 9.65 4.59 71 
 
As stated in the earlier chapters, the financial data used for this study were 
publicly available, based on the mandatory regular returns filed by individual banks. The 
financial data of each bank were pulled for 5 years, from 2010 to 2014 and their simple 
averages were computed and used to measure the control variables. In several prior 
studies, size of firms was adequately controlled in the regression models. I adopted a 
bidimensional approach to controlling for the size in the model, using both book value 
approach and market value approach. I therefore collected financial data on the total 
assets for the five-year period. The 71 sampled banks recorded total assets of $673.7 
billion for each year from 2010 to 2014, which translated to the average total asset 
volume of $9.49 billion ($5.218 billion, median) per bank per year. The asset values were 
then transformed to their natural logarithms to make them suitable for regression 
analysis. This produced an average log value of 22.48 (22.38, median). The yearend 
market values were extracted from the financial data collected. The annual total market 
value stood at $138.09 billion for the sampled banks, with mean market value of $1.944 
billion per bank ($708 million, median) for each of the 5 years. Growth factor was 
controlled in the Hypothesis 1 and it was measured as the annual growth rate of each 




median) in total assets of the selected banks. Risk was also controlled in the Hypothesis 
1, as prior research showed that risk had significant influence on the accounting returns. 
In this study, I measured risk as the leverage ratio; that is, the ratio of debt to capital 
employed. Leverage ratio was also included in the financial returns filed by banks. For 
the sampled banks, leverage ratio had a mean value of 9.65% (9.25%, median). Prior year 
accounting returns were controlled in the Hypothesis 1. When the dependent variable was 
EBITDA margin, the prior year EBITDA margin (or EBITDAMgnt-1) was controlled and 
when the dependent variable was taken as MTB ratio, the prior year MTB (i.e., MTBt-1) 
was controlled in the regression models. In both cases, the financial data collected 
showed the average prior year EBITDA margin as 29.17% (27.74%, median) and the 
average prior year MTB ratio as 1.02 (0.918, median). Finally, management preference 
factor, which prior researchers have established to significantly influence accounting 
returns, was controlled in the Hypothesis 1. As stated in the earlier chapters, I 
operationalized management preference factor as the ratio of capital expenditure to total 
assets, since capital expenditure is a discretionary expenditure made by management to 
influence financial performance. Descriptive statistics showed an average ratio of 
0.0027:1 for capital expenditure/total assets for each of the 5 years involved for each 
bank (0.0027, median). I expected that if these variables were appropriately measured as 
indicated and included in the regression model, their influence would be effectively 
isolated from the dependent variables in Hypothesis 1. 




 In Hypothesis 1, I claimed that corporate social responsibility factors could 
predict the financial performance of banks. In this hypothesis, I sought to measure the 
financial performance using both accounting (book) returns subject to the full managerial 
control and partially market based returns. For these measures, I used EBITDA margin 
and MTB ratio respectively. The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are 
shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Statistical Descriptives of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 1 
Variable Min Max M S.D. N 
EBITDA Margin (%) 0.28 80.26 29.02 19.21 71 
MTB (ratio) 0.0693 3.5263 1.0539 .5319 71 
 
EBITDA margin and MTB ratio were among the mandatory returns firms were 
required to file with the company registry. EBITDA margin is measured as EBITDA a 
percentage of revenue or turnover for the year. The sampled banks recorded an average 
annual EBITDA margin of 29.02% (26.19%, median). MTB, though reported by the 
sampled firms, is measured as the ratio of Market Price per share (MPS) to Book Value 
per share (BVPS). The sampled banks reported a mean MTB of 1.054 (0.946, median). 
The values of these dependent variables were fed directly into the regression model as 
they were not below the interval measurement level. 




 The focus of the Hypothesis 2 was on the testing of the market-based cost of 
capital of the sampled banks. I therefore claimed that corporate social responsibility 
factors of banks could predict the banks’ cost of capital. In order to preserve the 
predictive value of the corporate social responsibilities on the cost of capital, I controlled 
for the size measured by the asset volume and market capitalization, the growth measured 
by the annual growth rate in asset volume, and the financial returns measured by 
EBITDA margin and MTB ratio. While the descriptive statistics of the size and growth 
(asset volume/market capitalization and asset growth rate) have earlier been reported 
under Table 9, the descriptive statistics of the EBITDA margin and MTB ratio were 
reported under Table 10. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables in Hypotheses 1 and 2 
The individual corporate social responsibility (CSR) factors represent the 
independent variables for both hypotheses. Leaning on the research methodology of 
MSCI for CSR, I tested the MSCI’s ratings for community, governance, diversity, 
employee relations, and product. I interacted with the MSCI Research Inc. who provided 
access to the ratings data used for this study. The 3 year ratings data collected covered the 
period from 2011 to 2013 to ensure a 1-year lag against the financial data for the period 
2012 to 2014 to permit the testing of Granger causality of the models. The CSR ratings 
scores for each CSR factor are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 








Employee Relation 341 
Product 350 
Aggregate (Total) 1808 
 
In calculating the scores, consideration was given to the fact that environmental 
and human right factors were ignored in this study. This was because MSCI did not 
provide performance ratings for these factors. Exclusion was therefore justified in order 
not to bias the model. Table 11 showed that governance had the highest performance 
scores while employee relation factor had the least scores. The impact of each of these 
factors on the financial performance was the subject of the testing of the Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 2. To arrive at these overall scores for each factor, I summed the binary 
scores for strength and concern separately, and subtracted the sums of concern from those 
of the strength. The natural logarithmic values of the resultant sums were then taken to 
standardize the values and make them suitable for regression. As a check, these figures 
can be converted back using the Excel exponent function. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypothesis 2 
Having obtained the Fama-French three-factor cost of capital by pulling the 




in Table 7, and the premium for value factor in Table 8, together with the risk free factor, 
I obtained a distribution of the cost of capital which was then regressed against the 
individual bank’s independent variables (i.e., individual CSR factors). For this purpose, 
the distribution of the estimated cost of capital is presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics of the Estimated Cost of Capital  
Variable Min Max M S.D. N 
FF3FCOC  5.69 19.05 10.92 2.45 71 
 
The 71 sampled banks reported mean cost of capital of 10.92% (11.03%, median) for 
each of the 5 years sampled, 2010 to 2014.  
Data Analysis: Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions and Hypothesis Testing 
 In this section, I explore the SPSS outputs on the models presented in order to 
assess the level of their compliance with the regression assumptions made in chapter 3. 
This analysis is organized along the themes of study hypotheses. While testing each 
model, I evaluated the extent to which the linear regression assumptions were met or 
violated. The principal of such assumptions included multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, 
auto-correlation, and normality of distribution. I adopted triangulated approach to assess 
compliance with these assumptions by using plots and statistical numbers for the 
evaluation. 




 The first hypothesis of the study, focused on the relation between the individual 
CSR factors and the accounting returns is restated as follows: 
H01:  The individual CSR factors of banks cannot predict the banks’ 
 accounting performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique 
 and the management preference factors. 
Ha2:   The individual CSR components of banks can predict the banks’ 
 accounting performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique 
 and the management preference factors. 
The underlying research question that led to this hypothesis is: To what extent can the 
individual CSR factors of banks predict the bank accounting returns, controlling for the 
effects of bank unique and management preference factors?  The focus was therefore on 
the measurement of the effect of the individual CSR factors on the accounting 
performance measures. In chapters 1 and 3, I specified a regression model in the Equation 




Subscripts = Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j 
FPit  = Financial performance for each US bank, measured as EBITDA  
   margin and MTB ratio separately 
FPit = β0 + β1CSRjit-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3Levt + β4AssetGrowth + 





β0   = Model intercept 
β1  = Slope of rating score of each CSR component 
Β2...5  = Slope of each control variable 
CSRjit-1 = Lagged rating score of CSR component j 
FPit-1  = Preceding year’s FP (ROA or Net-Earnings) 
TotAssett = Total Assets measuring the size of each bank  
Levt  = Leverage ratio   
AssetGrowth = Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total    
   assets during the preceding period. 
CapexRt =  Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure management  
   preference. 
ɛit  = Statistical disturbance term 
I lagged the CSR factors by 1 year in order to examine the proposition that the individual 
CSR factors in a prior period Granger-influences the firm accounting returns in the 
subsequent period.  
Evaluating the EBITDAMgn regression model.  
In the first part of this model, EBITDA margin (a measure of accounting 
performance) was regressed against the individual CSR factors (Comscore, Govscore, 
Divscore, Empscore, and Prodscore) and the specified control variables (TotAsset, 
AssetGrowth, Leverage, EBITDAMgnt-1, and CapexR). Essentially, I entered 




method through the forced entry approach by entering the control variables in a block and 
the independent variables in another block without following any order. The control 
variables were entered all at once as a block, and, later, the independent variables were 
entered in the second block, also all at once. This strategy was to enable me isolate the 
effects of the control variables on the dependent variable. Because I made no decision on 
the order of entry of the variables in either block, all the variables within each block were 
entered once, thus adopting a forced entry approach. According to Field (2009, p. 212), a 
forced entry approach is appropriate for theory testing.  
Running the EBITDAMgn regression model yielded the model summary detailed 
in the Table 13, showing the extent to which the model was successful in predicting 
EBITDAMgn from the individual CSR scores. 
Table 13 
EBITDAMgn Regression Model: Model Summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .983a .966 .962 .0371967 .966 300.338 6 64 .000 
 
2 .983b .967 .961 .0379379 .001 .505 5 59 .771 1.923 
Note: 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EBITDAMgnt-1, Leverage, ASSETGRTH, LogTotAsset, LogME, CAPEXR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), EBITDAMgn t-1, Leverage, ASSETGRTH, LogTotAsset, LogME, CAPEXR, COMscore, 
GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore, PRODscore. 
 
 
The regression outputs detailed in Table 13 and Table 14 showed that the linear 






 = .97, adjusted R
2 
= .96, F(11, 59) = 157.71, p < .001. The control 
variables predicted EBITDAMgn significantly over and above the CSR scores, R
2
 = .97, 
F(6, 64) = 300.34, p < .001, but the CSR scores did not predict EBITDAMgn 
significantly after partialling out  the effects of the control variables, R
2
 change = .001, 
F(5, 59) = .51, p = .77. Based on these results, the CSR scores appear to offer little 
additional predictive power. 
Further, the SPSS model summary showed that the relationship between the 
control variables (EBITDAMgnt-1, Leverage, AssetGrowth, LogTotAsset, LogME, and 
CAPEXR) and the outcome variable (EBITDAMgn) was significant, R = .98, adjusted R
2
 
= .96, F(6,64) = 300.34, p < .001. The independent variables (COMscore, GOVscore, 
DIVscore, EMPRscore, and PRODscore) did not predict significantly over and above the 
control variable measures, R
2
 change = .001, F(5,59) = .51, p = .78.  The difference 
between the R
2
 and the Adjusted R
2
 was only .001, or .1%. This marginal difference 
suggests that if the model were to be applied to the population rather than the sample, 
variance would be reduced by merely .1%, which is negligible. It then suggests that the 
model, though largely explained by the control variables, could well generalize the ideal 
world with a strong goodness of fit. As advised by Field (2009, p. 222), a test of the 
cross-validity of the EBITDA margin model was performed by calculating the Adjusted 
R
2




=1  –       n-1      n-2        n+1        








where ‘n’ represents the sample size and ‘k’ stands for the number of independent 
variables. 
The performance of this test showed that the adjusted R
2
 calculated was .95 which 
was close to the SPPS-determined adjusted R
2
 of .97 and provided a further testament 
that the cross validity of this model was good.  
Table 14 presents the ANOVA result of the test whether the EBITDAMgn model 
significantly predicted the outcome better than the mean. When only control variables 
were included in the model, the EBITDAMgn was strongly predicted by these control 
variables, F(6,64) = 300.34, significant, p < .001. The inclusion of the CSR scores (the 
independent variables) into the model did not yield a significant improvement in the 
explained variation, R
2
 change = .001, F(5,59) = .51, p = .78. This was interpreted to 
mean that the observed marginal improvement resulting from the inclusion of the CSR 
scores into the EBITDAMgn regression model could have occurred by chance. 
In summary, when the model included only the control variables, it strongly 
predicted the EBITDAMgn,  F(6,64) = 300.34, significant, p < .001. Again, when the 
model included both the control variables and the criterion variables (the CSR factors), it 
still predicted the criterion variable strongly, F(11,59) = 157.71, significant, p < .001, 
though with a substantial reduction in the F value. This could be interpreted to mean that 
the improvement due to the regression model was not unlikely to have occurred by 
chance. 
Table 14 





Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2.493 6 .416 300.338 .000
b
 
Residual .089 64 .001   
Total 2.582 70    
2 
Regression 2.497 11 .227 157.712 .000
c
 
Residual .085 59 .001   
Total 2.582 70    
 
Test of autocorrelation in the EBITDAMgn model. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.923 shown in Table 13 is indicative of the 
presence or absence of autocorrelation in the data. As a convenient rule, Field (2009, 
p.236) suggested that Durbin-Watson statistic either lying between 1 and 3 or being close 
to 2 showed absence of autocorrelation. In this model, Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.9 lies 
between 1 and 3, and is also close to 2, implying lack of autocorrelation in the data. 
Autocorrelation is an independence error that occurs when two observations have 
residual terms that are correlated. Regression analysis assumes that residual terms must 
not be correlated. 
Evaluating the parameters in the EBITDAMgn model. 
 The parameters in the EBITDA margin model were evaluated, including the beta 
and correlation coefficients. The summary of the coefficients for each of the variables is 





Coefficients in the EBITDA Margin Model 






t Sig. 95.0% Confidence  
Interval for B 
Correlations Collinearity  
Statistics 
B Std.  
Error 






Partial Part Tole- 
rance 
VIF 
(Constant) -.100 .208  -.480 .633 -.517 .317      
LogTotAsset .012 .005 .059 2.362 .021 .002 .022 -.193 .294 .056 .884 1.131 
ASSETGRTH -.004 .089 -.001 -.051 .960 -.182 .173 .058 -.007 -.001 .711 1.407 
CAPEXR .326 .751 .012 .434 .666 -1.176 1.828 .089 .056 .010 .732 1.366 
Leverage -.046 .128 -.011 -.363 .718 -.302 .209 .019 -.047 -.009 .598 1.671 
LogME -.004 .004 -.025 -.916 .364 -.012 .005 .057 -.118 -.022 .767 1.303 
EBITDAMgnt-1 .973 .024 .999 40.186 .000 .924 1.021 .981 .982 .949 .901 1.110 
COMscore -.036 .031 -.030 -1.133 .262 -.098 .027 -.034 -.146 -.027 .786 1.273 
GOVscore .002 .040 .002 .055 .957 -.077 .082 .018 .007 .001 .528 1.893 
DIVscore .003 .025 .004 .137 .891 -.047 .054 .022 .018 .003 .840 1.190 
EMPRscore .025 .044 .015 .578 .565 -.062 .113 .000 .075 .014 .852 1.174 












From the model, the standardized beta values/coefficients of COMscore and 
PRODscore were negative implying that efforts made to improve community and product 
scores might hurt margin. The standardized beta values of GOVscore, DIVscore and 
EMPRscore were positive implying that greater efforts aimed at improving these social 
scores might lead to some improvement in the margin. The standardized betas of all the 
CSR scores did not appear to be tangible, because their t values were not significant, 
p>.05. Among the control variables, only AssetGrowth, Leverage, and LogME showed 
negative relationship with EBITDA margin while the other ones (TotAsset, 
EBITDAMgnt-1 and CapexR) showed positive relationship. The coefficient of 
EBITDAMgn t-1 was significant and not likely to be due to chance, with t = 2.36, p = .02. 
Also the standardized beta value of LogTotAsset was equally significant, t = 40.19, p 
<.001. The standardized betas of the other control variables (AssetGrowth, CapexR, 
Leverage and ME) were not significant, p > .05. This implied that their beta values might 
be due to chances and might not be significantly different from 0. Finally, the alpha value 
of the model (β0) is 0, with t = -.48, p = .63 (not significant). 
EBITDAMGNt = -0.1 - 0.03LogCOMscore + 0.002LogGOVscore +  
 0.004LogDIVscore + 0.02LogEMPRscore -     
 0.02LogPRODscore + 0.06LogTotAssett - 0.01Lev -   
 0.001AssetGrowth +  EBITDAMgnt-1 + 0.12CapexR  -   




Test of assumptions of collinearity in the EBITDAMgn model. 
 The collinearity statistics, which was required to assess the presence or absence of 
multicollinearity in the data, was also shown in Table 15. As a rule of thumb, if the 
largest variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than 10, there is evidence of collinearity 
in the data. Also as a rule of thumb, a tolerance below 0.1 shows presence of a serious 
problem with collinearity and tolerance below 0.2 equally indicates a potential problem. 
The largest VIF of 1.9 and the lowest tolerance (1/VIF) of 0.53 are within the acceptable 
range, indicating that multicollinearity was not present in the data.  
Evaluating the correlation coefficients in the EBITDAMgn model. 
 The Pearson partial correlation coefficient for EBITDA margin model was 
presented in Table 16, showing that no significant correlation was recorded between 
EBITDA margin and all the variables in the model. The only exception was the previous 
EBITDA margin which was highly correlated with the EBITDA margin, with R = .98, 
p<.001. The strong positive correlation between the current year EBITDA margin and the 
previous year EBITDA margin is understandable since they are an extension of each 
other. Notwithstanding, LogTotAsset and COMscore showed negative correlation 
coefficients, implying a tendency to have negative relationships with the EBITDA 
margin, while other variables showed positive correlation coefficients suggesting positive 
relationships with the EBITDA margin. A review of the correlation matrix presented in 
Table 16 did not show correlation coefficient (r) that is greater than .9, apart from the 
EBITDA margins of the current and the previous years. This also supported the fact that 





Correlation Coefficients in the EBITDA Margin Model 


















EBITDAMgin 1.000            
LogTotAsset -.193 1.000           
Sig. (1-tailed) .054            
ASSETGRTH .058 -.031 1.000          
Sig. (1-tailed) .315 .398           
CAPEXR .089 -.135 -.306 1.000         
Sig. (1-tailed) .231 .131 .005          
Leverage .019 -.176 -.182 .357 1.000        
Sig. (1-tailed) .439 .071 .064 .001         
LogME .057 .037 .299 -.033 -.295 1.000       
Sig. (1-tailed) .319 .380 .006 .394 .006        
EBITDAMgnt-1 .981 -.250 .072 .087 .030 .075 1.000      
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .018 .275 .234 .401 .267       
COMscore -.034 -.045 .102 -.026 .118 -.090 -.008 1.000     
Sig. (1-tailed) .388 .355 .199 .415 .164 .227 .475      
GOVscore .018 .078 .006 -.148 -.380 .076 .009 -.403 1.000    
Sig. (1-tailed) .441 .260 .481 .110 .001 .264 .469 .000     
DIVscore .022 -.079 .072 .015 .142 -.104 .020 .055 -.354 1.000   




EMPRscore .000 -.078 -.172 -.061 .178 .017 -.005 .077 .029 -.020 1.000  
Sig. (1-tailed) .498 .258 .076 .305 .069 .444 .484 .262 .404 .435   
PRODscore .094 .081 -.159 -.024 .033 .034 .110 -.195 .387 -.178 -.015 1.000 





In terms of the effect size, Field (2009, p. 57) suggested that correlation 
coefficients also stand for the effect size of the regression model, with +-.1, +-.3, and +-.5 
representing small effect, medium effect, and large effect respectively. The effect size of 
the variables that reported effect in the testing of the EBITDA margin model is presented 
in Table 17. The other variables did not report any significant effect. 
Table 17 
Determination of Effect Size in the EBITDAMgn Model 
Variable r Effect Size 
EBITDAMgnt-1 .98 Large 
LogTotAsset -.19 Small 
AssetGrowth .06 Small 
CapexR .09 Small 
LogME .06 Small 
PRODscore .09 Small 
 
Evaluation of homoscedasticity assumption in the EBITDAMgn model. 
 In regression analysis it is assumed that at each level of the predictor variables, 
the variances of the residuals should be constant (Field, 2009, p. 220). The constancy of 
the variances in this manner is referred to as homoscedasticity while the lack of it is 
referred to as heteroscedasticity. Following Field’s (2009) suggestion, I used a scatter 





Figure 3: Plot of  *ZRESID against *ZPRED for EBITDAMgn OLS Regression Model 
According to Field (2009, p. 247), the assumption of homoscedasticity is met only 
when the dots in the plot are random and the graph does not funnel out. The dots in the 
Figure 3 are scattered without any clear pattern and the graph did not funnel out, so the 
assumption of homoscedasticity was met in this data. 
Test of linearity assumption in the EBITDAMgn model. 
Linearity is a fundamental assumption of regression analysis. Field (2009, p. 247) 
suggested that linearity assumption be tested by a scatter plot of *ZRESID against 
*ZPRED. According to him, if there is no curve pattern in the scatter plot, then the 
relationship is linear and the assumption of linearity is met. The dots in the Figure 3 did 
not reveal any curve pattern or curvilinear relationship between the *ZRESID and 
*ZPRED. Therefore, the linearity assumption was met in the EBITDAMgn model. 
Test of homogeneity of variance assumption in the EBITDAMgn model. 
Regression analysis assumes that variances are homogeneous. Accordding to 




Table 18, the Levene’s statistic of the mean of the distribution is not significant, Levene’s 
statistic = 0.77, p = .47. This implied that the assumption of homogeneity of variances 
was not violated in the data. 
Table 18 
Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
EBITDAMgn 
Based on Mean .766 2 66 .469 
Based on Median .619 2 66 .541 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
.619 2 58.897 .542 
Based on trimmed mean .653 2 66 .524 
 
Evaluation of normality assumption in the EBITDAMgn model.  
 Another assumption of the regression analysis is the normality of the distribution. 
In this study, I tested normality through the use of histograms. The Figure 4 below is the 
histogram with a fitted normal curve for the EBITDA margin model. The normal bell-
shaped curve around the histogram is indicative of a data that reflects normal distribution 
with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
 




The normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual for EBITDA margin in 
Figure 5 indicates some variations of the residuals from the regression line. Field (2009, 
p. 248) suggested that quantitative test be performed to confirm if such a plot is 
significantly outside a normal distribution. 
 
Figure 5. Normal P-P Plot of the expected against the observed cumulated probability for 
the EBITDAMgn OLS Model. 
I explored two quantitative tests of normality assumption. First, I examined the 
skewness and kurtosis and computed their standardized scores. Field (2009, p. 139) 
suggested that if the distribution is normal, then the skewness and kurtosis of the 
distributions should be close to 0 and the standardized skewness (ZSkewness) and the 
standardized kurtosis (ZKurtosis) should be within the +/-1.96 for small sample size, +/-
2.58 for medium sample size, or +/-3.29 for large sample size. The sample size for this 
study was 71, which qualified for medium sample size. As suggested by Field, the 
standard scores are determined by division of the skewness or kurtosis by their respective 




with their respective standard errors and the computed standard scores. The individual 
skewness and kurtosis are not too far from 0, and the ZSkewness and ZKurtosis were 
within the standard score of +-2.58 applicable to the medium size sample of this study. 
This therefore suggests that the distributions of the data relating to the dependent and the 
independent variables were normal distributions. 
Table 19 
Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis 





EBITDAMgn 0.552 -0.175 0.285 0.563 1.937 -0.311 
MTB 0.675 0.255 0.285 0.563 2.368 0.453 
COC 0.615 0.282 0.285 0.563 2.158 0.501 
COMscore 0.126 -0.346 0.285 0.563 0.442 -0.615 
GOVscore -0.733 0.943 0.285 0.563 -2.572 1.675 
DIVscore 0.450 -0.418 0.285 0.563 1.579 -0.742 
EMPRscore -0.491 -0.282 0.285 0.563 -1.723 -0.501 
PRODscore -0.287 0.564 0.285 0.563 -1.007 1.002 
 
Secondly, in line with Field’s (2009, p. 145) recommendation a further test of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov combined with Shapiro-Wilk test was conducted to evaluate the 
extent of non-compliance with the assumption of normality of distribution. Table 18 
shows the outcome of these two tests. Field suggested that if the statistics of these tests 
are significant (p < .05), then the distributions are not normal, but if they are not 
significant (p > 0.05), then the distributions are normal. The statistics of both 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests presented in Table 20 are not significant (p 
> .05) for EBITDA margin against the CSR scores. This implies that the distributions are 





Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality 




  Statistic df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
EBITDAMgn 
COMscore 0.071 71 .200 0.976 71 0.678 
GOVscore 0.236 71 .200 0.935 71 0.632 
DIVscore 0.109 71 .200 0.97 71 0.891 
EMPRscore 0.081 71 .200 0.96 71 0.092 
PRODscore 0.073 71 .200 0.961 71 0.053 
 
Evaluating the MTB model. 
Hypothesis 1 sought to test the impact of the individual CSR scores on the 
accounting returns when the firm unique factors and management preference factors are 
controlled. It required accounting returns to be operationalized as EBITDA margin and 
MTB ratio respectively. Having explored the regression model when accounting return 
was operationalized as EBITDA margin, I then tested the hypothesis when accounting 
return was operationalized as MTB ratio. In this regard, I used the same input into the 
SPSS regression, but swapped the EBITDA margin with the MTB as the dependent 
variable and also swapped the EBITDAMgn t-1 with the MTB t-1 in the control variables. 
Running the MTB regression model yielded the model summary detailed in Table 21, 
showing the extent to which the model was successful in predicting the MTB from the 
individual CSR scores when the effects of the specified confounding variables were 
controlled. 
Table 21 





Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .999a .997 .997 .0300144 .997 3653.056 6 64 .000 
 
2 .999b .997 .997 .0298064 .000 1.179 5 59 .330 2.326 
Note: 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MTBt-1, LogTotAsset, Leverage, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MTB t-1, LogTotAsset, Leverage, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, DIVscore, PRODscore, 
EMPRscore, COMscore, GOVscore 
 
It was shown in Table 21 and Table 22 that the linear combination of the 11 
control and predictor variables was significantly related to the MTB, R
2
 = .997, adjusted 
R
2 
= .997, F(11, 59) = 2021.02, p < .001. The control variables predicted MTB 
significantly over and above the CSR scores, R
2
 = .997, F(6.64) = 3653.05, p < .001, but 
the CSR scores did not predict MTB significantly after partialling out  the effects of the 
control variables, R
2
 change = .000, F(5, 59) = 1.18, p = .33. Based on these results, the 
CSR scores appear to offer little additional predictive power beyond that contributed by 
the control variables. 
Further, the SPSS model summary showed that the relationship between the 
control variables (MTBt-1, Leverage, AssetGrowth, LogTotAsset, LogME, and CAPEXR) 
and the outcome variable (MTB) was significant, R = .999, adjusted R
2
 = .997, F(6,64) = 
3653.06, p < .001. Like the EBITDA margin model, the five predictors (COMscore, 
GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore, and PRODscore) also did not predict significantly 
over and above the control variable measures, R
2
 change = .000, F(5,59) = 1.18, p = .33.  
The difference between the R
2
 and the Adjusted R
2




model to the population rather than the sample would not lead to any meaningful change 
in the variance. It follows that the model, though largely explained by the control 
variables, could well generalize the ideal world with a strong goodness of fit.  
I also performed the test of cross-validity of the MTB model by calculating the 
Adjusted R
2




=1  –       n-1      n-2        n+1        
           n-k-1   n-k-2       n 
 
where ‘n’ represents the sample size and ‘k’ stands for the number of independent 
variables. 
This test yielded adjusted R
2
 of .995 which was close to the SPPS-determined R
2
 of .997, 
a further indication that the cross validity of this model was good.  
 Similarly, the ANOVA result of the test whether the MTB model significantly 
predicted the outcome better than the mean was presented in Table 22. When only control 
variables were included in the model, the MTB was strongly predicted by these control 
variables, F(6,64) = 3653.06, significant, p < .001. The inclusion of the CSR scores (the 
independent variables) into the MTB model did not yield a meaningful improvement in 
the explained variation, R
2
 change = .000, F(5,59) = 1.18, p = .33. This was interpreted to 
mean that the observed marginal improvement in the F ratio, resulting from the inclusion 
of the CSR scores into the MTB regression model could have occurred by chance. 
In summary, when the model included only the control variables, it strongly 







included both the control variables and the criterion variables (the CSR factors), F(11,59) 
= 1.8, p < .001 (significant). This was interpreted to mean that the inclusion of the CSR 
factors into the MTB model did not yield meaning improvement in the regression model. 
Table 22 
Evaluating the ANOVA Values of MTB Model 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 19.745 6 3.291 3653.056 .000 
Residual .058 64 .001   
Total 19.803 70    
2 
Regression 19.751 11 1.796 2021.017 .000 
Residual .052 59 .001   
Total 19.803 70    
 
Test of Autocorrelation in the MTB model. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.3 shown in Table 19 is indicative of the presence 
or absence of autocorrelation in the data. The statistic represented a measure of the extent 
of autocorrelation in the data used in the testing of the model. As stated earlier, Durbin-
Watson statistic lying between 1 and 3 or being close to 2 showed absence of 
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic in the MTB model of 2.3 lied between 1 and 
3 and was also close to 2, suggesting lack of autocorrelation in the data.  
Evaluating the parameters in the MTB model. 
 The parameters in the MTB model, including the beta and correlation coefficients, 
were evaluated. The summary of the coefficients for each of the variables in the MTB 





Coefficients in the MTB Model 





t Sig. 95.0% Confidence  
Interval for B 
Correlations Collinearity  
Statistics 
B Std.  
Error 






Partial Part Tole- 
rance 
VIF 
(Constant) -.107 .168  -.636 .527 -.443 .229      
LogTotAsset .002 .004 .004 .577 .566 -.005 .010 -.006 .075 .004 .941 1.063 
ASSETGRTH -.050 .076 -.006 -.654 .515 -.201 .102 .501 -.085 -.004 .601 1.665 
CAPEXR 1.78 .631 .024 2.814 .007 .513 3.039 -.373 .344 .019 .639 1.564 
Leverage -.170 .102 -.015 -1.670 .100 -.373 .034 -.035 -.212 -.011 .585 1.709 
LogME -.002 .003 -.004 -.512 .611 -.008 .005 .267 -.066 -.003 .726 1.378 
MTBt-1 1.008 .009 1.013 109.884 .000 .990 1.026 .998 .998 .736 .528 1.894 
COMscore .014 .026 .004 .551 .584 -.037 .065 .072 .292 .004 .731 1.369 
GOVscore .066 .032 .020 2.091 .041 .003 .129 -.122 .263 .014 .515 1.942 
DIVscore .013 .020 .005 .652 .517 -.027 .053 -.039 .085 .004 .829 1.207 
EMPRscore .019 .035 .004 .546 .587 -.050 .088 -.037 .071 .004 .850 1.177 
PRODscore -.004 .037 -.001 -.098 .922 -.077 .070 .060 -.013 -.001 .726 1.378 
 
The regression coefficients in the Table 21 were substituted in the MTB model producing the following equation: 
 MTB = - 0.107 + 0.004LogCOMscore + 0.02LogGOVscore + 0.005LogDIVscore + 
 0.004LogEMPRscore  - 0.001LogPRODscore +0.004LogTotAssett - 0.004Lev    




The MTB model showed that among the CSR factors only the PRODscore had 
negative standardized beta, implying that efforts made to improve the product scores 
would hurt MTB. The standardized beta values of COMscore, GOVscore, DIVscore and 
EMPRscore were all positive with the implication that greater efforts to improve these 
social factors might pay off with improvement in the MTB. The model showed a 
significant beta value of the GOVscore social factor, t = 2.09, p = 0.04 (significant). The t 
score of the other social factors (COMscore, GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore and 
PRODscore) were not significant, p > .05 respectively.  
Like EBITDA margin model, the MTB model also showed that AssetGrowth, 
Leverage, and ME had negative beta values, implying negative relationship with MTB, 
while TotAsset, MTBt-1 and CapexR had positive relationships. The coefficient of 
previous MTB was also significant and this was unlikely to be due to chance, with t = 
109.88, p = <.001. Also the standardized beta value of CapexR is equally significantly 
different from 0, with t = 2.81, p = .01. The t scores of the coefficients of the other 
control variables (TotAsset, AssetGrowth, Leverage, and ME) were not significant, with 
p > .05, suggesting that their beta coefficients might be due to chances and not 
significantly different from 0. Finally, the alpha value of the model (β0) is 0, with t = -
0.64, p = .53 (not significant). 
 A review of the collinearity statistics in Table 21 showed that the largest VIF was 
1.9 and the lowest tolerance was 0.52, which were within the required thresholds. This 





Evaluating the correlation coefficients in the MTB model. 
 The Pearson partial correlation coefficient was obtained for the MTB model. The 
correlation coefficients for each of the variables including their p values were presented 
in Table 16.  As observed in the EBITDA margin model, the strongest relationship was 
reported between MTB and MTBt-1, apparently because the two variables were an 
extension of each other, r = .998, p < .001 (significant). Of the control variables, 
AssetGrowth showed significantly high correlation with the MTB, r = .5, p < .001 
(significant), CapexR showed moderate negative correlation with the MTB, r = -.37, p = 
.001 (significant), while LogME showed moderate positive correlation with the MTB, r = 
.27, p = .01 (significant). Amongst the criterion variables (the CSR factors), only 
COMscore showed a low positive correlation with the MTB, r = .29, p = .01 (significant). 
The other CSR factors (GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore, and PRODscore) did not 
show significant correlation with the MTB. Notwithstanding, GOVscore, DIVscore, and 
EMPRscore showed negative correlation coefficients, implying a tendency to be 
negatively related with the MTB. 
The correlation coefficients presented in Table 24 did not show any correlation 
coefficient (r) that is greater than .9, apart from the correlation coefficient of the MTB of 
the current and the previous years. This also supported the fact that multicollinearity was 
























MTB 1.000            
LogTotAsset -0.006 1.000           
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.481            
ASSETGRTH 0.501 -0.031 1.000          
Sig. (1-tailed) 0 0.398           
CAPEXR -0.373 -0.135 -0.306 1.000         
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.001 0.131 0.005          
Leverage -0.035 -0.176 -0.182 0.357 1.000        
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.387 0.071 0.064 0.001         
LogME 0.267 0.037 0.299 -0.033 -0.295 1.000       
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.012 0.38 0.006 0.394 0.006        
MTBt-1 0.998 -0.01 0.505 -0.385 -0.024 0.265 1.000      
Sig. (1-tailed) 0 0.468 0 0 0.421 0.013       
COMscore 0.292 -0.045 0.102 -0.026 0.118 -0.09 0.293 1.000     
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.007 0.355 0.199 0.415 0.164 0.227 0.007      
GOVscore -0.122 0.078 0.006 -0.148 -0.38 0.076 -0.138 -0.403 1.000    
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.155 0.26 0.481 0.11 0.001 0.264 0.125      
DIVscore -0.039 -0.079 0.072 0.015 0.142 -0.104 -0.035 0.055 -0.354 1.000   




EMPRscore -0.037 -0.078 -0.172 -0.061 0.178 0.017 -0.037 0.077 0.029 -0.02 1,000  
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.381 0.258 0.076 0.305 0.069 0.444 0.378 0.262 0.404 0.435   
PRODscore 0.06 0.081 -0.159 -0.024 0.033 0.034 0.055 -0.195 0.387 -0.178 -0.015 1,000 





The effect size of the variables that reported effect in the testing of the MTB 
model was presented in Table 25. No significant effect was found in the remaining 
variables. 
Table 25 
Determination of Effect Size in the MTB Model 
Variable r Effect Size 
MTBprev .998 Large 
AssetGrowth .50 Large 
CapexR -.37 Medium 
LogME .27 Medium 
COMscore .29 Medium 
PRODscore .10 Small 
 
Evaluation of homogeneity of variance assumption in the MTB model. 
In Table 26, I presented the Levene statistics for the MTB model based on the 
three measures of central tendency. The Levene’s statistic of the mean of the distribution 
is not significant, Levene’s statistic = 1.83, p = .17. So, the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was not violated in the model.    
Table 26 
Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 




Based on Median 1.818 2 66 .170 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1.818 2 42.322 .175 
Based on trimmed mean 1.872 2 66 .162 
 
Evaluation of homoscedasticity assumption in the MTB model. 
 Following Field’s (2009) suggestion, I constructed a scatter plot of ZRSID against 
the ZPRED which is shown in Figure 6. The dots in the figure appeared random and the 
graph did not funnel out, confirming that the assumption of homoscedasticity was met in 
this data. 
 
Figure 6. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for MTB OLS Regression Model 
Test of linearity assumption in the MTB model. 
A review of the dots in the Figure 3 did not reveal any curve pattern or curvilinear 
relationship between the *ZRESID and *ZPRED. This suggests that the linearity 
assumption made on the MTB regression model was not violated. 




 I used both graphical and quantitative approaches to test the normality of the data 
used for the MTB model. The Figure 7 below is the histogram with a fitted normal curve 
for the MTB distribution. The fitted curve reflects normal bell-shaped curve, implying 
that the distribution followed normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation 
of 1. 
 
Figure 7. Histogram of the normally distributed residuals for the MTB distribution OLS 
model 
The normal P-P plot of the regression standardized residuals equally showed 
evidence of normal distribution for the MTB. The normal P-P plot for the MTB 






Figure 8. Normal P-P Plot of the expected against the observed cumulated probability for 
the MTB OLS Model  
The individual skewness and kurtosis of MTB and the predictors (CSR scores) 
were not too far from 0, and their ZSkewness and ZKurtosis were also within the 
standard score of +/-2.58 applicable to the medium size sample of this study. This was a 
testament that the distributions of the data relating to the dependent and the independent 
variables of the MTB model followed normal distributions. The skewness and kurtosis as 
well as their standard scores for each of the variables relevant to the MTB model were 
presented in Table 27. 
Table 27 
Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis 









COC 0.615 0.282 0.285 0.563 2.158 0.501 
COMscore 0.126 -0.346 0.285 0.563 0.442 -0.615 
GOVscore -0.733 0.943 0.285 0.563 -2.572 1.675 
DIVscore 0.450 -0.418 0.285 0.563 1.579 -0.742 
EMPRscore -0.491 -0.282 0.285 0.563 -1.723 -0.501 
PRODscore -0.287 0.564 0.285 0.563 -1.007 1.002 
 
A further test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and that of Shapiro-Wilk were performed 
to quantitatively evaluate the extent of compliance with the assumption of normality of 
distribution. The outcome of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of 
normality for MTB model was detailed in Table 28. The statistics of both Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were not significant (p > .05) for MTB against each of 
the criterion variables. This implied that the distributions of the MTB and the CSR scores 
were normal. 
Table 28 




  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
MTB 
COMscore 0.092 71 .200 0.975 71 0.642 
GOVscore 0.111 71 .200 0.951 71 0.284 
DIVscore 0.136 71 .200 0.914 71 0.208 
EMPRscore 0.166 71 .200 0.908 71 0.08 
PRODscore 0.113 71 0.08 0.887 71 0.06 
 
Hypothesis 2: Individual CSR Factors and Cost of Capital  
 The second hypothesis of the study, focused on the relation between the 
individual CSR factors and the cost of capital is restated as follows: 




Ha2: Individual CSR factors of banks can predict the banks’ cost of capital. 
This hypothesis addressed the second research question through the use of multifactor 
regression model, testing the impact of each CSR component separately on the cost of 
capital. The cost of capital used was based on Fama-French three-factor (FF3F) model 
that factored three different risk factors of market risk premium (MRP), size (SMB) and 
value (HML) into the rates of return required by investors.  The objective of the 
hypothesis was to assess the effect of the individual CSR factors on the cost of capital of 
a bank as a measure of financial performance. In chapters 1 and 3, I specified the 






Subscripts  = Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j 
FF3FCOCit     = Cost of capital calculated using Fama-French three-factor  
   approach 
β0   = Model intercept 
β1j   = Slope of CSR component j 
CSRijt-1  = Lagged rating score of CSR component j 
MTB   = Current period’s MTB ratio 
EBITDAMGN = EBITDA margin 
FF3FCOCit   =   β0 + β1jCSRijt-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3LEVERAGE +        
                           β4ASSETGRTH + β5EBITDAMgn + β6MTB +      




LogTotAsset  = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage  = Ratio of debt to total asset, measuring leverage ratio.   
AssetGrth  = Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total   
    assets during the preceding period. 
CapexR  =  Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure  
    management preference. 
Log_ME  = Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
ɛit   = Stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and  
    insignificant, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
The underlying research question that led to this hypothesis is: To what extent can the 
individual CSR factors of a bank predict the bank’s cost of capital, controlling for the 
effects of bank unique and management preference factors?  I lagged the CSR factors by 
1 year in order to support my claim that the individual CSR factors in a prior period 
Granger-influences the firm’s cost of capital in the subsequent period. 
Evaluating the FF3FCOC (Fama-French three-factor cost of capital) model. 
In Hypothesis 2, I sought to test whether individual CSR scores could predict the 
cost of capital when the firm unique factors and management preference factors were 
controlled. As I did in the testing of the Hypothesis 1, I equally adopted hierarchical 
block entry and forced entry approaches to input the variables into the SPSS linear 
regression in order to isolate the confounding effects of the control variables on the 
FF3FCOC. A multiple regression analysis was conducted in two unordered steps: the first 




LogME, ASSETGRTH, and CAPEXR, while the second step involved the CSR scores of 
DIVscore, PRODscore, EMPRscore, COMscore, and GOVscore. The summary of the 
regression model, the ANOVA details, and the bivariate and partial correlations of the 
predictors are detailed in Table 29, Table 30, and Table 31 respectively. 
Table 29 
FF3FCOC Regression Model: Model Summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .612a .375 .305 .0204379 .375 5.390 7 63 .000 
 
2 .639b .414 .286 .0207152 .039 .665 5 58 .042 2.029 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, DIVscore, 
PRODscore, EMPRscore, COMscore, GOVscore 
c. Dependent Variable: FF3FCOC 
 
Table 30  
FF3FCOC Regression Model: ANOVA 
Step Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .016 7 .002 5.390 .000 
Residual .026 63 .000   
Total .042 70    
2 
Regression .017 12 .001 3.338 .001 
Residual .025 58 .000   
Total .042 70    
Note: Step 1 contains the dependent variable (FF3FCOC) and the control 
variables (MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn, LogME, 
ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR) while Step 2 contains the variables under Step 1 







Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with FF3FCOC 
Predictors Correlation between 
each predictor and the 
FF3FCOC (zero order) 
Correlation between each predictor 
and the FF3FCOC controlling for all 
other predictors 
LogTotAsset .008 -.019 
ASSETGRTH -.167 -.196 
CAPEXR -.102 -.215 
Leverage -.339 -.131 
LogME .221 .256 
EBITDAMgn .314 .385 
MTB -.148 -.238 
COMscore -.134 .073 
GOVscore .228 .038 
DIVscore -.162 -.085 
EMPRscore -.094 -.141 
PRODscore .107 .013 
 
As shown in the Table 29 and the Table 30 the linear combination of the 12 
control and predictor variables was significantly related to the FF3FCOC, R
2
 = .41, 
adjusted R
2 
= .29, F(12,58) = 3.34, p < .05. The control variables predicted significantly 
over and above the CSR scores, R
2
 = .37, F(7,63) = 5.39, p < .001. Also, the CSR scores 
equally predicted significantly after partialling out the effects of the control variables, R
2
 
change = .04, F(5,58) = .66, p = .04. Based on these results, the CSR scores appear to 
offer significant additional predictive power beyond that contributed by the control 
variables, with additional 3.9% variations in FF3FCOC explained by the CSR scores.  
 Similarly, the ANOVA result of the test whether the FF3FCOC model 




When only control variables were included in the model (i.e. step 1), the FF3FCOC was 
strongly predicted by these control variables, F(7,63) = 5.39, p < .001. The inclusion of 
the CSR scores (the independent variables in to the model) led to some improvement in 
the explained variation, F(5,58) = .66, significant, p = .04. This was interpreted to mean 
that the observed improvement resulting from the inclusion of the CSR scores into the 
regression model could not have occurred by chance.  
LogME and EBITDAMgn were strongly positively related to the FF3FCOC with 
significant positive bivariate and partial correlation coefficients. Leverage was strongly 
negatively related to FF3FCOC only under bivariate correlation while CAPEXR and 
MTB were strongly negatively related to FF3FCOC only under partial correlation. 
LogTotAsset and ASSETGRTH did not show strong relationship with FF3FCOC either 
under bivariate correlation or partial correlation. 
I also performed the test of cross-validity of the FF3FCOC model by calculating 
the Adjusted R
2




=1  –       n-1      n-2        n+1        
           n-k-1   n-k-2       n 
 
where ‘n’ represents the sample size and ‘k’ stands for the number of independent 
variables. This test yielded adjusted R
2
 of.27 which was close to the SPPS-determined 
adjusted R
2
 of .30, an indication that the cross validity of this model was good. 
In the Table 29 Durbin-Watson statistic was shown as 2.03, representing the 







model. As stated earlier, Durbin-Watson statistic lying between 1 and 3 or being close to 
2 showed absence of autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic in the FF3FCOC 
model of 2.03 lied between 1 and 3 and was also close to 2, indicating that the 
assumption of absence of autocorrelation in the data was not violated. 
Evaluating the parameters in the FF3FCOC model. 
 The parameters in the FF3FCOC model, including the beta and correlation 
coefficients, were evaluated. The summary of the coefficients for each of the variables in 





Coefficients in the FF3FCOC Model 





t Sig. 95.0% Confidence  
Interval for B 
Correlations Collinearity  
Statistics 










Partial Part Tole- 
rance 
VIF 
(Constant) .120 .118  1.017 .313 -.116 .356      
LogTotAsset -.001 .003 -.020 -.190 .850 -.006 .005 .008 -.025 -.019 .908 1.102 
ASSETGRTH -.102 .053 -.253 -1.945 .057 -.208 .003 -.167 -.247 -.196 .603 1.659 
CAPEXR -.947 .444 -.273 -2.133 .037 -1.836 -.058 -.102 -.270 -.215 .623 1.604 
Leverage -.092 .071 -.172 -1.300 .199 -.233 .050 -.339 -.168 -.131 .583 1.714 
LogME .006 .002 .301 2.539 .014 .001 .011 .221 .316 .256 .725 1.380 
EBITDAMgn .054 .014 .420 3.812 .000 .025 .082 .314 .448 .385 .841 1.190 
MTB -.016 .007 -.340 -2.356 .022 -.029 -.002 -.148 -.296 -.238 .490 2.039 
COMscore .013 .018 .086 .724 .472 -.023 .049 -.134 .095 .073 .719 1.391 
GOVscore .008 .022 .053 .378 .007 -.036 .052 .050 .228 .038 .518 1.931 
DIVscore -.012 .014 -.094 -.846 .401 -.040 .016 -.162 -.110 -.085 .827 1.210 
EMPRscore -.033 .024 -.153 -1.394 .169 -.082 .015 -.094 -.180 -.141 .849 1.178 





The regression coefficients in the Table 32 were substituted in the FF3FCOC model 





The FF3FCOC model showed that among the CSR factors, COMscore, 
GOVscore, and PRODscore had positive standardized beta, implying that efforts made to 
improve them would increase FF3FCOC and hurt financial performance. DIVscore and 
EMPRscore had negative standardized beta, implying that efforts made to improve their 
scores would reduce FF3FCOC and improve financial performance. Of all the CSR 
factors, only GOVscore had a significant beta, t = .38, p = .01.   Similarly, LogME and 
EBITDAMgn had positive standardized beta, implying that increasing them would 
increase the FF3FCOC and reduce financial performance while LogToTAsset, 
ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, Leverage, and MTB had negative standardized betas, implying 
that increasing them would reduce FF3FCOC and improve the financial performance. 
However, the beta values of LogToTAsset and Leverage were not significant, p > .05, 
implying that their beta values were negligible. The standardized beta values of the 
remaining control variables (ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, LogME, EBITDAMgn and MTB) 
had significant standardized beta, p < .05, implying that the betas were not negligible. 
 As shown in the Table 32, the largest VIF ranged between 1.1 and 2.04, with the 
average of 1.48. These values were within the acceptable 2. The tolerance factor also 
FF3FCOC = 0.12 + 0.09LogCOMscore + 0.05LogGOVscore - 0.09LogDIVscore  
 - 0.15LogEMPRscore + 0.02LogPRODscore - 0.02LogTotAssett -  
 0.17Lev   - 0.25AssetGrowth + 0.42EBITDAMgn - 0.34MTB -  




ranged from 0.49 to 0.91 with an average of 0.70 which were above the minimum of 0.1. 
These suggested that multicollinearity assumption in the FF3FCOC model was not 
violated. 
Evaluating the correlation coefficients in the FF3FCOC model. 
 The Pearson partial correlation coefficient was obtained for the FF3FCOC model. 
Table 33 presented these correlation coefficients for each of the variables including their 
p values.  Significant partial correlations with FF3FCOC were recorded in EBITDAMgn 
(r = .31, p = .004), Leverage (r = -.34, p = .002), LogME (r = .22, p = .03) and GOVscore 
(r = .23, p = .03). The other variables showed no significant partial correlations with 
FF3FCOC, p>.05. Of the four control variables with insignificant correlation coefficients, 
only LogTotAsset had positive correlation coefficient while ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, 
and MTB had negative correlation coefficients. Out of the four CSR factors that had 
insignificant correlation coefficients, only PRODscore had a positive correlation 
coefficient while COMscore, DIVscore and EMPRscore had negative correlation 
coefficients.  
As shown in Table 33, the highest correlation coefficient (r) was .50 and none of 
the variables had correlation coefficient that was greater than .9. Therefore, there was no 


























FF3FCOC 1                         
LogTotAsset 0.008 1                       
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.474                         
ASSETGRTH -0.167 -0.031 1                     
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.082 0.398                       
CAPEXR -0.102 -0.135 -0.306 1                   
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.199 0.131 0.005                     
Leverage -0.339 -0.176 -0.182 0.357 1                 
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.002 0.071 0.064 0.001                   
LogME 0.221 0.037 0.299 -0.033 -0.295 1               
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.032 0.38 0.006 0.394 0.006                 
EBITDAMgn 0.314 -0.193 0.058 0.089 0.019 0.057 1             
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.004 0.054 0.315 0.231 0.439 0.319               
MTB -0.148 -0.006 0.501 -0.373 -0.035 0.267 0.242 1           
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.109 0.481 0 0.001 0.387 0.012 0.021             
COMscore -0.134 -0.045 0.102 -0.026 0.118 -0.09 -0.034 0.292 1         
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.133 0.355 0.199 0.415 0.164 0.227 0.388 0.007           
GOVscore 0.228 0.078 0.006 -0.148 -0.38 0.076 0.018 
-
0.122 
-0.403 1       
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.028 0.26 0.481 0.11 0.001 0.264 0.441 0.155 0         
DIVscore -0.162 -0.079 0.072 0.015 0.142 -0.104 0.022 
-
0.039 
0.055 -0.354 1     




EMPRscore -0.094 -0.078 -0.172 -0.061 0.178 0.017 0 
-
0.037 
0.077 0.029 -0.02 1   
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.218 0.258 0.076 0.305 0.069 0.444 0.498 0.381 0.262 0.404 0.435     
PRODscore 0.107 0.081 -0.159 -0.024 0.033 0.034 0.094 0.06 -0.195 0.387 -0.178 -0.015 1 





I attempted to further measure the effect size of the model through the correlation 
coefficients. The effect size of the variables that reported an effect in the testing of the 
FF3FCOC model was presented in Table 34. Only LogTotAsset did not report an effect, 
because its correlation coefficient was less than .1. As stated earlier, this followed Field’s 
(2009, p. 57) suggestion that correlation coefficients stand for the effect size of the 
regression model, with +-.1,  +-.3, and +-.5 representing small effect, medium effect, and 
large effect respectively.  
Table 34 
Determination of Effect Size in the FF3FCOC Model 
Variable Correlation Coefficient Effect Size 
EBITDAMgn 0.3 Medium 
Leverage -0.3 Medium 
GOVscore 0.2 Small 
LogME 0.2 Small 
PRODscore 0.1 Small 
EMPRscore -0.1 Small 
CAPEXR -0.1 Small 
COMscore -0.1 Small 
MTB -0.1 Small 
DIVscore -0.2 Small 
ASSETGRTH -0.2 Small 
 
Evaluation of homogeneity of variance assumption in the FF3FCOC model. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was tested and was found not to be 
violated. Based on the mean, Levene statistic = 0.14, p = .87 (not significant). The 
Levene statistics for FF3FCOC model based on the three measures of central tendency 





Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene  
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
FF3FCOC 
Based on Mean .140 2 66 .870 
Based on Median .120 2 66 .887 
Based on Median and with adjusted df .120 2 62.253 .887 
Based on trimmed mean .082 2 66 .922 
 
Evaluation of homoscedasticity assumption in the MTB model. 
 A scatter plot of ZRSID against the ZPRED was depicted in Figure 9. There 
appeared to be no clear pattern in the dots contained in the figure and the graph did not 
funnel out, suggesting that the assumption of homoscedasticity was met in this data. 
 




Test of linearity assumption in the FF3FCOC model. 
The dots in the Figure 9 did not reveal any curve pattern or curvilinear 
relationship between the *ZRESID and *ZPRED. Based on Field’s (2009, p. 247) 
suggestion, the absence of curvilinear relationship in the graph is indicative that the 
linearity assumption made on the FF3FCOC regression model was not violated. 
Evaluation of normality assumption in the FF3FCOC model.  
 Like I did in the earlier models, both graphical and quantitative approaches were 
adopted to test the assumption of normality of the data used for FF3FCOC model. The 
histogram in Figure 10 showed a normal bell-shaped curve, suggesting that the 
distribution followed normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
 
Figure 10. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for FF3FCOC’s OLS Model 
The normal P-P plot of the regression standardized residuals is shown in Figure 
11, with evidence that the dots, representing the residuals, clustered around the regression 





Figure 11. The normal P-P Plot of expected against observed cumulative probability of 
FF3FCOC OLS Model. 
The individual skewness and kurtosis of FF3FCOC and the independent variables 
(CSR scores) were not too far from 0, and their ZSkewness and ZKurtosis were also 
within the standard score of +/-2.58, which was applicable to the medium size sample of 
this study. The distributions of the data relating to the dependent and the independent 
variables of the FF3FCOC model therefore followed normal distributions. The skewness 
and kurtosis as well as their standard scores for each of the variables relevant to the 
FF3FCOC model are presented in Table 36. 
Table 36 
Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis 





COC 0.615 0.282 0.285 0.563 2.158 0.501 
COMscore 0.126 -0.346 0.285 0.563 0.442 -0.615 
GOVscore -0.733 0.943 0.285 0.563 -2.572 1.675 
DIVscore 0.450 -0.418 0.285 0.563 1.579 -0.742 
EMPRscore -0.491 -0.282 0.285 0.563 -1.723 -0.501 





In line with Field’s (2009) suggestion, I performed a further quantitative test of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and that of Shapiro-Wilk to evaluate the extent of compliance with 
the assumption of normality of distribution. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for FF3FCOC model were presented in Table 37. The 
statistics of both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were not significant (p > 
.05) for FF3FCOC against each of the criterion variables, a further indication that the 
distributions of the FF3FCOC and the CSR scores were normal. 
Table 37 




  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
FF3FCOC 
COMscore 0.087 71 .200 0.961 32 0.293 
GOVscore 0.079 71 .200 0.966 40 0.26 
DIVscore 0.162 71 .200 0.921 13 0.261 
EMPRscore 0.081 71 .200 0.96 49 0.091 
PRODscore 0.077 71 .200 0.967 68 0.064 
 
Summary 
 The results of my research were presented in this chapter, with the aim of 
answering the two research questions posed at the beginning of the chapter. Centrally, I 
sought to ascertain if financial performance, however defined, could be predicted by 
corporate social conduct.  
In the context of the US banking sector, my first research question was: to what 
extent can the individual CSR factors of a bank predict the bank’s accounting 




controlled?  In analyzing this question, two-pronged approach was adopted: first, 
financial performance was taken to mean EBITDA margin, a purely book based 
parameter, and second, financial performance was taken to mean MTB ratio, a mixed 
based parameter. 
The result of my hypothesis testing showed that the individual CSR scores on 
community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product did not predict 
EBITDA margin significantly over and above the specified control variables. Only 0.1% 
additional variation in EBITDA margin was attributed to the CSR scores, which was not 
significant at 5% significant level. Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis at 5% significant level. However, I found negative 
relationship between community and product factors and EBITDA margin and positive 
relationship between governance, diversity, and employee relation and EBITDA margin. 
Similarly, when the financial performance was taken to mean the MTB, my 
hypothesis testing showed that the individual CSR scores on community, governance, 
diversity, employee relation, and product still did not predict MTB significantly after 
controlling the effects of the specified confounding variables. The CSR factors could not 
explain any meaningful amount of the variation in the MTB. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis at 5% significant 
level. Notwithstanding, I found that governance had a strong predictive influence on 
MTB because it showed a standardized beta that was significant, t = 2.09, p = .04. I also 
found that community and governance were significantly positively related with MTB, r 




employee relation had positive relationship with MTB while product was negatively 
related with MTB. 
The second question was whether the individual CSR factors of banks could help 
in predicting the banks’ cost of capital. My data analysis showed that the CSR scores 
could significantly predict FF3FCOC after partialling out the effects of the control 
variables, as significant variation of 3.9% in FF3FCOC was explained by these factors. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis at 
5% significant level. Further analysis showed that, of all the CSR scores, only GOVscore 
had a significant beta parameter (B = .05), t = .38, p = .01. GOVscore was also 
significantly associated with the FF4FCOC, r = .23, p = .03. GOVscore therefore 
accounted for the observed significant variations in FF3FCOC explained by the CSR 
scores. I equally found that COMscore, GOVscore, and PRODscore were positively 
associated with FF3FCOC while DIVscore and EMPRscore were negatively associated 
with the FF3FCOC.  
In chapter 5, I provided a detailed discussion of these findings, with the 
explanation of the supportive facts on the outcome. I also discussed these findings in the 




Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary of Findings 
 In this quantitative study, I examined the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and financial performance of large banks in the United States, using the 
data from 2011 to 2014. The aim of the study was to examine the effect of the individual 
CSR factors on the financial performance measures with a view to measuring the extent 
to which social conduct could predict financial performance. The increasing pressure on 
the financial institutions following the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crises that led to 
global economic meltdown compelled them to aggressively embark on social conduct 
activities. But whether social activities could stimulate the bottom line was a question 
that was yet to be resolved by researchers. The purpose of the study, being relational in 
nature, necessitated the adoption of a correlational strategy for the investigation. In order 
to fulfill the purpose of the research I proposed two research questions: 
1. To what extent can the individual CSR components predict the bank accounting 
performance, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and management 
preference factors? 
2. To what extent can the individual CSR components of banks help in predicting 
the banks’ cost of capital, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and 
management preference factors? 
 The individual CSR factors examined included community factor, governance 
factor, diversity factor, employee relation factor, and product factor. In order to broaden 




in the Research Question 1: a purely book-based approach using EBITDA margin and a 
mixed measure approach using MTB ratio. The cost of capital focused on in the Research 
Question 2 was also a measure of financial performance, connoting an inverse 
interpretation, i.e., a higher cost of capital means lower financial performance while a 
lower cost of capital implies higher financial performance.  
 In the first research question, the findings revealed that CSR factors did not 
significantly predict the book-based accounting returns. Only 0.1% of the variation in the 
EBITDA margin was predicted by the CSR components and this contribution was not 
statistically significant at 5% significance level. The confounding factors controlled in the 
model (previous year EBITDA margin, leverage, asset growth, total asset, market 
capitalization, and capital expenditure) did explain 96.6% of the variation in the current 
year EBITDA margin, F(6,64) = 300.34, p < .001, significant. The results showed further 
that none of the five CSR factors studied had any significant influence on the booked-
based accounting return. However, the CSR factors behaved differently with regard to the 
accounting return. While governance, diversity and employee relation factors showed 
positive relation with EBITDA margin, community and product factors were negatively 
related with the book-based accounting return, though insignificantly. An implication of 
these findings was that bank business managers might not be able to improve their book-
based accounting returns significantly by doing good, suggesting further that efforts made 
and the resources expended to improve social conduct by business managers were not 
rewarded with improved book-based accounting returns. I provided further explanation of 




that the CSR factors did not predict the mixed-based accounting returns significantly, as 
no meaningful variation in MTB was explained by the CSR factors. The controlled 
confounding factors explained 99.7% of the variations in the MTB, which was 
statistically significant. However, governance factor not only displayed a strong positive 
influence on the MTB, measured by the size of the standardized beta, (t = 2.09, p < .05, 
significant), it was also positively related to MTB (though low correlation). As in 
EBITDA margin, governance, diversity, and employee relations showed positive relation 
with the MTB while product showed negative relation with the MTB. But this time 
around community showed positive relation with the MTB. An implication of this finding 
was that business managers would not be able to manipulate social conduct to improve 
their accounting performance, apart from governance factor. This implies that corporate 
governance is a factor that needs to be recon with while strategizing to improve the 
bottom line. Further discussions on these findings were provided in the later sections. 
 The findings on the Research Question 2 differed from those of the Research 
Question 1. CSR factors predicted Fama-French cost of capital significantly. Fama-
French cost of capital is a purely market-revealed measure of performance. The CSR 
factors explained 3.9% of the variations in the cost of capital, which was statistically 
significant, p < .05. Like in the case of MTB, governance displayed strong positive 
influence on the cost of capital and therefore largely accounted for the variation 
explained by the CSR factors. Furthermore, community, governance, and product were 
positively related to cost of capital while diversity and employee relation were negatively 




remained a critical factor that investors (shareholders) consider in their investment 
strategies. Among all the CSR factors, corporate governance appeared to be at the 
forefront of the social responsibility factors that shareholders used to screen their 
investment decisions. The detailed discussion of the implications of these findings was 
provided in the later section of the chapter. 
In both research questions, the financial factors controlled in the study, 
comprising previous year financial performance, management preference in the form of 
capital expenditure in relation to the total assets, market capitalization, asset growth, and 
total assets, dominated the prediction of the financial performance measures. This 
suggests that managers should consider these factors as major determinants of financial 
performance, and strategies should be formulated around them to optimize the bottom 
line. 
In the next section of this chapter, I provide the interpretation of the enumerated 
findings. In this regard, I showed the findings that were consistent with the findings of 
some prior researchers, those that diverged from the findings in the prior studies, as well 
as those that were unique to this study. While interpreting these findings I was guided by 
the differing interpretations provided by different researchers to similar findings, in order 
to find a meaning for the findings in this study in the context of the literature. The 
interpretation was also based on the Carol’s (1979) framework of the stakeholder theory 
which provided a theoretical foundation for this study. The interpretation section was 
followed by the description of the limitations of the study, the recommendations for 




at the firm level, at the policy level, at the professional practice level, and at the societal 
level. I then rounded off this report with the conclusion of the study, which provided the 
central message that formed the critical essence of the research. 
Interpretation of Research Findings 
 
 In this section, the discussion of the interpretation of findings was structured into 
the overview of the literature relating to the findings of this study, interpretation of the 
findings on each research question covering the model-level findings and factor-level 
findings, relating the findings to the theoretical framework, and the implications of the 
interpretations for the empirical literature and the theory. 
Overview of the Literature Relating to the Findings 
 As stated earlier in Chapter 2, divergent findings were reported in the empirical 
literature on the nature and the strength of the effects of the CSR activities on the 
financial performance of business firms. The results of the prior empirical studies of the 
effects of CSR on financial performance included those with strong positive effects, those 
with strong negative effects, those with neutral effects, and those with mixed effects. This 
study showed mixed effects of the CSR on the financial performance, depending on the 
particular model tested. The interpretations of the findings were also not consistent. 
Negative effect was interpreted to signify either the shareholders’ confidence in the firm 
and their preparedness to accept lower returns in the short run or in alignment with their 
private social responsibility values (Jenson, 2010) or to signify the presence of 




As observed in Chapter 1, the increasing pressure on banks after the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, forced them to intensify social responsibility to bolster stakeholders’ 
confidence and redeem their image (Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; Montiel & 
Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). Orlitzky (2013) also shared the view that the stakeholder 
orientation inherent in the CSR is a restraint to value maximization. These pessimistic 
views on business engagement in social conduct seemed to be supported by the global 
business leaders, who recently expressed skepticism in the CSR-business value link and 
therefore questioned the continued championing of the sustainability drive by the 
business sector (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). These downcast views on CSR 
suggest that business firms engaged in CSR activities not necessarily because they 
believed it would help to improve their bottom line but as a reactive strategy either to 
respond to an adverse development (like the need to restore stakeholders’ confidence 
following the alleged role of the banking sector in the recent subprime crisis) or to 
increase the provision of social goods so as to avoid the risk of being ostracized in the 
industry. I interpreted the results of the analysis of the research questions proposed in this 
study in the context of this multiperspective literature. 
Research Question 1: Effect of CSR Factors on Accounting Returns 
 Research Question 1 asked: To what extent can the individual CSR components 
predict the bank accounting returns, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and 
management preference factors? The hypothesized individual CSR factors were 




returns were taken as the EBITDA margin (booked based returns) in the first instance and 
MTB ratio (mixed based return) in the second instance, each tested separately. Consistent 
with the empirical literature on the effect of the CSR on the financial performance and 
the insights from the stakeholder theory, I claimed that the CSR factors had significant 
positive effect on the accounting returns. 
In conflict with my claim, I found that CSR factors did not significantly predict 
accounting returns, whether book-based or mixed measure. The model did not report any 
significant effect of the CSR factors on the accounting returns measured by EBITDA 
margin and MTB. This result was consistent with Soana (2011), in which no effect was 
observed between the multidimensional CSR ratings and accounting returns including 
ROA, ROE, CIR (cost to income ratio), MTB, and P/E ratio. The result was also 
consistent with Dinsmore (2014) who did not find significant effect of CSR on the 
financial performance in his study data. When no effect of CSR is observed on the 
financial performance, it implies that CSR is irrelevant to the financial returns of the 
business, which is consistent with the classical view of corporate social responsibility, as 
argued by Friedman (1970) and supported by Jensen (2010). Friedman contended that 
social responsibility and business are incompatible. If the two are incompatible, then CSR 
should produce no significant effect on the financial performance of a business, as 
revealed by the results of the Research Question 1. Research Question 1 supported the 
classical theory of corporate social responsibility.  The observation of no effect of social 




empirical researchers (Grove, et al. 2011; Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Orlitzky, 
2013; UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). 
Conversely, the result of the absence of the effect of CSR on the accounting 
returns revealed by Research Question 1 was at variance with Servaes and Tamayo 
(2013), Moura-Leite, Padgett, and Galan (2014), and Saeidi, et al. (2015). In these 
studies, researchers found positive effects of the CSR factors on the accounting returns 
including ROA, ROE, net profit margin, and ROI. The result also contradicted the 
findings of Rahmawati & Dianita (2011) and Lioui & Sharma (2012), who found 
negative effect of the CSR factors on the financial performance. 
 While examining the direction of the relationship of the individual CSR factors on 
the financial performance, I found support for Lioui and Sharma’s (2012) observation 
that not all the CSR activities have a positive effect on financial performance. In the 
Research Question 1, I observed that the individual CSR factors behaved differently with 
respect to either EBITDA margin or MTB. Governance had strong positive influence on 
accounting return, particularly on MTB. This was consistent with the finding by 
Rahmawati and Dianita (2011), who observed that weak corporate governance (e.g., 
aggressive earnings management) negatively affected financial performance, implying a 
positive relationship. Also, in Research Question 1, diversity and employee relation were 
positively associated with accounting return, consistent with Baird, et al. (2012) who 
found that firms that invested in diversity and in their employees improved their financial 
performance significantly. Product and community factors were negatively related to 




 The effect of the control variables on the accounting returns was observed to be 
noteworthy. The control variables whose effects were parceled out while analyzing the 
Research Question 1 included asset volume, asset growth, capital expenditure/total asset 
ratio, leverage ratio, market capitalization, and prior-year financial performance measure 
(using the previous year’s EBITDA margin or MTB ratio if the dependent variable is 
EBITDA margin or MTB ratio respectively). The result of the hierarchical unordered 
regression analysis showed that these control variables accounted for virtually all the 
variations in the accounting returns (96.6% of variations of EBITDA margin and 99.7% 
of variations in MTB), with virtually no meaningful amount of variation left for the CSR 
factors to explain. I interpreted this result to mean that control variables play more 
significant roles in explaining the effects of the CSR factors on the measures of financial 
performance. This position is consistent with the observation of Saeidi, et al. (2015) that 
the direct testing of the CSR on financial performance of a firm seemed to be spurious 
and imprecise, because of the many variables that have strong effects on a firm’s 
financial performance. Further analysis revealed that not all the hypothesized control 
variables had significant influence on the financial performance. When EBITDA margin 
was used as a measure of the accounting return in the Research Question 1 of this study, I 
found significant effect on financial performance by only asset volume (a measure of 
size), t = 2.36, p = .02 (significant) and the previous year’s EBITDA margin, t = 40.19, p 
< .001 (significant). Conversely, when MTB was used as a measure of the accounting 
returns in the Research Question 1, I found significant effect on the financial performance 




year’s MTB, t = 109.88, p < .001 (significant). I interpreted these findings to mean that 
asset volume being a measure of size, capital expenditure to total asset ratio and the 
previous year’s financial performance are critical to the explanation of the variations in 
the financial performance and should be adequately controlled in the studies involving 
the testing of the effects of corporate social responsibility factors on the financial 
performance of a firm. In either case, I did not find any significant effect of asset growth, 
leverage ratio, and market capitalization on the either measures of accounting return 
(EBITDA margin and MTB). 
In summary, I did not find a strong effect of the CSR factors on the accounting 
financial performance measures in this study, which was both consistent with some 
studies and also contrary to many others. Governance did stand out among all the CSR 
factors hypothesized in this study and showed a strong influence on the accounting 
return. This explains why Jensen (2010) was apprehensive that managerial opportunism 
might be responsible for the observed aggressive engagement in social conduct by 
business firms. This is also in consonance with Jiraporn and Chintrakarn’s (2013) 
observation that CEOs commit resources to CSR for selfish reasons such as to gain more 
power. Furthermore, the hypothesized control variables comprising asset volume, ratio of 
capital expenditure to total assets, and the previous year accounting returns accounted for 
an overwhelming proportion of the variations in the accounting returns, while the 
remaining variables asset growth, market capitalization, and leverage did not show any 




Overall, the observation of no effect of social conduct on the financial 
performance supported the pessimism jointly expressed by researchers (Grove, et al. 
2011; Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Orlitzky, 2013) and the global business 
leaders (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). The result of the analysis of Research 
Question 2 showed how the investors reacted to the managerial involvement in the 
provision of social goods with no assurance of impacting positively on the bottom line of 
the business. 
Research Question 2: CSR Factors and Cost of Capital 
 The Research Question 2 asked: To what extent can the individual CSR factors of 
a bank predict the bank’s cost of capital, controlling for the effects of bank unique and 
management preference factors? The bank unique factors controlled while analyzing this 
research question included MTB ratio, total asset volume, asset growth, leverage, 
EBITDA margin, and market capitalization, while the management preference factor 
hypothesized was the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset. Based on the prevalent 
findings in the empirical literature (Cajias et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 
2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013; Sun & Cui, 2014), I proposed in this 
research question that individual CSR factors could significantly predict cost of capital, a 
market-based measure of financial performance, and increased CSR activities should 
result in lower financing cost and greater value to the company.  
The result of the investigation partially affirmed the proposition. I observed that 




effects of the firm unique factors and the management preference factors were controlled. 
This was consistent with the prior research findings that an investment in CSR could 
enable the firms to raise equity finance at a cheaper rate or at a lower cost of capital 
(Cajias et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha 
& Sarfaraz, 2013; Sun & Cui, 2014). In these studies, CSR factors were found to have 
impacted cost of capital negatively which, by implication, meant that the CSR factors 
positively influenced the financial performance. The significant explained variation 
observed in the Fama-French cost of capital model in this study was attributed to the 
substantial effect of governance factor, which displayed strong positive influence on the 
cost of capital. Governance also showed a significant correlation with the Fama-French 
cost of capital, though at a low level.  
However, the result was not consistent with my proposition on the direction of the 
effect of the CSR factors on the financing cost. Rather than showing a negative effect of 
CSR factors on the cost of capital as expected, the results of the analysis of the Research 
Question 2 revealed a positive effect of the CSR factors on the market-revealed cost of 
capital. Hence, although the results of this study was in agreement with Cajias et al. 
(2014), Campbell et al. (2012), Ghoul et al. (2011), Gregory et al. (2014), Hajiha and 
Sarfaraz (2013), and Sun and Cui (2014) cited earlier in terms of the power of the 
multiple regression models, the direction of the observed effect differed significantly. 
While the researchers in the cited studies observed negative relationship between the 
CSR factors and the cost of capital, the results of the Research Question 2 in this study 




did not sight any study among the peer reviewed resources used in the literature review 
with the result of the positive effect of the corporate social responsibility factors on the 
cost of capital, I hereby claim that this finding is novel and unique in the studies of the 
effect of CSR on cost of capital. Notwithstanding, this result calls for a careful 
interpretation.  
A positive relationship of the CSR factors with cost of capital implies negative 
relationship with the market-based financial performance, translating to lower returns to 
the company due to the higher financing cost. Relying on Jenson’s (2010) views on the 
need to carefully interpret the outcome of regression models in the research involving 
CSR activities and market-based financial performance, I interpreted the result of 
Research Question 2 to mean that investors perceived higher risk from the hypothesized 
banks that actively engaged in corporate social responsibilities and therefore demanded 
higher returns to compensate them for possible indulgence in managerial opportunism, 
which translated to higher cost of capital for the firm and, impliedly, lower profit. Jensen 
(2010) contended that, by engaging in aggressive CSR, business managers might indulge 
in extracting private benefits at the expense of the stockholders. Jiao (2010) attributed the 
resultant negative effect of CSR activities on the financial performance, as obtained from 
the outcome of the analysis of the Research Question 2, to managerial opportunism.  
This further suggests that it is not to be taken for granted that investors would 
place a premium on the CSR activities of firms as suggested by the prior literature (Cajias 
et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & 




particularly if they believed that the CSR activities did not align with the observable 
fundamental drivers of business performance. I therefore claim that the effect of the CSR 
activities of a firm on the firm’s market-based financial performance may not necessarily 
be predicted reliably because such effect is largely determined by how the investors 
perceive the managerial activities. Investors may value the firm’s social conduct and be 
contented with lower returns on their investments, implying lower cost of capital for the 
firm and higher profit for the firm. On the other hand, investors may equally discount 
such social activities by demanding higher returns, implying higher cost of capital and 
lower profits for the company. The latter situation therefore suggests lack of confidence 
in the social activities, leading to the demand for a premium to compensate them for the 
higher risk supposedly assumed. This view was consistent with the conclusion of Busch 
and Hoffmann (2011), Becchetti, et al. (2013) and Baird, et al. (2012) who alluded to the 
fact that when market based measures are adopted, CSR activities might go either way, 
depending on the shareholders’ perception of the firms’ social conduct.  
 In terms of the direction of the relationship between the individual CSR factors 
and the Fama-French cost of capital, I found that community, governance and product 
were positively associated with the cost of capital while diversity and employee relations 
were negatively related to the cost of capital. This suggests that shareholders penalized 
the hypothesized banks with higher cost of financing for increasing community relations 
activities, increasing their governance activities and improving and repositioning their 
products, which the investors did not value. The investors therefore raised their required 




banks. The impact of the relationship revealed by these three factors seemed to have 
explained the overall positive effect of the CSR factors on the Fama-French cost of 
capital observed in the model analyzing Research Question 2.  
Conversely, the shareholders valued the social activities that were focused on 
improving the diversity and relations with the employees, as they believed such would 
help to enhance the banks’ competitiveness and enable them to create value. They were 
therefore willing to accept lower returns, translating to lower cost of capital for the 
increased social conduct in diversity and employee relations activities. As noted earlier, 
the different behavioral patterns of CSR factors on the financial performance appear to be 
a common development (Lioui & Sharma, 2012). 
 Like I did under the Research Question 1, I also examined the effects of the 
confounding variables controlled while analyzing the Research Question 2. As noted 
earlier, these variables were MTB ratio, total asset volume, asset growth, leverage, 
EBITDA margin, market capitalization, and the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset. 
After performing the hierarchical unordered regression analysis on the data, I found that 
these control variables accounted for a sizeable proportion of the variations in the Fama-
French cost of capital (37.5% of variations of the FF3F cost of capital). This result was 
interpreted to mean that the hypothesized control variables play key roles in determining 
the effects of the CSR factors on the measures of financial performance, further 
confirming the earlier synthesis that the direct testing of the CSR on financial 
performance of a firm appeared to be spurious and imprecise due to general influence of 




revealed that not all the hypothesized control variables had significant influence on the 
cost of capital. Showing significant influence on the Fama-French cost of capital were the 
ratio of the capital expenditure to total asset, t = -2.13, p = .04 (significant), market 
capitalization, t = 2.54, p = .01 (significant), EBITDA margin, t = 3.81, p <.001 
(significant), and MTB ratio, t = -2.36, p = .02 (significant). Total asset volume, asset 
growth, and leverage did not reveal any significant influence on the cost of capital.   
Research Findings and the Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is alien to the Smithsonian economic 
thoughts, as business corporations are obliged only to pursue profit making for their 
owners (Friedman, 1970). This neoclassical theoretical perspective to CSR presupposes 
that any benevolent attempt by business managers to render social service is classified as 
unethical and amounts to a breach of the agency contract between the managers and the 
business owners. Jenson (2010) reiterated that divergence from profit making goal to the 
pursuit of social ends creates an opportunity for managers to move away from their radar 
of control into seeking private benefits to the detriment of the stockholders and other 
stakeholders of the business.  
 Stakeholder perspective was later conceived in a way to justify why doing good to 
stakeholders is really good for the business. Freeman (1984) propounded the stakeholder 
theory as a paradigm shift from the neoclassical socioeconomic thought. As a good 
management theory, stakeholder theory is the proposition that engagement of business 




gain competitive advantage and improve their bottom line (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011).  
As explained in chapter 2, stakeholder theory is the dominating theory in the empirical 
CSR literature. Leaning on the enlightened self-interest argument of the stakeholder 
theory, Deng et al. (2013) found that the acquirer’s social performance is positively 
related to merger performance, Orlitzky (2013) found evidence that corporations are 
under increasing pressure to become more socially responsible, Jiao (2010) used the 
theory to test if the stakeholder welfare impacts on the firm valuation, Busch and 
Hoffmann (2011) tested if the climate change impacts on the financial performance of 
firms, Lioui and Sharma (2012) examined the effects of environmental factors on the 
profitability of a business, and Ghoul et al. (2011) examined the CSR impacts on the 
financial risk of a company. On the strength of its popularity among researchers, I applied 
the stakeholder theory to guide my study of the effects of the individual CSR factors on 
the financial performance of banks in the United States. I provided below the 
implications of my research findings for the stakeholder theory.  
Stakeholder Theory: Interpretation of Findings on Research Question 1 
 Investigation of the effect of CSR factors on accounting returns revealed that CSR 
factors cannot significantly predict the accounting returns, whether in terms of EBITDA 
margin or MTB. This result of no effect therefore did not support the stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder theory is the perspective that business activities aimed at pleasing the 
stakeholders should help the business to create competitive advantage and improve the 




therefore aligns with the irrelevance theorem of social conduct for business firm. This 
outcome therefore reinforces Friedman’s (1970) contention that business firms should not 
engage in social responsibility. 
Stakeholder Theory: Interpretation of Findings on Research Question 2  
 Research Question 2 is the proposition that individual CSR factors of a bank can 
help in predicting the bank’s cost of capital. I claimed that increased CSR activities 
should lead to the reduction of cost of capital. The analysis of the question showed that 
the CSR factors can help in predicting the cost of capital of the hypothesized banks, in 
support of the stakeholder theory. Even though the investigation outcome was that the 
increased social activities led to higher cost of capital, the observed positive relationship 
between CSR activities and the cost of capital in no way nullify the fact that social 
activities are relevant to the prediction of the cost of capital. It is only that the direction of 
the prediction of cost of capital seems to be a question of how the relevant stakeholders 
value the social activities. Social activities may be valued positively or negatively; but 
however they are valued would determine the direction of the influence of the CSR 
activities on the financial performance of a business firm. 
 In summary, there is consistency between the results of the Research Question 1 
and those of the Research Question 2. While the result of Research Question 1 indicated 
that CSR conduct had no significant effect on the financial performance of the banks, the 
result of the Research Question 2 demonstrated that shareholders (investors) reacted by 




engaging in the social activities that had no potential to improve the bottom line of the 
business. This internal consistency in the findings of this research is a key contribution to 
the literature. Furthermore, the investors’ action could be attributed to information 
asymmetry, as they might not have been well informed about the essence and the 
potential long-term value of the social activities. This interpretation calls for increased 
communication with and strategic engagement of the investors in the management of the 
corporations. 
Limitations of the Study 
 This study was focused on the banking industry in the United States. Hence, it 
would not be appropriate to generalize the findings and conclusion of the study outside 
the banking industry of the United States. Any attempt to generalize the findings of the 
study beyond its context may render such generalized conclusions invalid. The study 
suffers from a number of limitations that may further constrain its generalizability and 
trustworthiness.  
First, the plan was to randomize the sample, but this could not be achieved 
because of the incomplete sampling frame. The sampling frame required that the sample 
be drawn from the list of banks that were on the MSCI social rating list. However, I 
discovered that many banks that were on MSCI rating list did not have complete financial 
data on the Bankscope database. Also, some banks that were on the Bankscope database 
were not on the MSCI rating list. I finally came up with the intersection set of 71 banks, 




inability to achieve the planned randomization of the sample constitutes a limitation to 
the generalizability of the study findings.  
 Second, for the reason explained above, the sample size of 71 banks used for this 
study was another limitation. Selection of only 71 banks in a population of large banks 
numbering over 6,000 may not be adequately representative. In the chapter 3, I explained 
that the sample size was to be 92 banks, a number that came up when I ran the G*Power 
statistical tool. The limited sample size therefore further constrains the generalizability of 
the findings and conclusions of this study to the entire population. 
 Third, the cost of the accessible MSCI data constituted a limitation to the study. 
During the data collection, I discovered that I could only have access to the CSR ratings 
data for the period from 2011. To access the data for a period earlier than 2011 required a 
payment of a sizeable amount of money, which I could not afford within my available 
financial resources. I therefore obtained the financial data and the stock market data for 
the period from 2010 to 2014 because of the need to calculate the growth rates as well as 
the need to lag the CSR independent variables. The selected period of study of only 5 
years is too short to permit unrestricted generalization of the study findings. 
 Fourth, the secondary data used for this study constitutes a limitation. Secondary 
data are data that were collected for a different purpose. Using such a data for other 
purposes is fraught with risk. Trustworthiness issue would also arise, because of the 
collection and processing errors that could have inadvertently been made by the people 
involved in those processes. Deliberate manipulation of the data, particularly the financial 




The financial data of the banks were extracted from the regulatory returns filed by those 
banks. There is tendency that those financial data might have been tainted by 
management in order to suppress a problem or to window dress their accounts for selfish 
reasons. The combined effects of these data errors and deliberate data compromise by the 
personnel of the banks constitute integrity issue that reduces the trustworthiness of the 
data and of any research study that utilizes such data. 
 Fifth, the limited number of variables I used in this study is also a source of 
limitations of the study. Generally, MSCI KLD provides social ratings data for over 
3,000 large and listed US companies. The ratings were available in two categories, 
comprising qualitative screen (community, governance, diversity, employee relation, 
product, environment, and human right) and exclusionary screen (alcohol, tobacco, 
firearms, nuclear power, gambling, and military). While collecting data on the CSR 
scores, I discovered that ratings were not available for environment, human rights and all 
the factors under the exclusionary screen for the rated banks. I therefore excluded these 
variables from the study. If data were to be available for these excluded variables and the 
variables had been included in the study models, I might have obtained different and, 
possibly, more accurate results. The exclusion of these independent variables from the 
study is therefore a limitation of the study. 
 Sixth, another major limitation to this study relates to the construct validity for 
both dependent and independent variables. Construct validity refers to the extent to which 
a given measure approximates the theoretical construct being measured. Essentially, 




essentially contested concept, with meanings varying with people and with contexts 
(Saeidi et al. 2014). The definitional lacuna that characterizes the CSR literature 
constitutes a limitation to this study. In this study, I conceptualized the CSR from the 
perspective of the MSCI, with the implication that it may be meaningless to compare the 
study with other studies that conceptualized CSR from a different perspective. The 
operationalization of the dependent variables and control variables is also subject to 
construct validity issues. I operationalized accounting returns as EBITDA margin and 
MTB. Alternative operationalization of the accounting returns exist in the empirical 
literature such as return on asset (Saeidi, et al. 2015), return on equity (Servaes & 
Tamayo, 2013), earnings per share (Becchetti, et al. 2011), and Tobin’s q (Moura-Leite, 
et al. 2014). Using any or a combination of these alternatives could produce a different 
result. In the control variables, operationalization issues also arise. Size was 
operationalized as total assets, but some researchers had used turnover, or market 
capitalization. Therefore the construct validity issues may not permit a free generalization 
of the study or a perfect comparison with other studies. 
 Finally, the adopted design and methodology of the study might potentially 
constrain the validity of the conclusion and thus limit the extent to which the findings 
may be generalized or replicated. Quantitative design was adopted to examine the effect 
of the CSR factors on the financial performance of the hypothesized banks in the United 
States. Generally, quantitative strategy of inquiry has its inherent limitations. It seeks to 
explain phenomenon from the patterns contained in the numerical data, usually to 




conclusions merely from the analysis of numerical data to explain social interaction is 
fraught with risk, without attempting to obtain the lived experience of the stakeholders on 
the social phenomenon. The nature of Research Question 2 is such that the shareholders 
expressed their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the managerial activities on 
social issues, through the amounts of returns on the shares which were used to determine 
the cost of capital. Therefore, a mixed method strategy of inquiry, which involves the 
integrated use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, may better explain the 
stakeholders’ valuation of the managerial involvement in the provision of social goods. 
Because mixed method approach was not adopted in this study, it becomes difficult to 
accurately interpret the observed unusual positive effect of the CSR factors on the cost of 
capital revealed by the results of the analysis of the Research Question 2. The finding 
could only be justified by inferences in the theoretical literature; it lacks direct support in 
the empirical literature, as empirical literature rarely recorded positive effect of CSR 
factors on the cost of capital.  
Recommendations for Action 
 Based on the interpretations of the findings of this research, I hereby offer a 
number of recommendations as a call for action by different groups: the stockholders or 
investors, the boards of directors which play oversight roles on the management of the 
banks, the management of the banks themselves, the banking regulators, and the public 




various stakeholders from the engagement of firm management in the provision of public 
goods. 
Recommendations for Shareholders 
 The findings of this study revealed that social conduct did not yield significant 
effect on the financial returns of the hypothesized companies, and the investors reacted 
by demanding a premium for the higher risk associated with the engagement of the 
businesses in the supposed unfruitful social activities. This therefore calls for increased 
shareholders’ understanding of the managerial actions. The investors would be better 
informed of the actions taken by the corporation managers only if they were involved in 
the corporations’ activities. Corporate governance requires that ownership responsibilities 
are attached to stockholding (OECD, 2008). This research therefore reinforced the 
international call for shareholders to be actively involved in the activities of the 
companies in which they invested so as to discharge their mandatory ownership 
responsibilities. Perhaps, if the shareholders had been better informed of the rationale for 
the social activities of their corporations, the premium taken for the social conduct would 
have been unnecessary, and the observed positive effect of social conduct on the cost of 
capital could have been reversed in alignment with the common pattern in the empirical 
literature. 
Recommendations for Board of Directors 
 The dominant outcome of the empirical studies on the effect of social conduct on 




pattern has been attributed to the presence of managerial opportunism, where managers 
were deemed to be seeking private benefits from the increased social activities (Jiao, 
2010). In this study, particularly in the analysis of the Research Question 1, I did not find 
evidence of the positive effect of social conduct on the financial performance of the 
hypothesized banks. The suggestion of the possibility of the presence of managerial 
opportunism calls for increased oversight of the board of directors on the activities of the 
management. Greater scrutiny of managerial actions would help to reduce the room for 
managerial opportunism that could motivate managers to engage in unfruitful social 
activities. Increased oversight would also help to ensure greater transparency particularly 
in the corporations’ social investments. This would help the shareholders to take 
informed decisions on stock related transactions.  
The observed influence of CSR on financial performance under the two research 
questions were attributed to governance factor. Governance factor was also positively 
correlated with the accounting returns and the cost of capital. This lends credence to the 
fact that the corporate governance of the hypothesized banks required considerable 
attention of the board. It is therefore recommended that the boards of directors pay due 
attention to corporate governance of the firms. MSCI corporate governance factors 
include such matters as the level of compensation for directors and the ownership related 
issues. 
 By virtue of the position of the directors as the link between the investors and the 
management, I also call on the boards of directors to leverage on their vantage position to 




share ownership responsibilities under the international corporate governance rule 
(OECD, 2008). This would help to ensure that the investors are well informed of the 
rationale for corporate activities such as social investments and would also help to 
minimize the bias or noise associated with the stock price movements. By so doing, it 
would be possible for the stock prices to respond appropriately to the economic 
fundamentals that have potential to affect the future performance of the stocks. 
Recommendations for Management 
 The calls for management are threefold: (1) a need to ensure transparency of the 
managerial process; (2) a need to ensure full disclosure of relevant information to all 
stakeholders including the investing community; and (3) a need to strategically 
discriminate among the social activities as they are differently associated with financial 
performance. First, I recommend that corporation managers in banks manage the banks in 
a transparent manner. The fact that the investors demanded premiums for increased social 
activities connotes that they perceived the presence of managerial opportunism, which 
could have been possible because they did not perceive transparency of the managerial 
actions. Second, the fact that investors might not have appropriately valued the social 
programs of the hypothesized banks is indicative of the fact that the investing community 
lacked adequate information on the corporate social activities. Full disclosure of all 
relevant information would help to reduce the impact of the information asymmetry 




 The five hypothesized measures of corporate social responsibility behaved 
differently with respect to the financial performance measures. This suggests a strategic 
manipulation of each factor in order to obtain optimal desired impact on the bottom line. 
Diversity and employee relation were positively correlated with accounting returns and 
negatively correlated with the cost of capital, implying positive relationship with 
financial performance. This relationship suggests that it would be beneficial to intensify 
investment in the social activities relating to diversity and employee relations.  Corporate 
managers should therefore ensure increasing diversity in the senior management and 
board appointment or promotion, provision of family benefits, adequate 
representativeness of the women and other minority groups including minority 
contracting, employment of disabled, and the progressive gay in the workforce. These 
measures would improve diversity with potential improvement in the financial 
performance. Managers should also intensify the improvement of the employee relations 
through positive relation with the workers union, setting of rules governing layoff and 
workforce reduction, increasing cash profit sharing, encouraging workers involvement, 
providing appreciable retirement benefits to employees, and paying increasing attention 
to health and safety of the work environment. These measures should help to positively 
induce financial performance. 
 The community and product social factors were found to be negatively correlated 
with the financial performance. Because the negative correlation of these factors with 
financial performance suggests that they are capable of destroying value, it is 




Recommendations for Banking Industry Regulators 
 Banking is a highly regulated industry. The result of this research showed that 
regulators equally need to play their due oversight roles on the banks to ensure proper 
management and strong corporate governance of the institutions. The insinuated presence 
of managerial opportunism and the increased cost of capital associated with the 
hypothesized CSR factors suggest evidence of weak governance in the hypothesized 
banks. If the regulators could intensify oversight on the banks, the observed weakness in 
governance would be corrected, and investor confidence would be increased. 
Recommendations for Public Policy 
 Ordinarily, corporate social responsibility of business firms is good for the society 
since it improves the wellbeing of the stakeholders. However, to depend on the business 
sector to champion the supply of these public goods might not guarantee adequate supply 
because there is tendency that the business sector would selectively embark on the 
aspects of the CSR that had potential to improve their bottom line. For instance, banks 
are not likely to intensify efforts in improving their social conduct in the areas of 
community and product since these were found to be negatively correlated with the 
bottom line. Griffin and Prakash (2014) have earlier contended that business sector and 
government must effectively participate in CSR if social conduct is to be sustainable. 
Government therefore needs to encourage the business sector to support the provision of 
public goods. Like Cajias et al. (2014), who called for enactment and enforcement of 




high sense of social conduct, I hereby call on the government to provide tax incentives 
and other stimulating measures to the private sector to encourage them to improve their 
CSR activities, particularly with respect to those that are negatively associated with 
business financial performance. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 As noted in the chapter 2 literature review, research studies on CSR and financial 
performance that focused on the US banking sector are rare. This was one of the gaps that 
led to this study. Many earlier studies examined the impact of CSR factors on the 
financial performance of multiple industries, making it difficult to address the 
peculiarities of each industry or each stakeholder group. The results of the current study 
are unique to the banking industry. It was found that CSR factors had no significant effect 
on the financial performance of the banks and that the shareholders penalized the banks 
for this in the form of higher cost of capital. However, before final position can be taken 
on these findings, further research is recommended to expand the scope of the study. The 
period of 5 years covered in this study is hardly enough to reach a robust conclusion. 
Apart from expanding the scope of the research, other future researchers might extend the 
study by performing qualitative research to explore the exact meanings the investors 
attach to the business CSR activities. This would provide opportunity to triangulate the 
research with potential to yield a more reliable and more complete finding. Finally, future 




multidimensional ratings to measure the CSR as was done in this study or using some 
other forms of methodology to measure the independent variable. 
Implications for Social Change 
 Apart from contributing to the body of knowledge, this study also has potential to 
create positive social change for a number of stakeholders. Articulated below are the 
potential impacts for positive social change for the decision makers in the banking 
industry, the shareholders/investors, the banking industry regulators, and the academic 
community. 
Positive Social Change for Decision Makers in the Banks 
 This study has demonstrated that decision makers in banks need to discriminate 
among the various CSR factors because they impact on the financial performance 
measures in different ways. The study showed that among the hypothesized CSR factors 
only diversity and employee relations are positively related to the financial performance. 
This information would guide corporate and business strategy by ensuring that 
investment in diversity and employee relations would ultimately help to build and sustain 
competitive advantage with improved bottom line. Also as part of corporate strategy, 
decision makers are now better informed of the effect that investment in community and 
product related social performance could possibly have on the ability to compete better 
and make more profit. These factors were found to be negatively related to financial 




ensure that investment in such factors is appropriately restricted to improve overall 
financial performance.  
 Secondly, the decision makers including the boards of directors are now better 
informed that investors could misinterpret well intentioned corporate actions, like 
investment in social activities that could help to foster relationship with the stakeholders 
and improve the overall business performance. When such happens, irrational investment 
decisions distorted by bias and information asymmetry could lead to increase in the cost 
of raising finance by the company as observed in this study. This could happen if the 
shareholders were not adequately carried along, and were not clear about the rationale for 
embarking on such social activities. I have recommended that the shareholders be well 
informed of the corporate strategy relating to social responsibility and that the investors 
be encouraged to participate in corporate activities, particularly those relating to the 
engagement in CSR. 
 The decision makers in the banks including directors were also informed of the 
significant influence of corporate governance on the financial performance and the 
possible reaction of the shareholders to the intensity of this social factor in the overall 
conduct of the business. The result of the analysis of the research questions showed that 
corporate governance accounted for the observed effect of the CSR factors on financial 
performance. The fact that the shareholders perceived this positive influence on financial 
performance as a risk is a wakeup call for the banks’ decision makers, particularly those 
with oversight responsibilities, to increase the level of their scrutiny of governance 




Positive Social Change for Banking Regulators and Government 
 The results of this study showed that the Jiao’s (2010) contention that engagement 
in corporate social responsibility could signify the presence of managerial opportunism 
holds true in the banking industry. Even though the analysis of the research questions 
showed some effect of corporate social responsibility on the financial performance, the 
shareholders perceived the social activities as an avenue for managerial opportunism with 
the implication of increased cost of capital. The social change implication is that the 
regulators are now aware of the need to increase their scrutiny of the CSR activities of the 
banks to check abuse such as managerial opportunism. Government policy makers are 
also now aware of the need to implement measures such as taxation to encourage the 
business sector to undertake social activities that can help to improve the overall 
wellbeing of the citizenry. Such social activities are those to which banks ordinarily 
would not commit significant resources such as community and product factors because 
of their negative relationship with the financial performance measures. 
Positive Social Change for the Academic Community  
 The outcome of this study helps to update the literature, not only because of the 
current data it provided, but also in terms of the gaps that were addressed. As stated in the 
chapter 1, researchers rarely examined the effects of the individual CSR factors on the 
financial performance, particularly the cost of capital in the banking sector of the United 
States. This study helped to bridge this gap, by providing insight into how the various 




employee relations, and product could possible affect the accounting returns and the cost 
of capital of the large banks in the United States. It was revealed that increased CSR 
activities in banks, particularly in the areas relating to community, governance, and 
product could lead to higher cost of raising finance, while increased CSR activities in the 
areas relating to diversity and employee relations could help to reduce cost of capital and 
they could also help to improve accounting returns simultaneously.  
Conclusion 
 In this study, I found mixed effects of corporate social conduct of banks on their 
financial performance. The results varied with the measures of the financial performance 
adopted, whether accounting returns or market determined cost of capital. For the 
accounting returns, no significant effect of the CSR was observed on the financial 
performance. This result supported the irrelevance theorem of the neoclassical economic 
theory by Friedman (1970) and a few empirical researchers who observed no significant 
effect (Grove, et al. 2011; Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Orlitzky, 2013; Soana, 
2011). With this result, there is a basis for the skepticism expressed by the world business 
leaders that it is inappropriate for the business sector to champion the corporate social 
responsibility because no clear link between the CSR and business value has been 
established (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013).  
 For the cost of capital as a measure of financial performance, a significant effect 
of CSR was observed on cost of capital, but in a direction that differed from the expected, 




activities should help to reduce cost of finance, but this study showed a positive effect of 
CSR activities on the Fama-French cost of capital. Because the Fama-French cost of 
capital used was market determined, the results implied that the shareholders perceived 
the intensified CSR activities as risky and therefore required additional premium for 
compensation, leading to higher cost of capital. Jiao (2010) had earlier attributed this risk 
to the possible presence of managerial opportunism. 
 The overall conclusion is that the controversy of whether social conduct of a 
business firm creates or destroys value is far from being resolved. The inconsistent results 
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Appendix A: Analysis of the Recent Studies on Impact of CSR on FP 




Industry Context Scope Relation-ship  
Found 
1 Adeyanju (2012) Sponsorship and Donations  Stakeholder Ratings of 
the banks 
Banking  Nigeria 2012 Positive 
2 Ganescu, M. C. (2012) 1) Business model, Organizational 
culture, and TQM  
 
2) Questionnaire 
CSPt Automative Europe 2010 Positive 
3 Jo & Harjoto (2011) KLD Aggregated CSR Rating Tobin’s q Multiple Multiple 1993-2004 Positive 
4 Tafti, Hosseini, & Emami 
(2012) 
Workplace policy, Environmental 
policy, Marketplace policy, 
Community Policy - Questionnaire 
Company value Banking Iran 2011 Positive 





2) EIRIS Aggregated CSR Rating 












bank profits – 
ROA, ROE, 








Excess returns Multiple, with 
control 
US 1992-2007 Positive 
7 Mustafa, Othman, & Perumal 
(2012) 
Questionnaire survey based on 
Carroll(1991) - ethics, legal, 
economic, & philanthropic. 
Company performance Multiple, no 
control 








Industry Context Scope Relation-ship  
Found 
8 Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hassan & 
Kobeissi (2012) 





9 Sun & Cui (2014) CSR, firm capability, environmental 
dynamism, & complexity. 
 
Fortune Magazine’s AMAC 




Default risk Multiple, 
303firms 
US 2008-2010 Positive – 
higher CSR 
lower risk 




US 1991-2005 Positive 
11 Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & 
Mishra (2011) 
KLD CSR Aggregated ratings Cost of equity Multiple with 
control 
US 1992-2007 Positive 
12 Weshah, Dahiyat, Awwad & 
Hajjat (2012) 
Donation/Interest Revenue 
Firm Size =Total Assets 
Risk =  Total Liab/TA 
Advert Intensity = 
AdvertExpnd/Interest Revenue 
ROA (Net income 
before tax/Total Asset 
Value 
Banking Jordan 2011 Positive 
13 Goss & Roberts (2011) KLD Aggregated CSR  Cost of bank loans of 
firms (i.e. loan 
spreads)  
Multiple US 1991-2006 Positive 
14 Nandy & Lodh (2012) KLD Composite CSR Ratings for US 
firms (composite score) 
Loan contract term - 








US 1991-2006 Positive 
15 Torres, Bijmolt, Tribo & 
Verhoef (2012) 
Sustainalytics Global Profile (SGP) 
database (formerly SiRi Pro)  
Aggregated but weighted average 
scores of the ratings. 
Brand Equity  Multiple 
industries with 
control 








Industry Context Scope Relation-ship  
Found 
16 Chen & Wang (2011) Questionnaire Survey ROA, ROS, Growth 




China 2007-2008 Positive 
17 Hajiha & Sarfaraz (2013) KLD Aggregated CSR Index 
 
Control variable: size, BTM, 
Leverage, Beta 




2008 – 2012 Positive 
18 Gregory, Tharyan, & Whittaker, 
(2014) 
KLD Aggregated CSR Index  
 
Control Variable: 
Size, capital expenditure. 
Firm value and 
profitability, Cash 




US 1992-2009 Positive 
19 Rahmawati & Dianita (2011) Content analysis of disclosure ROA Multiple no 
control 
Indonesia 2006-2008 Negative 
20 Lioui & Sharma (2012) KLD CSR Environmental Rating ROA & Tobin's q Multiple with 
control 
US 1993-2007 Negative 
21 Soana (2011) AEI aggregate CSR ratings ROA, ROE, CIR, Mkt 
to book ratio, price to 
book value & P/E 
Ratio adjusted 
Banking Italy 2005 Neutral 
22 Moura-Leite, Padgett, & Galan 
(2014) 
KLD Aggregated CSR Ratings 
 
Control variables: 
Size, risk, advertising intensity 
ROA and Tobin’s q Multiple with 
control, 809 
firms 
US 2003-2007 Positive 
23 Parsa, Lord, Putrevu & Kreeger 
(2015) 
Demographics, involvement, attitudes, 






Willingness to pay Retail & 
Consumer 
services 
US 2014 Positive 
24 Cajias, Fuerst, Bienert (2014) KLD Aggregated CSR ratings 
 
Control variable: 
Market value, leverage, market to 
book, growth in returns. 
Cost of capital Multiple, with 
control, 
2300 listed firms 








Industry Context Scope Relation-ship  
Found 
25 Baird, Geylani & Roberts (2012) KLD Component CSR rating for each 
industry. 
Share value Multiple, no 
control 








26 Busch & Hoffmann (2011) Firm’s carbon intensity (Total GHG 
emissions (in tons) and a firm’s sales 
(in US$)).  
 
CSR Questionnaires focused on 
carbon performance  
 
Sustainability ratings by Sustainable 
Asset Management (Swiss-based) 





Multiple 2007 Mixed 
 
Results depend 
on how carbon 
emission is 
used. 















across the four 
industries. 
28 Wang, Wu & Sun (2015) On-time performance, accident rate, 
flight frequency, growth of employee 
revenue and employees revenue  
CSP Airline China 2007 -2012 Positive 
29 Becchetti, Ciciretti, & 
Giovannelli (2013) 
KLD CSR scores  
 
1) Absolute Forecast 
Error on EPS 
2) Standard Deviation 
of Absolute Forecast 
Error on EPS 
Multiple, no 
control 













Industry Context Scope Relation-ship  
Found 
30 Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, & 
Saeidi, (2015) 
CSR comprising ethical, economic, 
discretionary, & legal 
 
Control variable: 
Firm size, age, and sales revenue 
 
Questionnaire was used due to 
limitation of KLD. 
ROE, ROA, ROS, 











Appendix B: List of Sampled Banks 
S/n Ticker Industry Name 
1 BOKF Credit Services BOK Financial Corp ET AL 
2 CBF Credit Services Capital Bank Financial Corp. 
3 COF Credit Services Capital One Financial Corp 
4 CSH Credit Services Cash America International Inc 
5 FCF Credit Services First Commonwealth Financial Corp 
6 FCFS Credit Services First Cash Financial Services Inc 
7 MBTF Credit Services MBT Financial Corp 
8 MGI Credit Services MoneyGram International Inc 
9 NPBC Credit Services National Penn Bancshares Inc 
10 EWBC Foreign Money Center Banks East West Bancorp Inc 
11 FBNC Foreign Regional Banks First Bancorp 
12 FBP Foreign Regional Banks First Bancorp 
13 ABCW Money Center Banks Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc 
14 BAC Money Center Banks Bank Of America Corp 
15 CBU Money Center Banks Community Bank System, Inc. 
16 HOMB Money Center Banks Home Bancshares Inc 
17 OFG Money Center Banks OFG Bancorp 
18 ABCB Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks Ameris Bancorp 
19 CCBG Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks Capital City Bank Group Inc 
20 CFNL Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks Cardinal Financial Corp 
21 FCNCA Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks First Citizens Bancshares Inc 
22 FNFG Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks First Niagara Financial Group Inc 
23 CBSH Regional - Midwest Banks Commerce Bancshares Inc 
24 CHFC Regional - Midwest Banks Chemical Financial Corp 
25 FFBC Regional - Midwest Banks First Financial Bancorp 
26 FITB Regional - Midwest Banks Fifth Third Bancorp 
27 FMBI Regional - Midwest Banks First Midwest Bancorp Inc 
28 HBAN Regional - Midwest Banks Huntington Bancshares Inc 
29 LKFN Regional - Midwest Banks Lakeland Financial Corp 
30 MBFI Regional - Midwest Banks MB Financial Inc 
31 MBWM Regional - Midwest Banks Mercantile Bank Corp 
32 MCBC Regional - Midwest Banks Macatawa Bank Corp 
33 MSFG Regional - Midwest Banks Mainsource Financial Group 
34 ONB Regional - Midwest Banks Old National Bancorp 
35 OSBC Regional - Midwest Banks Old Second Bancorp Inc 
36 AROW Regional - Northeast Banks Arrow Financial Corp 




38 LBAI Regional - Northeast Banks Lakeland Bancorp Inc 
39 MTB Regional - Northeast Banks M&T Bank Corp 
40 NBTB Regional - Northeast Banks NBT Bancorp Inc 
41 BOH Regional - Pacific Banks Bank Of Hawaii Corp 
42 BSRR Regional - Pacific Banks Sierra Bancorp 
43 CACB Regional - Pacific Banks Cascade Bancorp 
44 CATY Regional - Pacific Banks Cathay General Bancorp 
45 CPF Regional - Pacific Banks Central Pacific Financial Corp 
46 CVBF Regional - Pacific Banks CVB Financial Corp 
47 GBCI Regional - Pacific Banks Glacier Bancorp Inc 
48 HAFC Regional - Pacific Banks Hanmi Financial Corp 
49 BXS Regional - Southeast Banks Bancorpsouth Inc 
50 CSFL Regional - Southeast Banks CenterState Banks, Inc. 
51 CTBI Regional - Southeast Banks Community Trust Bancorp Inc 
52 FFKT Regional - Southeast Banks Farmers Capital Bank Corp 
53 IBKC Regional - Southeast Banks Iberiabank Corp 
54 BANF Regional - Southwest  Banks Bancfirst Corp 
55 CFR Regional - Southwest  Banks Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 
56 FFIN Regional - Southwest  Banks First Financial Bankshares Inc 
57 GSBC Regional - Southwest  Banks Great Southern Bancorp Inc 
58 HTLF Regional - Southwest  Banks Heartland Financial USA Inc 
59 IBOC Regional - Southwest  Banks International Bancshares Corp 
60 OKSB Regional - Southwest  Banks Southwest Bancorp Inc 
61 AF Savings & Loans Astoria Financial Corp 
62 BFIN Savings & Loans Bank Financial CORP 
63 BHLB Savings & Loans Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc 
64 BKMU Savings & Loans Bank Mutual Corp 
65 BRKL Savings & Loans Brookline Bancorp Inc 
66 CFFN Savings & Loans Capitol Federal Financial Inc 
67 DCOM Savings & Loans Dime Community Bancshares Inc 
68 FBC Savings & Loans Flagstar Bancorp Inc 
69 FFIC Savings & Loans Flushing Financial Corp 
70 KRNY Savings & Loans Kearny Financial Corp. 
71 OCFC Savings & Loans Oceanfirst Financial Corp 
Appendix C: Fama-French three-Factor Model Cost of Capital 
Name Beta  Rim Rf Rs Rv Cost of 
Capital 
Ameris Bancorp 0.8235 0.0561 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.83% 




Astoria Financial Corp 0.4625 0.0315 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.37% 
Arrow Financial Corp 0.5763 0.0392 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.14% 
Bank of America Corp 0.8988 0.0612 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.34% 
Bancfirst Corp 0.3145 0.0214 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 7.36% 
BankFinancial CORP 0.3796 0.0258 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 7.80% 
Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc 0.5992 0.0408 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.30% 
Bank Mutual Corp 0.5023 0.0342 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.64% 
Bank Of Hawaii Corp 0.9479 0.0645 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.67% 
Bok Financial Corp ET AL 0.5959 0.0406 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.28% 
Brookline Bancorp Inc 0.9849 0.0671 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.93% 
Sierra Bancorp 0.6954 0.0474 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.95% 
Bancorpsouth Inc 1.1407 0.0777 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.99% 
Cascade Bancorp 0.0698 0.0048 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 5.69% 
Cathay General Bancorp 1.0601 0.0722 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.44% 
Capital Bank Financial Corp. 0.2155 0.0147 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 6.69% 
Commerce Bancshares Inc 0.6840 0.0466 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.88% 
Community Bank System, Inc. 0.9619 0.0655 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.77% 
Capital City Bank Group Inc 0.4407 0.0300 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.22% 
Capitol Federal Financial Inc 0.4413 0.0301 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.22% 
Cardinal Financial Corp 0.6964 0.0474 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.96% 
Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 0.9341 0.0636 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.58% 
Chemical Financial Corp 0.8909 0.0607 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.29% 
Capital One Financial Corp 1.1309 0.0770 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.92% 
Central Pacific Financial Corp 1.1200 0.0763 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.85% 
CenterState Banks, Inc. 0.2959 0.0202 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 7.23% 
Cash America International Inc 1.0075 0.0686 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.08% 
Community Trust Bancorp Inc 0.5940 0.0404 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.26% 
CVB Financial Corp 1.2388 0.0844 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 13.65% 
Dime Community Bancshares Inc 0.6444 0.0439 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.61% 
East West Bancorp Inc 1.2177 0.0829 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 13.51% 
Flagstar Bancorp Inc 0.6590 0.0449 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.71% 
First Bancorp 1.0624 0.0723 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.45% 
First Bancorp 1.8827 0.1282 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 18.04% 
First Commonwealth Financial Corp 0.8157 0.0555 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.77% 
First Cash Financial Services Inc 0.9025 0.0615 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.36% 
First Citizens Bancshares Inc 1.1109 0.0756 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.78% 
First Financial Bancorp 0.8529 0.0581 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.03% 
Flushing Financial Corp 0.9169 0.0624 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.46% 
First Financial Bankshares Inc 1.0712 0.0729 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.51% 




Fifth Third Bancorp 0.9850 0.0671 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.93% 
First Midwest Bancorp Inc 0.9620 0.0655 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.77% 
First Niagara Financial Group Inc 0.7574 0.0516 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.38% 
Fulton Financial Corp 1.1722 0.0798 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 13.20% 
Glacier Bancorp Inc 1.2867 0.0876 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 13.98% 
Great Southern Bancorp Inc 0.8746 0.0596 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.17% 
Hanmi Financial Corp 0.3301 0.0225 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 7.47% 
Huntington Bancshares Inc 0.9441 0.0643 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.65% 
Home Bancshares Inc 1.1073 0.0754 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.76% 
Heartland Financial Usa Inc 0.4085 0.0278 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.00% 
Iberiabank Corp 1.1090 0.0755 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.77% 
International Bancshares Corp 1.2975 0.0884 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 14.05% 
Kearny Financial Corp. 0.5347 0.0364 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.86% 
Lakeland Bancorp Inc 0.6125 0.0417 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.39% 
Lakeland Financial Corp 0.6176 0.0421 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.42% 
MB Financial Inc 1.0761 0.0733 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 12.55% 
MBT Financial Corp 0.3996 0.0272 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 7.94% 
Mercantile Bank Corp 0.4717 0.0321 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.43% 
Macatawa Bank Corp 1.3435 0.0915 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 14.37% 
Moneygram International Inc 1.5422 0.1050 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 15.72% 
Mainsource Financial Group 0.8392 0.0571 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.93% 
M&T Bank Corp 0.5974 0.0407 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 9.29% 
NBT Bancorp Inc 0.7537 0.0513 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.35% 
National Penn Bancshares Inc 0.5507 0.0375 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 8.97% 
Oceanfirst Financial Corp 0.3546 0.0241 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 7.63% 
OFG Bancorp 0.9355 0.0637 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 11.59% 
Southwest Bancorp Inc 0.8399 0.0572 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.94% 
Old National Bancorp 0.8181 0.0557 0.0221 0.0024 0.0277 10.79% 





Appendix D: CSR Scores of Sampled Banks 
S/n Ticker Bank Name CSR Factor Scores 
Community Governance Diversity Employee  
Relation 
Product Aggregate 
1 ABCB Ameris Bancorp 4 6 4 5 5 24 
2 ABCW Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc 4 6 5 5 5 25 
3 AF Astoria Financial Corp 4 6 5 5 4 24 
4 AROW Arrow Financial Corp 6 4 4 4 5 23 
5 BAC Bank of America Corp 4 6 4 5 5 24 
6 BANF Bancfirst Corp 5 5 6 4 5 25 
7 BFIN BankFinancial CORP 5 6 4 5 5 25 
8 BHLB Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc 7 3 7 5 2 24 
9 BKMU Bank Mutual Corp 6 5 8 6 5 30 
10 BOH Bank of Hawaii Corp 5 6 6 5 5 27 
11 BOKF BOK Financial Corp ET AL 5 6 5 5 5 26 
12 BRKL Brookline Bancorp Inc 5 6 5 4 5 25 
13 BSRR Sierra Bancorp 6 6 4 5 5 26 
14 BXS Bancorpsouth Inc 6 4 5 4 5 24 
15 CACB Cascade Bancorp 6 3 7 6 5 27 
16 CATY Cathay General Bancorp 4 6 5 4 5 24 
17 CBF Capital Bank Financial Corp. 5 6 5 5 5 26 
18 CBSH Commerce Bancshares Inc 5 5 6 5 5 26 
19 CBU Community Bank System, Inc. 4 6 4 5 5 24 
20 CCBG Capital City Bank Group Inc 6 5 7 5 5 28 
21 CFFN Capitol Federal Financial Inc 5 5 5 5 5 25 




23 CFR Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 6 5 4 5 5 25 
24 CHFC Chemical Financial Corp 5 6 6 5 5 27 
25 COF Capital One Financial Corp 4 6 5 5 5 25 
26 CPF Central Pacific Financial Corp 6 5 5 5 5 26 
27 CSFL CenterState Banks, Inc. 5 6 6 5 5 27 
28 CSH Cash America International Inc 4 6 5 5 5 25 
29 CTBI Community Trust Bancorp Inc 6 5 4 5 5 25 
30 CVBF CVB Financial Corp 6 5 4 5 5 25 
31 DCOM Dime Community Bancshares Inc 6 4 8 5 5 28 
32 EWBC East West Bancorp Inc 5 6 5 5 5 26 
33 FBC Flagstar Bancorp Inc 5 5 5 5 5 25 
34 FBNC First Bancorp 5 6 6 4 5 26 
35 FBP First Bancorp 5 5 5 4 5 24 
36 FCF First Commonwealth Financial Corp 5 6 5 4 4 24 
37 FCFS First Cash Financial Services Inc 6 6 5 5 5 27 
38 FCNCA First Citizens Bancshares Inc 5 6 5 5 5 26 
39 FFBC First Financial Bancorp 5 4 5 4 5 23 
40 FFIC Flushing Financial Corp 4 6 4 5 5 24 
41 FFIN First Financial Bankshares Inc 6 5 4 4 5 24 
42 FFKT Farmers Capital Bank Corp 4 6 5 4 5 24 
43 FITB Fifth Third Bancorp 4 5 6 5 5 25 
44 FMBI First Midwest Bancorp Inc 6 4 6 5 5 26 
45 FNFG First Niagara Financial Group Inc 5 6 5 4 5 25 
46 FULT Fulton Financial Corp 6 6 4 6 5 27 
47 GBCI Glacier Bancorp Inc 6 6 5 5 5 27 




49 HAFC Hanmi Financial Corp 8 6 4 5 5 28 
50 HBAN Huntington Bancshares Inc 5 5 4 5 5 24 
51 HOMB Home Bancshares Inc 4 5 7 5 5 26 
52 HTLF Heartland Financial USA Inc 4 5 6 4 5 24 
53 IBKC Iberiabank Corp 5 6 8 4 5 28 
54 IBOC International Bancshares Corp 5 6 4 5 5 25 
55 KRNY Kearny Financial Corp. 6 5 5 5 5 26 
56 LBAI Lakeland Bancorp Inc 4 6 5 5 5 25 
57 LKFN Lakeland Financial Corp 5 6 6 4 5 26 
58 MBFI MB Financial Inc 5 6 4 5 5 25 
59 MBTF MBT Financial Corp 4 6 4 5 5 24 
60 MBWM Mercantile Bank Corp 5 6 6 5 5 27 
61 MCBC Macatawa Bank Corp 6 6 5 5 5 27 
62 MGI MoneyGram International Inc 5 6 5 5 5 26 
63 MSFG Mainsource Financial Group 5 5 6 4 5 25 
64 MTB M&T Bank Corp 5 6 6 5 5 27 
65 NBTB NBT Bancorp Inc 5 5 5 5 5 25 
66 NPBC National Penn Bancshares Inc 4 5 5 5 5 24 
67 OCFC Oceanfirst Financial Corp 5 5 5 4 5 24 
68 OFG OFG Bancorp 5 5 5 4 5 24 
69 OKSB Southwest Bancorp Inc 4 5 7 5 5 26 
70 ONB Old National Bancorp 5 6 4 5 5 25 
71 OSBC Old Second Bancorp Inc 4 6 5 6 5 26 
  Total Score 361 386 370 341 350 1808 
 
